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FROM THE EDITORS
As the Navy continues to grapple with its priorities and overall direction in the
context of its ongoing work on a newMaritime Strategy, it is worthwhile taking a
fresh look at the complex of issues connected with what is perhaps best referred
to as “disorder at sea.”Themost potentially threatening form of disorder at sea is
maritime terrorism, including not only terrorist attacks on shipping but the use
of the maritime domain to transport terrorists or weapons or to mount attacks
from the sea against coastal targets. However, there is a range of other activities
that fall into this category as well, from illegal fishing to the smuggling of goods
and people to piracy. The strategic environment that has confronted us follow-
ing the events of 9/11 has caused a bright light to play on this shadowy world,
and many improvements have been made in the ability of the United States and
the larger global community of seafaring nations to monitor and counter such
activities. For understandable reasons, many continue to sound alarms about
the severity of the threat and the adequacy of the response. Nevertheless, at a
time when many demands are being levied on American military forces and re-
sources, it is important not to overstate the problem. Two contributors to this is-
sue provide useful perspective for understanding the problem of disorder at sea
and evaluating the American response to it.Martin Murphy and Richard Farrell
are in broad agreement that elements of the threat—particularly piracy and the
use of LNG tankers as weapons of mass destruction—have too often been
grossly exaggerated. But Murphy also makes a compelling case for a renewed
commitment to naval presence andmaritime security cooperation as indispens-
able components of an increasingly fragile global maritime order.
ASIA EYES AMERICA
Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the
Twenty-first Century, edited by Jonathan D. Pollack, is in preparation for release
in late summer 2007. This third book in our Policy Studies Series extends the
East Asia focus of the first two volumes, Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations
in the Early Twenty-first Century and Korea: The East Asian Pivot, also edited by
Dr. Pollack. A highly distinguished assemblage of international scholars and
analysts presented these papers at the NavalWar College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of
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4–5 May 2006. They examine a contemporary Asia marked by increased compe-
tence, confidence, and resilience, and in which the U.S. role is a major variable.
This book is a groundbreaking contribution to the study of the contemporary
Asia-Pacific and to the wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy
and policy. The book will be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office,
through its online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/.
TO OUR INTERNATIONAL READERS
Sharp increases in the cost of international mailing oblige us to consider less ex-
pensive ways of serving our international readers. Our present plan is, beginning
with the Winter 2008 issue, to mail the Review outside the United States in print
form only to institutional subscribers (libraries, etc.), supplying it to individual
readers, whether subscribers or requesters, on CD-ROM. Exceptions will be
considered: individual subscribers who cannot, for whatever reason, read the
journal in CD format are invited to contact the Press editorial office. The same
policy will apply to our Newport Paper monographs, beginning with the next
Paper, number 29, expected this fall. Readers within the United States are not af-
fected in either case.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AWARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL WRITING
Among the winners of nineteen prizes for course papers written during the Naval
War College’s recently completed 2006–2007 academic year were two that became
the bases for articles in the Naval War College Review: “Merchant Shipping in a
Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” by Lieutenant Michael C. Grubb, USN, winning the
Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize and appearing in our Winter 2007 is-
sue; and “Dragon with a Heart of Peacefulness? China and United Nations Peace-
keeping in Africa,” by Lieutenant Colonel Philippe D. Rogers, USMC, winning the
Jerome E. Levy Economic Geography and World Order Prize and published as
“China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa” in our Spring
2007 issue.
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SAILING TO A NEW PORT
Commencement address delivered at the Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island, on 15 June 2007, by Admiral James G. Stavridis
When Admiral Shuford asked me to make a trip to Newport, it broughtback wonderful memories of my time here as a junior officer, with Lieu-
tenant Jake Shuford. I can’t say much more about that, mostly on advice of coun-
sel, but suffice to say it was a wonderful time and involved jazz festivals, a lot of
time on the tennis court, sailing, and an occasional cold beer.
It’s wonderful and inspiring to see what a joint, interagency, and international
event this is today. I do want to begin with a story which illustrates a bit about
each of the services.
One day, three colonels were hiking together and unexpectedly came upon a
wide, raging, violent river. They needed to get to the other side but had no idea
how to do so. The Air Force colonel called out to God, praying, “Please God, give
me the strength to cross this river.” Poof! God gave him big arms and strong legs,
and he was able to swim across. It did, however, take him more than an hour, and
he almost drowned a couple of times. Seeing this, the Army colonel prayed to
God saying, “Please God, give me the strength and tools to cross this river.” Poof!
God gave him a rowboat and oars. He was able to row across, but it still took al-
most an hour, it was very rough, and he almost capsized several times. The Ma-
rine colonel saw how things worked out for the other two, so when he prayed to
God, he said, “Please God, give me the strength, tools, and the intelligence to
cross this river.” Poof! God turned him into a Navy lieutenant—a Surface War-
fare Officer, actually. He looked at the map, hiked upstream a couple of hundred
yards, and walked across the bridge.
That’s a true story, in case you were wondering.
And lest our colonels in the audience get discouraged, let me tell you a true
story—this one really is true—about Alexander Haig’s promotion ceremony
from colonel to one-star general. When Haig got his first star, he was working in
the White House at the National Security Council staff as Henry Kissinger’s mil-
itary assistant. At a little ceremony in his White House office to pin on the star,
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Henry said that in his years as a professor in the national security field he had
met a lot of bright colonels—but not that many bright generals. Therefore, he
said, he planned to work Haig extra hard in the coming period “before the men-
tal deterioration set in.”
Since you can only imagine the mental deterioration that has set in in my case
with each subsequent promotion, I will try to be brief today.
Seriously, my intent is to take a few moments today and lay out an idea for our
graduates about how the future might look for the security of the United
States—essentially, how we might think about structuring ourselves. Much of
my thinking is shaped and reflected by the audience today and especially the
graduates—joint, interagency, and multinational. I hope to share with you a new
idea, and in that context it is interesting to think for a moment about the name
of this beautiful, small town on the Narragansett Bay. It is, of course, “Newport”—
quite literally a new port—founded in 1639 after the city fathers had a political
falling-out with the larger colonial community in Portsmouth. Newport offered
a fresh start. Over its storied history, this city used creativity and innovation to
maintain its relevance as a tolerant and forward-thinking enclave.
Of course, this Naval War College has so often been an incubator for new
ideas, new concepts, new innovations, dating back to its foundations and the
golden years of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Stephen B. Luce, and others. Indeed, dur-
ing my thirty years’ time in the Navy, the Naval War College has been at the cen-
ter of debates ranging over the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, of . . . From the
Sea in the 1990s, and now, as Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, seeks to write a new maritime component for the national military
strategy.
And so in this new port—in sight of the vibrant Naval War College, which has
been involved in new ideas for its entire life—I want to talk for a moment this
morning about how we need to change and grow in the way we approach na-
tional security broadly here in the United States.
This unfolding twenty-first century presents our entire national security
structure in general, and U.S. Southern Command in particular, with an unprec-
edented opportunity to define and shape new means and capabilities that will
achieve U.S. national security objectives in an era of transnational and uncon-
ventional threats. Let me explain.
We live in a dangerous age. Globally, international terrorism will be the prin-
cipal national security threat to the United States for the near future. Having said
that, it is clear that the risk of regional conventional conflicts, such as in Asia and
the Middle East, will persist. Clearly, the United States must maintain the capa-
bility to fight and win conventional wars, although they will probably not be the
defining conflicts of this age.
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Rather, it is the small, radical organization that holds the most significant
threat to U.S. national interests. Driven by unprecedented technological ad-
vancement, globalization will continue to simultaneously disenfranchise and
empower radical actors who will attempt to coerce representative governments
through terrorist tactics. Defeating terrorists is a significant challenge for the United
States, because our established national security tools—centered on military-
backed diplomacy—are less capable against this asymmetric threat. Of greatest con-
cern, of course, is the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining and using
weapons of mass destruction.
Preventing terrorism and defeating terrorists requires a multifaceted approach
that reduces terrorist resources and capabilities while simultaneously addressing
the underlying conditions of poverty, inequality, and corruption that create the
conditions that give rise to future terrorists. Currently, no single arm of the U.S.
federal government has the ability or authority to coordinate the multiple entities
required to execute an effective international antiterrorism campaign.
Frankly, this is not war as the U.S. military has historically envisioned it,
which leads to significant challenges in training, equipping, and organizing our
forces for a new sort of war. Perhaps most challenging, we in the Department of
Defense must expand our understanding of conflict beyond lethal means and
reenvision all our operations, including “peacetime” engagement and training
activities as part of a single strategic framework. These are the new fundamental
conditions of the twenty-first-century security environment:
• Attacks by radical organizations bent on religious or ideological domination
• Nation-states fighting in unconventional settings with unfamiliar tool sets
• The “war of ideas” at the root of conflicts, requiring sophisticated strategic
communication
• A globalizing economy with perceived winners and losers
• Rising environmental concerns, coupled to globalization
• Miniaturizing technologies producing powerful effects
• Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction—including biological and chemical
• “24/7” news coverage with satellite radio and television
• Satellite information and instant, global communication at everyone’s
fingertips
• Exploding Internet with bloggers, hackers, and chat rooms
• Cell-phone cameras and recorders, making everyone a “reporter”
• Sophisticated media engagement by transnational terrorists and organizations.
S T A V R I D I S 9
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A difficult set of conditions, to be sure. Accordingly, we must clearly under-
stand ourselves to be daily embroiled in a struggle of ideas wherein every activity
attributable to the United States communicates to some audience. Therefore, ex-
actly what we wish to communicate must be predetermined and guided through
a systematic, yet flexible and effective, process.
Perhaps nowhere in the unified command system does this new set of condi-
tions present itself more fully than in U.S. Southern Command. As a traditional
military jurisdiction, its area of responsibility is notable for its current lack of
conventional military threats; but the region’s persistent conditions of poverty,
inequality, and corruption provide fertile soil in which international criminals
and terrorists can flourish.
Throughout this area of responsibility—thirty-two countries, thirteen territo-
ries, five hundred million people, fifteen million square miles—security threats
most often take forms that we more readily associate with crime than war. In the
region’s growing gang activity, we see criminals and the disenfranchised banding
together and combining traditional criminal activities in ways that threaten U.S.
national security. Kidnapping, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and drug traf-
ficking—which leads to over ten thousand deaths annually in the United States—
combine with extremist ideologies to create a dangerous blend. All of these condi-
tions can undermine fragile democracies. Ecological issues are bubbling fast, es-
pecially in South America and the Caribbean. Radical ideologues are gaining sway
and putting real pressure on democratic norms in a variety of nations.
These new threats—while ultimately not susceptible to combat operations—
tend to operate at our intellectual seams and thrive in our bureaucratic and cul-
tural blind spots. Our system of legal, political, moral, and conceptual boundaries
defining what constitutes combat versus criminal activity, domestic versus inter-
national jurisdiction, and governmental versus private interests all provide opera-
tional space for lethal opponents with no such boundaries to respect.
Countering such threats and reacting to the informational realities will re-
quire new organizational structures not predicated on traditional notions of
war and peace. Our old model, wherein the State Department offers a “carrot” in
time of peace while the Defense Department threatens the “stick” in time of war,
provides solutions only when peace and war are readily distinguishable. Today
they are not so neatly divided. Given an environment of unceasing microconflict
and constant ideological communication, “carrot and stick” must work not
merely hand in hand but hand in glove—synchronized with a single purpose
and unity of effort, across national and tactical echelons—in ways previously
unseen in our country’s history.
Which brings me to U.S. Southern Command. We cannot expect clear transi-
tions between peace and war, and, thus, we need to explore a new standing
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organization chartered to operate within today’s dynamic and changing inter-
national environment.
The Combatant Commands of today appropriately seek to maintain a vital
regional perspective on security issues. However, enabling truly joint and inter-
agency activities may require additional modalities and authorities to provide
effective synchronization of various U.S. government agencies’ resources. We
need vastly better integration across the entire government of the United States
and better coalition integration.
We need to “test drive” a new model that truly evokes joint, interagency, and
international. U.S. Southern Command is well suited as a test case: it could easily
transition over a relatively short period to a more integrated posture that ex-
pands its strong interagency perspective and capacity.
Specifically, we need:
• More interagency integration: a true interagency team, with senior
representatives from each key agency and cabinet actually holding
command positions throughout the organizations. We need directorates
reflecting the missions of the command in the twenty-first century,
including stability, prosperity, security, and intelligence.
• State Department teaming: Of particular note, we need greater engagement
with the State Department throughout the enterprise. This should be
highlighted by sending a three-star-equivalent, post-ambassador deputy to
the command.
• Combined/international partnering: An expanded set of partnering
arrangements with all the nations and territories in the region, to include
more liaison officers, both military and civilian, from the region.
• Strategic communication focus: We are in a geopolitical marketplace of ideas, and
strategic communication thus becomes the “main battery” of U.S. Southern
Command—both in the sense of providing power like a battery and of sending
shots downrange, as in the “main battery of a ship.” At SOUTHCOM we aren’t
launching Tomahawk missiles—we’re launching ideas. Strategic communication
should therefore be a direct report to the commander and become the direct
responsibility of a two-star chief of staff. In the geopolitical marketplace of ideas
“down south,” we must increase our market share!
• Public/private linkages: So much of the power of the United States to create
successful partnerships in SOUTHCOM is found in the private sector. At the
command, we must find ways to work with nongovernmental organizations,
private charitable entities, international organizations, and the private sector.
We should look for ways to do this in appropriate staff nodes.
S T A V R I D I S 1 1
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• High-speed staff process: Using new methods of connection and a flattened
organization, linking the staff to move at requisite speed in the era of the
twenty-four-hour news cycle is also a prerequisite for success.
• Less in Miami, more forward: We must seek ways to place more staff
resources forward with embassies, and team with the State Department and
other agencies in the field.
• Culture of both war and peace: While remaining capable of combat
operations, we should recognize that the real thrust of twenty-first-century
national security in this region is not vested in war but in intelligent
management of the conditions of peace in a volatile era.
We are moving in this direction now, but there is much to be done. Taking this
new approach at SOUTHCOM would be a useful experiment in creating new
organizations to best meet twenty-first-century security challenges. It seems
clear that it is time to at least consider rethinking the fundamental structure and
approach of Southern Command and then intelligently seeking to leverage the
lessons learned for the future.
I want to close with some thoughts about how ideas are passed along from gen-
eration to generation.
Over a week of vacation last week, I had the chance to get to two books on my cur-
rent reading list—both novels. As an aside, I am an enormous believer in reading fic-
tion, which I think in many ways does a better job than nonfiction of capturing the
real ideas of culture, history, social justice, humor, compassion, and competition—all
of what makes up the fabric of our societies. I read two utterly different novels, but
they had something vital in common, and I want to close on that thought.
The first is by one of the sharpest observers of U.S. culture, Christopher
Buckley. It’s called Boomsday, and with tongue firmly in cheek, he tackles key issues
like social security, the aging of the baby boom, conflict between generations,
pop culture, and a dozen other topics. I won’t steal his thunder, but to say the
least, his character’s “solution” to the enormous bow wave of baby boomers
headed toward social security is creative indeed.
The second novel is a dark story of life in the United States following an apoca-
lyptic event, and it describes the wandering of a father and a young son around a
country that is devastated and living in complete anarchy. It’s called simply The
Road, and it is notable in every sense, most particularly for the heartbreaking
beauty of its poetic language and as well for the utterly bleak situation it portrays.
You should be wondering what on earth two novels like that have in common.
The answer is simple: both are about what generations owe each other. In
Boomsday we have a satiric vision of the cut-and-thrust between generations as
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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they jockey for the best life in a world of rich resources—but disagree bitterly
about how to divide them. The generations must learn to work together to solve
the problems they face, with creativity and innovation. In The Road we see the care
and love—and the life lessons passed—between a father and a son in a bleak world
in which there are virtually no resources to divide. Above all, the father passes to
his son hope—hardest of all in the world they inhabit quite literally “on the road.”
Both Christopher Buckley and Cormac McCarthy touch the central idea I
want to leave you with today—that each generation must learn and strive and
accomplish but must also learn to pass along what it learns to the successors.
That, as any of us with teenage children will attest, is hard work indeed. But it is
vital and important to our society and our civilization.
It also has a distinct meaning within the context of this graduation day. Today,
nearly six hundred new graduates of this war college will sail on, including well
over a hundred distance-learning graduates. They are all part of the Class of
2007 from this College, which numbers over 1,300 graduates. They wear many
different uniforms, they come from many different U.S. government agencies
and many different countries, and they have each learned very different things.
But I would submit that one of the crucial things they all share is that they
must return to their ships and submarines and aircraft squadrons and SEAL
teams and battalions and divisions and brigades and Coast Guard cutters, their
countries and their agencies and cabinet staffs, and all the rest—they must pass
the spark of innovation and creativity that they have been given here, in this War
College, in this New Port, in a time of seemingly infinite challenges and I believe
equally extraordinary promise.
The Greeks say you never cross the same river twice—the water moves on. Sail
bravely into your future! Accept each new assignment as the invigorating, life-
enhancing challenge that it can be. That is what makes a life such an incredible ex-
perience to cherish, especially if you do the kinds of things all of you are about to
do. Hand off your brilliant ideas to the next generation! And as all of you depart
on the beautiful trajectory of your lives and careers, I am confident you will do ex-
actly that. I wish you all Godspeed and open water in the voyage ahead.
ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Stavridis is a Surface Warfare Officer and has had multiple commands at sea.
He holds a PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy of Tufts University. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College
and a 1976 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. Admiral Stavridis assumed com-
mand of the U.S. Southern Command on 19 October 2006.
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, fol-
lowing a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Com-
mander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds mas-
ter’s degrees in public administration (finance) from
Harvard and in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, where he graduated with
highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon
tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Re-
sources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—
primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission
area. His most recent Washington assignment was to
the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate
Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear
Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham
Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He be-
came the fifty-first President of the Naval War College
on 12 August 2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
No college or university could have greater justification for pride
in its faculty. Their outstanding service to the country is essential
to ensuring that the armed services can operate effectively in the
years ahead.
WHEN THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL recently visited Newport, he
asked just what it was that made the Naval War College different from the other
service colleges. Without hesitation, I replied: “Our faculty.” The worldwide rep-
utation of this faculty is a source of great pride—not only to me but to the naval
services and the Department of Defense. I miss no opportunity to emphasize
how the talent that resides in the faculty and its tireless efforts make this College
the preeminent institution that it is.
That the faculty is the key distinguishing feature of the College should sur-
prise no one. The reputation of the Naval War College has always rested, since its
founding, on the genius of the faculty. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the Col-
lege’s first President, understood that the institution’s ability to carry out its vital
mission would require an outstanding faculty. Luce went to great lengths to
make sure that the College identified and attracted outstanding professionals,
officers and scholars, to serve on the faculty. He brought aboard the very best, re-
cruiting illustrious teachers in Tasker Bliss, James R. Soley, and Alfred Thayer
Mahan. William McCarty Little and Charles Stockton soon joined the faculty as
well. These giants established the reputation of the College as a world-class insti-
tution for education and research into strategy and war. Mahan’s celebrated
books on the influence of sea power started as lectures on strategy to the stu-
dents attending the College. These lectures, when transformed into print, had
powerful and enduring impact in educating strategic leaders (such as Theodore
Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill) and in changing the way
the world thought about and appreciated maritime capability—far beyond
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Newport.* Teaching and research thus went hand in hand, mutually supporting
each other. The growing reputation of the faculty helped establish, sustain, and
promote the College, transforming Luce’s vision into reality.
This reputation gained fetch between the two world wars with the inclusion of
the Navy’s preeminent operators in the faculty, for example, Captain Raymond
Spruance and Captain Richmond K. Turner. The time spent by Spruance and
Turner in Newport was memorable and helped prepare them for the leadership
roles that they would play in gaining the great victories of the Pacific War. Just imag-
ine the opportunity that students had between the wars to study naval warfare and
joint operational planning with the future victor of Midway and the battle of the
Philippine Sea. Speaking to the tradition of academic rigor for the College, one stu-
dent later recalled: “Spruance was a tough taskmaster, and the harder we worked the
more he demanded of us.” Turner, whose lectures predicted the leading role that
carrier and amphibious warfare would play in the next war, was also a gifted but de-
manding teacher. One of his students stated: “He worked our pants off. It was the
hardest year I ever spent. Turner corrected every estimate of the situation and final
decision in red ink, and they were saturated with his caustic comment.” The faculty
at the College between the wars thus pushed the students to think systematically
and creatively about strategy and war, preparing them for the rise of the United
States to the position as the world’s premier maritime power and for the leadership
challenges that awaited them in the “Two-Ocean War.” The victory at sea in the
world war rested on the intellectual capital built up by the officers who studied with
the brilliant faculty assembled at the College.
When Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner revitalized the College’s educational
curriculum in the early 1970s, he relied fully on his faculty to craft and imple-
ment his plan. Dr. Phil Crowl, an outstanding scholar and teacher, as well as a
veteran of the final, grisly campaigns in the Pacific War, became chairman of the
Strategy and Policy Department. Bill Turcotte came in to head the National Se-
curity Decision Making Department (NSDM). Drawing around them distin-
guished academics and serving officers, they transformed the College’s
curriculum, taking the College to a new level of innovation, academic rigor and
discipline, and relevance. Their work proved so successful that it became the
model for courses offered around the world, at universities like Yale, Harvard,
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* In his book Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters, Robert Seager II relates how in August
1893 Queen Victoria asked Mahan to a dinner for Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, who was visiting
England, so that the two men might meet. That meeting spawned another dinner between the two
in August 1894, where Mahan learned that the kaiser was very interested in his books. By January
1898, the Imperial German Navy had ordered that a translation of the volume “be supplied to all
the public libraries, schools and government institutions” in the nation. Mahan’s work was widely
read as well by strategists and policy makers in Great Britain, and it was a significant factor in a de-
bate that drove new life and significant funding into the Royal Navy.
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the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Georgetown University,
Boston University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as well as educational
programs in the system of professional military education in our nation and
partner nations around the world. This faculty has thus transformed how our
country’s leading universities study strategy, war, and the profession of arms.
These recent few years have witnessed another transformation of the Col-
lege’s programs. Charged with developing a new curriculum—building on what
was best in the existing programs of study—today’s faculty has taken the educa-
tional experience at the College to a new, still higher level of excellence and rele-
vance. The faculty threw themselves at the task! The result is a new curriculum
consisting of separate, distinct intermediate and senior-level courses. Notewor-
thy is the fact that this major restructuring was planned, coordinated, and im-
plemented in about twenty months, while the faculty continued to teach
without pause—a feat akin to turning a Schwinn bicycle into a Harley motorcy-
cle while riding it down the highway! Despite the heavy workload, the faculty
continued to produce new courses, without equal in the professional military
education system, to better prepare our students to think strategically, to carry
out critical analysis, and to operate with telling effect in a joint, interagency, and
multinational environment. Given the history of this faculty and its tradition of
dedication and genius, I was not surprised at this achievement.
It is important to recognize that the College’s faculty extends well beyond our
campus in Newport, through the College of Distance Education (CDE). They
serve effectively in the College’s large and robust satellite program at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, and on twenty-two satellite cam-
puses elsewhere around the country. The CDE faculty also teaches a Web-enabled
course, as well as a CD-ROM–based course for students without routine access
to the Web. The College’s Distance Education faculty is hired to the same stan-
dards and processes as our resident faculty. Moreover, our Distance Education
faculty participates in the curriculum development process, ensuring a sense of
direct ownership and bringing additional, rich, diverse perspective and exper-
tise to the curriculum’s content. The standards to which we recruit our Distance
Education faculty and the way each member is directly integrated into the Col-
lege’s academic processes have proven to be extraordinary strengths, called out
repeatedly by both military and civilian accreditation authorities.* The Associa-
tion for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) presented its
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 7
* In March of 2005, the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Inc., issued a report to the
College stating “the College is responding to the challenge of providing education at remote loca-
tions in a highly responsible way consistent with the best practices of other colleges and universities
engaged in this type of activity.” The head of the accreditation team added: “The Naval War Col-
lege’s Distance Program is second to none.”
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“crystal award” to CDE in 2002, representing still another independent judg-
ment regarding the quality of the College’s distance programs.
Today’s faculty is increasingly diverse. We attract to serve on the College’s fac-
ulty professionals with the expertise required to disentangle the knotty strategic
problems facing the country as it negotiates a dramatically altered international
security terrain. We have experts on critical strategic regions, on warfare in the
information domain, on culture and religion, on energy and resources, and on
best practices in business and the management of large complex organizations,
as well as historians, scholars of international relations and strategy, and war-
riors with extensive operational experience. This mix of talent provides a unique
educational experience. The recently completed study of the College by the Pro-
cess for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Team notes: “The faculty
was consistently praised by the students as the strength of the college.” I can only
concur with the accolades accorded by the students.
In research and writing, the faculty’s contribution is a catalyst for new ideas
about how to understand and grapple with the security challenges that con-
front our country. Examples abound. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of
NSDM, has produced an outstanding study, Space as a Strategic Asset, about
this critical operating domain for our armed forces. Derek Reveron, also of
NSDM, has written a valuable study, Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism, that
could not be timelier. Meanwhile, from the Joint Military Operations Depart-
ment (JMO), Milan Vego’s classic book on Operational Warfare is being
produced in a second, updated edition that will serve as the premier text for
over two dozen command and staff colleges in partner nations around the
world. The hard-fought battles of the Pacific War, with their fine examples of
leaders who needed to balance operational risks and strategic rewards, are ably
analyzed by Douglas V. Smith of the College of Distance Education in his Car-
rier Battles: Command Decision in Harm’s Way. Within the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies (CNWS), Peter Dombrowski, the chair of the Strategic Re-
search Department, has published Buying Military Transformation: Technolog-
ical Innovation and the Defense Industry; Carnes Lord, the editor of the Review,
has written The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now; and S. Paul
Kapur has completed Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and
Conflict in South Asia. The Strategy and Policy Department faculty has con-
tributed Tim Hoyt’s Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, and Toshi
Yoshihara and James Holmes’s Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury: The Turn to Mahan. This prodigious output of recently published books
rivals that of any major university and bolsters the impact and reputation of
the College as a research institution—and at the end of the day, it is our stu-
dents who benefit from this level of expertise.
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We work hard to fight against the natural tendency, observed in many col-
leges and universities, for a wall to develop between faculty members who
primarily teach and those who are primarily researchers. We recognize that
great benefits accrue when discoveries made through research activities and
practitioner experimentation are routinely disclosed alongside those made
through the dynamics of student/mentor interaction in the classroom. I am
pleased to note that, to a degree never before attained, our faculties work as
one across departments and “codes” (deaneries) in collaborative teaching
and research. To provide just a few examples, the writings of Lyle Goldstein,
William Murray, and Andrew Winner of CNWS form a part of the required
reading in the new strategy courses offered by the Strategy and Policy De-
partment. In the China Maritime Security Institute, CNWS has provided an
organizational home in which the faculty form partnerships in their research
and writing. Professor Andrew R. Wilson of the Strategy and Policy Depart-
ment, in collaboration with Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William
Murray of the Strategic Research Department, has pulled together penetrat-
ing analyses in the volume China’s Nuclear Submarine Force, published by the
Naval Institute Press. This book includes essays by Thomas G. Mahnken and
Toshi Yoshihara of the Strategy and Policy Department and by Peter Dutton
of JMO. Meanwhile, Bruce Elleman, in the Maritime History Department of
the CNWS, wrote a pathbreaking study on the Navy’s role in tsunami relief
that NSDM uses as a case study. These collaborative efforts show that in their
diversity the faculty is working together as one team, supporting each other
in their research, writing, and teaching.
In recent years, the College has established a number of named chairs as a
means of recognizing and promoting academic programs and fields of study
that are consistent with our overall scholarly plans, objectives, and missions.
These chair holders are responsible for contributing to the College’s courses
and programs by writing educational and professional materials, publishing
the results of applied research, maintaining a high level of knowledge regard-
ing current issues in their area of expertise, and developing ongoing profes-
sional relationships with faculty at other colleges and universities. These
chairs, funded by the Naval War College Foundation, have provided a way for
faculty to collaborate on valuable ventures of import to the Navy, the armed
services, and the country. The Ruger Chair, held by the stalwart Rich Lloyd of
NSDM, ran an immensely successful workshop on maritime strategy and
economics. Professor Lloyd drew upon faculty members from different de-
partments as well as outside scholars and analysts to produce a remarkable
study published by the College. Some of the papers delivered at this work-
shop will also soon appear in print in some of the finest policy-oriented
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 9
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journals of strategy and international affairs. Professor Jeff Norwitz, holder
of the Brown Chair, coordinates and supports efforts across the College that
examine the strategic problems posed by terrorism, insurgency, and other
forms of irregular warfare. The Levy Chair holder, John Garofano, pulled to-
gether the faculty for a workshop about maritime strategy and the changing
geostrategic environment in Asia. This collaboration among the faculty is
paying huge dividends in supporting the teaching and analysis carried out at
the College—and in advancing the world’s understanding of a host of issues
in the field of security studies and geostrategy.
In this regard particularly, this past year has also witnessed an extraordinary
effort on the part of the College’s faculty in support of the development of a
new maritime strategy. Last June, at the College’s Current Strategy Forum, the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, announced a major
new initiative to develop a new maritime strategy for the country (see the
“President’s Forum” in the Autumn 2006 issue). Faculty members from
throughout the College took the lead in responding to this task. Professor Bar-
ney Rubel, the dean of CNWS, organized the collegewide effort. Members of
the research faculty, including Peter Dombrowski, Andrew Winner, Carnes
Lord, Don Marrin, and Mike Martin, as well as others from across CNWS, sup-
ported the College’s analytical process. Meanwhile, members of the teaching
faculty—Scott Douglas, Tim Hoyt, and John Schindler, for example—brought
their immense talent to bear in support of the analysis. Karl Walling of the
Strategy and Policy Department and George Baer, author of the prizewinning
book One Hundred Years of Sea Power and now serving with the College’s pro-
gram at Monterey, gave brilliant presentations about strategy, the maritime
environment, and the enduring importance of sea power as part of our public
outreach effort known as the “Conversation with the Country.” Skillfully or-
chestrated by faculty member John Jackson, the Conversation events included
participation by noted futurist and author Peter Schwartz, who noted: “These
are remarkable events, unique in all the world to my knowledge. I commend
the Navy for taking this innovative approach to considering the future!”
The work to develop the new maritime strategy was a team effort by the fac-
ulty across the entire College.
No college or university could have greater justification for pride in its fac-
ulty. Their outstanding service to the country is essential to ensuring that the
armed services can operate effectively in the years ahead. Nevertheless, we can-
not take this engine of mission success for granted. The report issued by the re-
cent PAJE Team identified some challenges that must be addressed if the
College is to continue to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding teachers and
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scholars.* To address these issues, we have established faculty committees
tasked to provide concrete recommendations for action in such areas as pay
and compensation policy, sabbatical leave time, and publication policies. In
addition, working with the Naval War College Foundation, we are exploring
ways to provide greater opportunity for faculty development, including the
ability to attend professional conferences, carry out research, and achieve even
greater impact—particularly with regard to the College’s international and re-
gional initiatives! We owe this support to our dedicated faculty. More impor-
tantly, we owe it to the thousands of students who have passed through
Newport since the College’s founding, to the thousands of leaders around the
world touched by their genius, and to those unknown numbers who will serve
this country and our partner countries in positions of leadership and author-
ity in the years to come.
The Naval War College is the institution that it is today because of the genius
and dedication of its extraordinary faculty. In their teaching and research, the
faculty is leading the way in professional military education in delivering an ed-
ucational program for those who are called upon to serve in the profession of
arms and diplomacy. Our students thus leave prepared to face the challenges and
take on the struggles that lie before us as a Navy and a nation. The work of the
faculty currently at the College stands in the finest traditions of our institution,
and its legacy will prove as powerful and lasting as that of the roll call of great
teachers—Mahan, Bliss, Soley, Stockton, McCarty Little, Spruance, and
Turner—who came before them.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 2 1
* “Because of workload and curtailed opportunities for professional development and scholarship,
the ability to recruit and retain outstanding faculty members may be compromised [in the future].
Return of professional development opportunities, time and resources for travel and scholarship,
and appropriate compensation are all elements required to maintain and enhance faculty
strength”—PAJE Team report.
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Martin Murphy is a senior strategic analyst at the Uni-
versity of Reading, where he is writing a doctoral disser-
tation on maritime irregular warfare and related
criminal activity at sea under the supervision of Professor
Colin S. Gray. He holds degrees from the universities of
Wales and Reading. He has published widely on mari-
time terrorism, piracy, and riverine warfare; an Adelphi
Paper on modern piracy and maritime terrorism is
forthcoming.
© 2007 by Martin N. Murphy
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SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM
A Suitable Role for a Navy?
Martin N. Murphy
On 12 October 2000, two men from an organization aligned with al-Qa‘idaloaded a rigid raider (a small boat with glass-reinforced-plastic hull) with
explosives and drove it into the side of the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole
(DDG 67). Seventeen sailors lost their lives. This was a seminal event. It epito-
mized small war versus “big” war and the threat that small-war tactics could
present to “big war” fleets. It was also an echo of the U.S. Navy’s past. As the ini-
tial alarm faded, the Navy’s response became largely inward looking and defen-
sive, limited for the most part to the implementation of more robust
force-protection measures.
On 11 September 2001, al-Qa‘ida operatives hijacked four civilian airliners
and prepared to attack targets in the United States. Three of the planes got
through. Until the attacks of 9/11 gave it context, most of the wider implications
of the attack on the Cole were missed or ignored. It was the attacks on New York
and Washington that put it back on the agenda and sparked a search for similar
scenarios, a search that led ineluctably to concerns about the vulnerability of
commercial shipping. From there it was merely a small conceptual hop to piracy
and the fear that pirates might be in a position to teach terrorists how to use
ships for a variety of purposes, including, most spectacularly, as weapons.1 Since
then the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism have been yoked together.
Is this linkage justified? Does either, separately or together, represent a serious
threat to the United States or its allies? It is important to be honest. The Cole event
was significant, but the criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity that has taken
place on water both before and since has been of little strategic or political impor-
tance. There is, however, no guarantee that this benign situation will continue.
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Trends in demography and economic growth and the concomitant demand for
natural resources suggest that it might change.2 If this is the case, is the suppres-
sion of maritime criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity a suitable role for the
Navy? Is it one to which it can make a worthwhile contribution, or one it should
leave to others?
This article will argue that piracy and maritime terrorism are not the main
threats about which the Navy and those with interests in maritime security
should be concerned.3 They are instead just two items on a longer list that can
grouped under four headings:
• Criminal/insurgent/terrorist links
• “Migration to the sea”
• Territorial expansion
• Complex maritime conflict.
It will ask whether the Navy is the most appropriate arm of U.S. national power
to confront these threats. It will argue that if the service is to confront these chal-
lenges effectively, it will need to adjust to ways of warfare that are in many ways
closer to those of the nineteenth than the twentieth century, albeit that the com-
plexity of conflict has increased immeasurably.
CRIMINAL/INSURGENT/TERRORIST LINKS
Although we are quick to talk of terrorism, the current conflict is being fought
not against an abstraction but against specific groups with specific motives,
skills, and resources. Most acts of politically inspired violence at sea have been
perpetrated by insurgent groups. Some of these have been acts of terrorism, but
most have not. Giving these acts the blanket label of “terrorism” serves only to
obscure their purpose and their nature.4 Terrorism is a tactic; an insurgency is an
organized movement that is inspired by political, religious, or even quasi-criminal
motives and uses war and subversion to overthrow a government and achieve
power. Around the world are areas where maritime insurgency and terrorism are
both problems.
In addition to political violence there is criminal violence—that is, piracy.
Criminally inspired violence at sea is more common than politically inspired vi-
olence; nonetheless, piracy is a problem only in certain areas and for certain
states. In addition there are areas where piracy and insurgency are problems.
Even though there are strong grounds for considering piracy and insurgency/
terrorism as two aspects of the larger phenomenon of maritime insecurity—
“disorder at sea”—it is worth considering their differences before looking at
where, if, and how they might come together.
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Piracy
Piracy is a crime defined by geography that requires the presence of other factors,
such as a permissive political environment, cultural acceptability, and the opportu-
nity for reward, in order to flourish. Since the end of World War II such combina-
tions have occurred in only a relatively few places: around parts of Southeast Asia
and in the Bay of Bengal; off East and West Africa; and in a few ports of and off some
stretches of coastline around South America. Most of the factors that encourage and
sustain piracy are enduring. Although it can spring up in places where it has not
been a problem historically—the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia, for example—it is
generally the case that unless local or national leaders find reasons and resources to
suppress it, piracy can persist in such areas, sometimes for centuries.
Piracy is an organized crime. The degree to which it is a threat at any level,
from the purely local to the international, depends on the degree to which is it
organized effectively. Even at the lowest level of organization, piracy, like street
crime or small-scale crime anywhere, can be immensely destructive. If not con-
fronted it can suppress economic activity and distort economic incentives, lower
productivity by increasing security and replacement costs, erode confidence in
authority, and undermine notions of justice. These effects can be observed along
the Straits of Malacca, where gangs of largely Indonesian pirates prey regularly
on fishing craft from communities on the Malaysian side of the waterway. One
study of such a community, Hulan Melintang, has labeled this predation “sus-
tainable,” in that the cost and physical danger it adds to the fishermen’s lives are
never enough to stop them putting to sea completely.5 In other cases, however,
the level of predation has become so acute—against parts of the Nigerian fish-
ing fleet, for example—that lawful economic activity ceases, even if only for a
time, and in some areas can be carried out only with great vigilance.6 The inter-
national fishing boats that ply their trade off part of the Somali coast need to be
on almost constant alert against attack by local boats; one observer described the
situation there as closer to a war than fishing.7 There are, however, genuine ques-
tions as to whether much of the fishing conducted by foreign boats in these wa-
ters is legal or, even if legal, should be allowed, given their rapacity.
In areas that are afflicted by piracy, small gangs can harass and board even
large ships if the weather and sea conditions are right. In order to capitalize on
the vulnerability of these ships and maximize the “take,” gangs need specialized
marine equipment, modern arms, and a network capable of disposing of the
goods and foreign currency they steal. At the highest level of organization, ships
and their cargoes can be stolen to order, a process that demands close coordina-
tion between the buyer and the pirate/contractor. Piracy at this level is what it
has always been, a business. Its effects therefore spread beyond the scene of the
crime. Like all forms of organized criminal behavior—and when piracy reaches
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this stage it ceases to be a stand-alone enterprise and becomes a subsidiary to a
larger criminal concern—its most worrying effect is corruption, which, as it is
argued, “is the main vehicle, and likely the most socially damaging activity, by
which criminal gangs achieve their aims.”8 Another commentator reaches the
same conclusion: “Organized crime makes systematic use of corruption,” an ef-
fect that has not been emphasized sufficiently.9 Small-time pirates, however, are
not necessarily cut out of these more sophisticated operations; they constitute a
pool of skilled labor that pirate-gang masters can call upon when needed.10
Therefore, while the highest-profile consequences of piracy are attacks on
large vessels carrying cargo to international destinations, the greatest damage ei-
ther is felt among already-poor local communities or results from the suborning
of local and national officials, military leaders, and politicians of weak states. In
other words, the number of attacks on international shipping, though it shines a
useful light on the problem, is not a true measure of its effect. For example, in the
last decade or so there were a number of high-profile attacks on ships transiting
the Straits of Malacca. Some of these could have had disastrous consequences if
control from the bridge had been lost completely, but the number of incidents as
a proportion of the total international traffic using the straits, and in relation to
the volume of local traffic, was and remains very small. What the presence of pi-
racy demonstrates wherever it occurs, in this case on the Indonesian side of the
strait in particular, is a worrying lack of order: if not reversed or controlled it
could allow other forms of maritime-related disorder to take root and grow, but
it is difficult to eradicate, because it is an outgrowth of the divisions and corrup-
tion that infect host societies more widely.
Insurgency and Terrorism
Some insurgent campaigns have been mounted on the high seas.11 The majority,
however, have taken place on coastal and inland waters, where their success de-
pends on factors very similar to those that encourage and sustain piracy. Conse-
quently, maritime insurgents operate in similar (often the same) areas as pirates
and in many cases indulge in piracy on their own account. The principal reason
why there have been so few maritime insurgencies is that in very few places
around the world has political conflict coincided with favorable maritime geog-
raphy. The main campaigns have taken place around Sri Lanka, parts of South-
east Asia, and off the Levant; lesser campaigns have occurred around the
Arabian Peninsula, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Nigeria has experienced piracy and
criminal violence since at least the 1970s. The new wave of violence, while it un-
doubtedly emerges out of political discontent and has a substantial political di-
mension, also has a large criminal component. Whether this wave of killings and
kidnappings will develop into a major political insurgency is as yet unclear.
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Although we are living in an era when some terrorist groups are prepared to
embrace annihilation as a legitimate objective, the age-old hunt for publicity,
the “propaganda of the deed,” remains the primary objective of any terrorist
group. In a world of mass, global communication, maritime terrorism need not,
unlike piracy, be defined by geography. That it has been so defined, however, is
due to the fact that (with the exception of al-Qa‘ida) the groups that have em-
ployed it so far have been, like most insurgent groups, geographically specific.
Furthermore, few maritime targets have propaganda value, and the groups in-
terested in using the sea have not yet found a cost-effective way of generating de-
sired effects from those that do. Even the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), fighting for an independent Tamil homeland on Sri Lanka and drawing
much support from the Tamil “diaspora” around the world, have not under-
taken terrorist acts outside home waters.
Al-Qa‘ida has done most to shrug off the shackles of geography but has suc-
ceeded only up to a point: its three successful or near-successful attacks have
taken place around what it would regard as its heartland, the Arabian Peninsula.
Other al-Qa‘ida attacks around that peninsula, including an elaborate plan to
attack U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz using a combination of small, fast
attack craft and a mother ship laden with explosives, have been disrupted, as
were an attempted attack on American and British naval vessels in the Strait of
Gibraltar in 2002 and a plan to attack U.S. warships in Singapore, also in 2002.
The latter was to have been carried out with the assistance of the local al-Qa‘ida
affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah.
On land, al-Qa‘ida’s ideal targets mix iconic status with a high casualty poten-
tial. There are few iconic targets at sea; the main ones are warships, and since the
Cole attack in 2000, all navies have taken additional precautions that, while far
from perfect, are probably sufficient to make any repetition harder to accom-
plish. Passenger ferries and cruise ships would make excellent mass-casualty tar-
gets, and a very small number of cruise ships combine this quality with iconic
status. Cruise ships, although not constructed to naval standards, are extraordi-
narily robust, with many watertight subdivisions, and are hard to sink. That,
though, hardly matters if the objective is mass panic (probably resulting in large
numbers of accidental deaths and injuries) and vivid media images of
bomb-blackened hulls and petrified Westerners. The concerns of the insurance
market are reflected in a recent RAND study pointing out that such an attack, if
even minimally successful, would give rise to substantial claims and have a po-
tentially catastrophic economic effect on the cruise industry.12
Al-Qa‘ida recognizes the importance of economic targets, although its at-
tacks so far have been limited to oil-related installations. The first was on the
Limburg, a very large crude-oil carrier, partially loaded, in 2002. This attack
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hardly affected the world energy market, but it is important to note that it took
place at a time of slack demand and that a similar attack (or more worryingly,
multiple attacks) carried out when the market is tight might have more serious
repercussions. The second attack, on the al-Basra oil terminal off Iraq, would
have affected oil prices and, in addition, undermined confidence in U.S. military
competence had it been successful; in fact the raiders came perilously close to
reaching their objective, but they were foiled, albeit at the cost of three American
lives. However, a strategy of economic dislocation focusing solely on maritime
targets would be neither easy nor necessarily fruitful. It would require coordina-
tion, persistence, and probably a sophisticated understanding of market dynam-
ics. It would also demand resources, and these are what almost all terrorist
groups lack, certainly those that cannot call on state support.
These are probably among the factors that have led al-Qa‘ida to concentrate
on land-based economic targets in preference to those at sea. The one worth-
while example that demonstrates what could possibly be achieved using mari-
time targets alone was the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors in the mid-1980s by
“Contra” groups. This precisely targeted campaign, timed to coincide with the
main export season, was designed to limit the country’s vital foreign earnings,
but it depended on covert American assistance for its success.
Coastal raiding is such a well established naval method that it is perhaps sur-
prising terrorists have not used it more frequently. The Philippine Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) has grabbed hostages from beach resorts on two occasions (each
of which yielded a substantial profit), and the LTTE has carried out or attempted
raids on Sri Lankan harbors, but no group has carried out pure terror raids on
the beaches, hotels, resorts, or shopping malls that populate the coasts of many
developed states or of Western vacation destinations.
Robbery, Kidnapping, and Logistics
Terrorists and insurgents have therefore been largely unsuccessful in their at-
tacks on maritime targets. Certainly when measured against the criteria that
matter to them—numbers of casualties and psychologically effective publicity—
they have largely failed. Where they have been more successful is in robbing
maritime and coastal targets and capturing hostages for ransom—acting, in
other words, like pirates. Three groups—Abu Sayyaf, the Acehenese separatist
group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and politico-criminal gangs operating in
the Niger Delta—have successfully taken hostages from beaches, ships, or off-
shore oil installations and exchanged them for ransom. The actions of ASG and
GAM in particular have drawn the piracy label.
Insurgents and terrorists have also used the sea successfully for logistical pur-
poses. It is worth remembering that around 90 percent of the world’s trade
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moves by ship. While terrorists and insurgents are likely to move a smaller pro-
portion of their material requirements by ship, that proportion, because of cir-
cumstances specific to each group, could still be substantial, perhaps 50 percent.
Hezbollah and some of the other anti-Israeli groups move large quantities of
arms into Lebanon and Gaza by sea, al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates are known to have
moved bomb materials by sea prior to both the East African and Bali attacks, and
the LTTE, GAM, and the various Philippine groups all operate in what are essen-
tially maritime theaters. More generally, many terrorist and insurgent groups to-
day do not live off the local population in the same way as their forebears did
(and as described by Mao Zedong). Particularly if they originate from outside an
operational area, they tend to be wealthier than the indigenous population and
look to external supply for the money and often sophisticated weapons they
employ.
In many cases large consignments can be moved more discreetly by sea. On
land, vehicles can be subjected to inspection relatively easily. In coastal waters,
however, insurgents can hide among a multiplicity of small craft and fishing
boats—a problem that confronts the Israeli air force and navy off the coast of
Gaza, for example, as it seeks to isolate arms smugglers from ordinary fishermen.
Outside territorial waters there are fewer ships, but international law can shield
cargo from inspection. Unless a sea area is subject to a United Nations Security
Council resolution that permits such an action, a boat or ship can be boarded only
with flag-state consent unless it is of questionable nationality or is suspected of
slaving, piracy, or that most heinous of international maritime crimes, illegal
broadcasting.13 Of course, ships are boarded with the consent of their masters,
but, depending upon the provisions of his own national legislation, not every
master can give a boarding party permission to search; any search or seizure car-
ried out on the basis of such consent is illegal. Such acts can yield valuable intelli-
gence, but the advantage might be short-lived; they can provoke retaliatory
harassment and international opprobrium. If a search is conducted on the basis of
inaccurate information and nothing is found, the only results will be acute embar-
rassment, a claim for compensation, and a further erosion of international good-
will. The alternative is the “if you don’t like it sue me” position, which if carried
out mid-ocean would almost certainly be acceded to but is manifestly illegal and
almost inevitably involves the use or threat of force. The bottom line in most cases
where boarding is refused is that “you can look but not touch.”
The Proliferation Security Initiative
What the case of the North Korean cargo vessel So San in 2002 demonstrated,
however, is that even a boarding party that has forced itself on board, looked,
touched, and found a suspicious cargo—in this case Scud missiles—cannot
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confiscate it if buyer and seller are able to demonstrate that their transaction was
legal.14 It was this case that spurred the George W. Bush administration to insti-
gate the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).15 This program seeks to bring to-
gether like-minded states prepared to open their own flag vessels to inspection
and to interdict vessels with suspicious cargoes once they enter their territorial
waters. The United States has also used its leverage with the major “open regis-
ter” (that is, flag of convenience) states, such as Panama and Liberia, to sign
workable ship-boarding agreements.16 Previously it had virtually forced the clo-
sure of the Tongan register on the suspicion that it might be holding the registra-
tion of several ships of which al-Qa‘ida was the beneficial owner. (The suspicion
in this case appears to have been erroneous but understandable, given the often
extensive measures even legitimate owners use to hide their beneficial interests
in order to evade tax or other legislated obligations.) The aim of the ship-boarding
agreements with the open-register states is to restrict the space in which rogue
shippers can hide.
Large gaps, of course, remain. Around half of the world’s vessels are flagged in
states that are not PSI signatories.17 Also, most open-register states have not
signed, including some, like Cambodia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines, that
have long been suspected of less than rigorous procedures. At the same time
there are closed-register states, such as Iran and North Korea, that are not ame-
nable to either pressure or persuasion; another closed-register nation, China,
though sympathetic to U.S. proliferation concerns, is not persuaded of the
scheme’s legality.
Blurring the Gray Area
Criminals and terrorists are not finding common cause, but they are finding rea-
sons to cross the species barrier, whether based on the sea or on the land. The
first reason is that both insurgents and terrorists are prepared to do business
with criminals who have specific goods or skills they need, such as forged docu-
ments, or services that can expedite their operations, such as smuggling net-
works that can infiltrate operatives into specific destinations. Terrorists are
known, for example, to have used the human smuggling networks that move
people across the Mediterranean and into Western Europe.
The second reason is that they are acting like criminals in their own right.18
Running an insurgency or terrorist operation requires hard cash.19 It was com-
mon in the past for mature or senescent groups to turn to crime. More recent ex-
perience indicates two different trends. The first is acts of terrorist violence by
small bands of individuals who, while they might share an ideology with an es-
tablished group, have little or no direct connection to it, sometimes as a matter
of choice. Lacking resources, they have had to resort to robbery or other crimes,
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such as drug dealing, in order to buy what they need, as the German
Baader-Meinhof gang did in the 1970s. The second trend has affected estab-
lished groups. Historically, insurgents and terrorists have depended to a large
extent on the support of sympathetic states, but as this has been reduced—
although by no means eliminated, as the strong Iranian support for Hezbollah,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas clearly shows—such groups have turned
to a variety of other income sources, of which criminal activity is one. Terrorist
involvement in drug crime, for example, is well known. A Congressional Re-
search Service report lists four reasons why criminals and terrorists might cooper-
ate: to create chaos and instability in source and transit countries; to encourage a
climate where corruption is acceptable and intimidation is unopposed; to pro-
vide cover and a common infrastructure for their joint and separate activities;
and most important of all, for money.20 The narcoterrorist phenomenon, as
epitomized by FARC in Colombia, is merely the most obvious example of insur-
gent criminal behavior as groups including al-Qa‘ida have become involved in a
wide range of illegal enterprises, including arms trading, dealing in counterfeit
goods, money laundering, and migrant smuggling. In other cases, of which the
LTTE is the prime example, insurgent/terrorists have sold their services to crim-
inals. In the LTTE’s case, what they have sold has been access to their shipping
network.
The range of criminal activity at sea is already large and appears to be grow-
ing. Maritime illegal activity includes arms smuggling, drug smuggling, people
smuggling, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and, of course, piracy. Insur-
gents, terrorists, and criminals are, nonetheless, wary of each other: insurgents
and terrorists distrust criminals’ traditionally poor operational security; crimi-
nals have traditionally been unwilling to court the additional law enforcement
attention attracted by association with groups that practice politically moti-
vated violence.21 When it comes to piracy itself, there is no worthwhile evidence,
despite the speculation, of any cooperation between pirates and insurgent/
terrorists. Even in the absence of a connection, however, criminal activity can
serve the aims of terrorists and insurgents simply by masking what they do. Fur-
thermore, the nature of criminal organization appears to be changing. Although
disciplined, hierarchical, mafia-type organizations continue to flourish, more
nonhierarchical groups are beginning to appear. They mirror the network struc-
ture of many terrorist or insurgent organizations. Decision making occurs on a
more distributed basis, often by gang members who have less reluctance than is
traditionally the case to associate with terrorists or who might, in some cases,
share their aspirations and their contempt for established authority.
Several factors have influenced the growth of transnational organized crime:
porous borders; the migration of ethnic groups who, once they have settled in
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developed countries illegally, become vulnerable to exploitation; access to more
efficient money-transfer mechanisms; and better communication. Although it
is difficult to identify one that has particular application to the sea, they all re-
volve around movement—the movement of commodities, such as arms and
drugs, and the movement of people.22 The principal medium for movement was,
and remains, the sea. This increasing ease of movement has been attributed to
the somewhat weightless notion of “globalization,” but there are also other
trends, which, while far from criminal in themselves, suggest that the level of
criminal activity at sea is likely to grow still further.
“MIGRATION TO THE SEA”
The sea’s resources have of course been exploited for centuries, but that exploita-
tion has now reached unprecedented levels driven by the demand for resources
and living space on land. It has spurred what could be described as a migration
to the sea, or what one astute observer has described more graphically as a
“scramble for the sea,” language chosen quite deliberately to evoke parallels with
the colonial “scramble for Africa” in the nineteenth century.23 This migration or
scramble is driven by the need for energy (in the form of oil, gas, or structures
that capture wind or tidal power), for minerals, for drinking water distilled from
the sea, for waste disposal, and for food (harvested either from increasingly de-
pleted fish stocks or from fish farmed in sheltered waters). It is propelled also by
the urge to exploit the world’s maritime ecosphere for tourism and leisure, in
some places by the need for space to live, either on reclaimed land or actually on
(or perhaps under) the sea, and in others by the desire for such space—for exam-
ple, in South Pacific island lagoons or the “palm” structures extending out from
Dubai.24
All of these pressures will mean that the sea will become more populated and,
consequently, contested.25 More people means more economic activity. More
economic activity means more crime. More crime means more cover for terror-
ists. More people and more economic activity mean more targets. More goods in
transit on fewer but larger ships passing though fewer giant ports and an un-
changeable number of narrow choke points will mean that opportunities for
successful interdiction by criminals or insurgents will increase.
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
Complicating this picture further is the possibility that this migration will be ac-
companied by the seaward extension of state territoriality. It is possible to envis-
age a return to the confused situation that existed prior to the adoption of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), when states claimed various
degrees of territorial supervision, up to two hundred miles from their shores
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:32 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
38
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/26
and in some cases beyond. About 40 percent of the world’s ocean surface lies
within that two-hundred-mile limit.26 The risk in the case of states that have
proved unwilling or unable to discharge their security responsibilities in these
maritime zones is that criminal activity and the illegal exploitation of resources
will increase and what are effectively criminal and pirate sanctuaries might be
created.27
The law of the sea developed in a way that is very different from the law of the
land, and in a way that was neither obvious nor preordained. As has been
pointed out, the current position represents the “triumph of Grotius’s thesis of
mare liberum and its concomitant prohibition on claims of territorial sover-
eignty. That triumph reflected not only the transitory nature of human activity at
sea, but a rational conclusion that the interests of states in unrestricted access to the
rest of the world outweighed their interests in restricting the access of others.”28
That consensus is under pressure, perhaps most powerfully for environmen-
tal reasons, and although UNCLOS, the international treaty that currently en-
shrines the notion of maritime freedom, is holding for the moment, the
pressures exerted for and against that freedom are finely balanced and might
well become so great as to fracture it. The expectation historically would have
been that the maritime powers would defend maritime freedom. Today, instead,
they and the rising economic powers of Asia are ambivalent. The continuing re-
luctance of the United States, the current maritime hegemon, to sign UNCLOS
(rather than merely, as it now does, tacitly observe its provisions), even if only to
be in a position to influence what follows, is particularly puzzling and could lead
to a disastrous situation where the free movement of trade and shipping is ham-
pered.29 In the waters of strong states this could take the form of authorized ha-
rassment; the proliferation of sophisticated subsurface weaponry is particularly
worrying in this regard. It is worth recalling that both the USS Pueblo and SS
Mayaguez incidents were sparked by differences between the United States and
coastal states over the width of their territorial waters. The seizures by Iran of
British Royal Marines in 2004 and a boarding party of British sailors and ma-
rines in 2007, though both clearly planned provocations, were also mounted in
disputed waters.30 In the case of weak states, this hampering could take the form of
predation by criminally or politically motivated nonstate actors. All the inhibi-
tions that restrain action against weak states on land could be extended to the sea.
Maritime Disorder and the Threat to Free Movement at Sea
The potential threats that therefore confront all maritime users and every power
that values the freedom of the seas are not piracy or maritime terrorism alone.
Those are just two among several that can be viewed collectively as problems of
maritime disorder. Participants can move between activities—legal fishermen
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can fish illegally, illegal fishermen can be pirates, pirates can be smugglers,
smugglers can move weapons and men for terrorists, terrorists can kidnap fish-
ermen for ransom, and so on—and each activity can influence and create op-
portunities for another, to a point that could spark conflict. The context within
which these conflicts will take place is likely to be one of increasing legal confu-
sion and political ambiguity as different states assert different rights over the sea
space. These assertions will for the most part fall just short of actual claims of
territoriality, at least for the time being, but the sum effect will be a gradual ero-
sion of the modern world’s shared understanding that movement on the high
sea is free for all.
“Defense of Trade”
From at least the end of the seventeenth century, defense of “trade” was a mis-
sion central to a navy’s purpose. Mahan, even though he is known more widely
as the champion of fleet-on-fleet combat, recognized both that the free move-
ment of trade was a vital sinew of national power and that the trading system
upon which that power depended was far from secure. In his words, the sea was
“the great highway.” He would have concurred with Sir Walter Raleigh that
“whosoever commands the sea commands trade; whosoever commands the
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the
world itself.” Even Ralph Peters, a strategic commentator with a famously “up
and at ’em” view of military power, has suggested that the Navy, by focusing on
neutralizing opposing naval forces and projecting expeditionary power, has
overlooked its decisive role, “the ability to protect our maritime trade while inter-
dicting that of the enemy.”31 For, despite the focus on instant communication,
rapid travel, and global capital flows, all of which appear to be unrelated to the
manufacture and distribution of physical goods, globalization is fundamentally
about trade, the physical movement of weighty goods and commodities. Despite
this, the very phrase “defense of trade” sounds archaic and the suggestion dated.
Yet any navy that has lost sight of its economic mission to protect the seaborne
commerce of its own country or the trading system to which its country belongs
has become detached from its roots and reality.32
Countering threats to free navigation, even when they come from irregular
opponents such as pirates and terrorists, is a “defense of trade” task. However,
“defense of trade,” with its blunt clarity, has been replaced by a term altogether
more vague: maritime security. The terminological change is nonetheless justi-
fied, because the challenge has indeed become more diverse and more complex.
The conflicts that will arise under the new rubric are unlikely to follow the pat-
terns of twentieth-century naval engagement. As with the conflicts that are likely
to accompany the “migration to the sea,” the chances are that they will mimic the
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:32 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
40
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/26
changing patterns of irregular war that have been the predominant form of land
warfare for the last fifty years.
COMPLEX MARITIME CONFLICT
Seaward migration will mean that the human and informational terrain of
coastal waters will become crowded. The conflicts there will be fought among
confusing numbers of people, not all of whom will be engaged; the majority of
participants, in fact, will be the partially engaged, the previously engaged, and
the unengaged. David Kilcullen, a perceptive observer of the wars that land
forces have found themselves fighting in just these circumstances, has urged
ground commanders to think in terms of “mission space,” in which “battle
spaces” erupt as part of what he has called “complex irregular warfare”:
Armed forces today must deal with many adversaries beyond their traditional oppo-
nents, the regular armed forces of nation states. These include insurgents, terrorists,
organized criminals and many other actual and potential adversaries. This creates a
multilateral and ambiguous environment, leading to vastly increased complexity. In-
stead of a traditional “bilateral” construct—two opposing sides—armed forces now
find themselves in a conflict “ecosystem” that includes numerous armed or unarmed
actors capable of posing a serious threat to mission success, but against whom the ap-
plication of military force is at best problematic. Thus, while in a previous era of war-
fare armed forces sought to capture and control territory (a “terrain-centric approach”)
or to destroy in battle the main forces of the enemy (an “enemy-centric approach”)
they must now seek to dominate the entire environment, including a variety of dis-
parate threat elements, and other challenges which are the result of conflict such as
humanitarian and reconstruction tasks.33
Kilcullen has two important foci here. The first is the challenges of urban
conflict; his comments, however, are just as relevant for the topographically and
hydrographically complex terrain of coastal waters and the adjacent land. The
trends that are driving seaward migration mean that in many parts of the world
these regions will develop into increasingly complex zones of conflict; and that
conflict will bear the hallmarks of complex irregular warfare. The second is that
technologically advanced “naval and air platforms with networked information
capability to generate precision strike” is part of an approach that has not proven
to be particularly workable in the face of irregular threats.34
WHAT IS THE NAVY FOR?
What is a modern navy? It is a service in search of a role. With a diverse range of
competitors that might need to be confronted and allies who might need to be
supported, the U.S. Navy has an embarrassment of choices. Many of these
choices, moreover, are potential rather than immediate. They call for investment
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and preparation now for contingencies that might be realized only in years or
decades.
What is so disconcerting is that the conflict the United States (and its allies) is
engaged in right now has more in common with the nineteenth than the twentieth
century. It is made up of overlapping small wars, each of indeterminate duration
against enemies that are illusive, that some analysts have labeled “protean,” and
that find shelter in weak states and operate in the anonymous alleyways of third-
world cities and the urban sprawl of Western slums.35 In the equally bitter domestic
contest for scarce resources, navies have sought a way to demonstrate their rele-
vance to this conflict. That, however, is not immediately apparent either to the
observer who is uninformed about the enduring importance of the sea or to many
in the Navy itself who have been brought up in the Mahanian tradition and are
concerned that consideration is once again being given to roles it was possible to
believe had been left in the wake of the Great White Fleet.
All armed services exist to advance state interests by killing people and break-
ing things or by threatening to kill people and break things. The paradox, how-
ever, is that for all their purposeful brutality, their continuing effectiveness
depends on maintaining a delicate balance between morale and materiel.
Navies, in particular, are hugely expensive organizations. Because navies are so
expensive and take so long to acquire the skills and ships they need, they can of-
ten achieve their effect as much by being as by fighting. That is, the length of time
it takes a navy to become effective means that its very existence can deter a rival.
This enduring quality can often be overlooked in time of peace. In the current
period of ambivalence, when people appear uncertain as to whether we are at
peace or at war and wish to maintain the illusion that such neat categories are
still relevant to the world in which they live, this naval myopia appears particu-
larly acute. The consequences of uncertainty are revealed starkly in the fate of
the Royal Navy, which, lacking strategic direction and political support since the
end of the Cold War, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self by succes-
sive governments.36 The U.S. Navy must look at it and quiver, wondering if simi-
lar strategic ignorance might infect its own political paymasters. The question
those paymasters are asking, of course, and that the Navy needs to answer, is:
What does it exist for?
A Traditional Role Restored
The purpose of this article has not been to answer that question in all its com-
plexity but to direct attention to one aspect of a navy’s purpose, maritime secu-
rity. The definition of “maritime security” as used by navies (insofar as any
definition is agreed) is more restrictive than that understood generally by the
wider maritime community of international organizations, law enforcement
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agencies, and commercial shippers. Many would argue that “maritime security”
is what navies have always done, and this lack of congruence between the two inter-
pretations appears to underlie many of the debates about the Navy’s role in what
is, without doubt, a more complex maritime environment. Furthermore, its re-
introduction at a time when navies have been debating their futures has not
been entirely welcome, because all three of its constituent tasks from a naval per-
spective—defense of trade, homeland defense, and maritime irregular warfare—
demand more ships. In particular, they demand relatively unsophisticated ships.
This runs counter to the acquisition policy pursued by all major navies over the
past fifty years, an ever-shrinking number of higher-quality platforms, a policy
driven by an enemy, the Soviet Union, whose approach to warfare followed a
similar trajectory. Many current and several potential future opponents have de-
cided, however, that, for the time being at least, this is not a race they wish to enter
and that they will instead fight what the British army general Rupert Smith has
called “war among the people.”37
Major navies have a very real dilemma: unsophisticated ships asked to fight a
sophisticated enemy are likely to be sunk. Expeditionary warfare against a capa-
ble opponent, which is what navies have focused on fighting since 1990, de-
mands a sophisticated fleet with a full range of capabilities. The argument that
these ships can be used for lesser tasks is not really sustainable. First and fore-
most, there are not enough of them; secondly, they are simply too expensive to
be risked in low-intensity tasks, where much of their highly destructive weap-
onry would be inappropriate; and lastly, their crews, if they are to remain effec-
tive against sophisticated enemies, need to train continuously for the war they
are intended to fight.
Nonetheless, as Clausewitz pointed out, war is a chameleon and enemies are
not static. Even potential adversaries who current assessments suggest will fight
conventionally are unlikely to attack Western navies at their strongest point or
on the terms those navies prefer. The risk Western naval forces run is of being
prepared for and focused on high-technology warfare they might never have to
fight while leaving themselves underprepared and ill equipped for a form of
warfare that they probably will, including the “long war” against salafist,
Islamist extremism, characterized by sovereignty concerns, political and legal
ambiguity, the criticality of intelligence, and the savagery of small-unit action,
all played out on the big screen of the wider information war.38 They are, in other
words, likely to encounter more frequently and in more places Rupert Smith’s
“war among the people.” As has been suggested, “The Big War paradigm might be
comforting and conducive to justifying a large share of the national treasure. But
its relevance to today’s geopolitical disorder is questionable.”39 Furthermore, the
idea that we are living in an interlude and that normal service will be resumed
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when “Big War” comes back is incomplete and ahistorical. Irregular or “small”
war has existed throughout history. Even as organized forces clashed at Cannae,
Breitenfeld, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Verdun, and Khe Sanh, the drumbeat of con-
flicts on the edge of ancient empires, colonial wars, the wars of America’s west-
ward expansion, the anticolonial wars, and the Cold War “wars of liberation”
continued uninterrupted.
What Is the Source of Maritime Disorder?
Disorder at sea is multifarious. Talk of “disorder” presupposes an order, yet the
notion of the freedom of the seas as articulated by the Dutch philosopher Hugo
Grotius in 1609 depends on a very restrictive idea of order outside the narrow
strip of territorial water over which each coastal state has control. The gradual
acceptance of his restrictive notion created the first global “common.” Being a
common, it is anarchic; even the very minimal order that has existed upon it has
always been exerted by a hegemon. That order has depended, in other words, on
the self-interest of an imperial or global power or powers to enforce it, either
alone or with the help of regional allies. In the absence of such a self-interested
power or powers, seafarers have generally been subject to the depredations of
criminals or state-sponsored privateers. This is how it has always been and will
continue to be for the foreseeable future. Those who argue that the security of a
global common can be exercised through treaties or “regimes,” rather than hege-
monic power, in anything other than a limited or temporary sense have scant ev-
idence upon which to base their faith.
In Grotius’s vision this anarchic state applied only to the high seas—that is to
say, the area beyond the territorial limit. In reality it existed right up to the coast
of any and every state that was unable to enforce its own will over its territorial
waters. The same applies today in the case of failed states, such as Somalia, Sierra
Leone, and Papua–New Guinea.40 In the case of weak states such as Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Bangladesh, it can also extend right up the coast in some ar-
eas and can even affect major ports such as Chittagong or Lagos if the authorities
are underfunded or corrupt. Failed and weak states can provide criminals and
terrorists with sanctuary. Weak states where order is more a semblance than a re-
ality can, ironically, provide more secure shelter for criminals and terrorists than
do failed states, because weak but corruptible law enforcement can protect them
from internal enemies and deter external powers and international organiza-
tions from pursuing them directly, by the fear that such action will make an al-
ready bad situation worse.
What Is the Role of the United States?
What then is the role of the United States, and what has it to do with the suppres-
sion of piracy and maritime terrorism? The United States must pursue its
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self-interest; it must “please itself in the process of serving the general good”;
otherwise, “a praiseworthy desire to improve conditions here or there must
prove too shallow a motive to bear the traffic when unexpected costs are suf-
fered.”41 That general good manifestly includes the maintenance of good order
and freedom of movement at sea. Although the United States prides itself on its
maritime heritage, it is more of a continental island than a nation that depends
on the sea. Vast oceans have protected it, and it has historically been untroubled
by anything other than homegrown maritime disorder. It therefore subscribes to
the illusion that maritime security is at most times and in most places a law en-
forcement problem, one that is properly the concern of coast guards. This is
strange, given that the first serious action in which the fledging U.S. Navy en-
gaged was the suppression of Barbary piracy. But then again, perhaps not—the
predators of the Barbary Coast were in fact servants of the Barbary states, who
owed allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. They were, in other words, not pirates in
pursuit of private gain but effectively privateers; they provided these local lords
with what today would be termed “contractor support.” What the Navy was con-
fronting then was not a law enforcement problem but a political one, because
what the Barbary pirates did was perfectly legal.42
Consequently, although the U.S. Coast Guard has a leading role when it comes
to ensuring maritime security in home waters, it can play only a supporting role
globally, because the problem, which is primarily political, is the same now as it
was then. This is undoubtedly the case when it comes to international waters.
The suggestion that operations on inland and coastal waters are substantially
different from those on deep water (and, by implication, that the former is more
suited to coast-guard activity whereas the latter is the preserve of the gray-hulled
navy) is seductive but wrong.43 Although each venue has different operational
characteristics, they are essentially a continuum that criminals, insurgents, and
terrorists have no hesitation in exploiting. The Navy must do the same. The ad-
vantages cited for coast guards include a lower political profile that, it is said, is
less threatening in situations where sovereignty is an issue and the fact that they
are generally cheaper to establish and maintain.44 The argument also seeks to
draw a hard line between the “defense of trade” and “constabulary” missions,
but this line will be increasingly hard to draw as the seas become more crowded
and the operational seascape more complex.
The Political Dimension of Naval Operations
Navies are different from the other armed services. Killing people and breaking
things in the service of the state constitute only part of what they do—histori-
cally, only a very small part. Navies have always been aware of the political conse-
quences of their actions. They have therefore often been more willing than other
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armed services to exert their influence politically rather than militarily. The
growing political challenge will be to secure both the ocean spaces and the
coastal waters, upon which human activity will encroach more and more. It will
require political sensitivity more than law enforcement acumen. It will also re-
quire that all the levers of national power be applied and focused with political
confidence and determination. Providing that the U.S. Navy can absorb the les-
sons that ground forces have learned so painfully over the last half-century and
adapt its force structure and training accordingly, it has the substantially greater
resources and the vital relationships with its naval counterparts that will be nec-
essary to tackle the maritime security role effectively.
But, given the current wave of anti-Americanism that is sweeping the world,
is America in a position to anchor the global maritime order? It appears that
anything America touches or anything with which it is associated is tainted and
provokes an immediate and negative reaction. But even if so, there is no alterna-
tive to American leadership, for the moment at least. The effect of this wave of
resentment and suspicion has been to set American political and military lead-
ers a very delicate task. When promoting the “thousand-ship navy” the United
States is right to be as backward as it can be when coming forward. Necessary hu-
mility is not, however, a substitute for clear leadership. Free markets demand
free movement at sea, free from harm. Subtlety is not a substitute for strength
but its servant. As Teddy Roosevelt admonished: “Speak softly and carry a big
stick; you will go far.”
The Future of Maritime Disorder
Piracy and terrorism show no apparent links, but the presence of piracy is a pos-
sible indicator that the conditions exist for maritime insurgency or maritime
terrorism to take root.45 As the issue has been put, “While we should not take pi-
racy as a marker for terrorism, it is a useful indicator of the level of security in
the area.”46 How maritime insurgents and terrorists might exploit opportunities
in the future can only be a matter of speculation. What will motivate them, how-
ever, is quite clear. The constraints, geography and opportunity, will remain the
same, and so too will the imperative: the need to respond to political circum-
stances on land.47 Only if political circumstances change on land will insurgents
and terrorists need to operate at sea. Among the salient characteristics of salafist,
Islamist terrorism have been its mobility and its willingness to support local
groups with specialist knowledge, even if that support amounts to little more
than advice and political exhortation. The concern must be that unless naval
forces are prepared to confront such eventualities, there is a good chance those
groups will succeed.
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For example, if U.S. forces are constrained to operate from sea bases because
local conditions preclude secure land bases, a sea base might well become a tar-
get if it is in confined waters, such as those of the Persian Gulf or the eastern
Mediterranean.48 Alternatively, if salafist organizations are able to gain foot-
holds in areas where political change or instability might allow them to operate
with greater freedom than they do now, and where the sea might offer them sig-
nificant opportunities, that combination might increase the incentive to place
greater emphasis on the development of a maritime capability than is the case
currently. In the first instance, it is likely that terrorists and insurgents will de-
velop the capacity to do more of what they are doing now—moving cadres,
equipment, and money. Thereafter they could possibly build on this expertise to
develop an attack and area-denial capability to interdict international trade,
hinder the free movement of naval forces, and impede access to littoral waters.
Keeping the constraints of geography and opportunity firmly in mind, South-
east Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean are all maritime
theaters surrounded by large Islamic populations, which if Islamist attitudes
take hold could develop into areas of future conflict.
THE GAP IN THE CONTINUUM
Confronting these challenges is what navies do. The U.S. Navy is the interna-
tional “cop on the beat.” It cannot be everywhere, but it needs to demonstrate
that it recognizes that at least two aspects of maritime security—the defense of trade
from criminal and political threats and the suppression of maritime insurgency—
are key parts of its mission. It also needs to be able to demonstrate that it can op-
erate across the continuum, from blue water to brown water. As Admiral Mullen
has said, “We cannot sit out in the deep blue, waiting for the enemy to come to
us. . . . We must go to him.”49 To do that effectively will mean changing some of
the ways it does its job. It needs to recognize that there is a significant gap in the
continuum. Recent U.S. doctrine has viewed the littorals as a space over which
expeditionary forces must leap from the fleet to the land, rather than a vital hu-
man and economic space that is often poorly secured, to the point that disrup-
tive, subversive, and criminal elements can operate in it to their advantage and to
the detriment of the host nation and the international community.
Intelligence is key. Technical intelligence-gathering methods might provide
the Navy with a vital edge, or they might not. Currently a heavy investment is be-
ing made in a system of fused sensors to deliver “maritime domain awareness.”
Modern warships depend increasingly on their sensors to interrogate their envi-
ronment. However, in any “war among the people,” empathy is as important as
data.50 Dependence on technical intelligence can make any force deaf to the hu-
man factor.51 Once deaf to that, it is blind to complexity.
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The only way navies will be able to gather this human intelligence is to behave
like their nineteenth-century predecessors by stepping off their ships into boats
and onto land. Sailors will need to recognize that, like ground forces, they will
have to sacrifice a degree of force protection in order to gather information and
interact with the people they are there to win over.
The need, in other words, is to redevelop the old naval virtue of presence. Not
merely persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the cur-
rent grail of the intelligence community, but physical presence—ships regularly
on station demonstrating particular interest in, and commitment to, the sea
peoples of weak and failing states. It cannot fulfill this task alone, which is why it
needs to develop close relationships with navies around the world and develop
workable and interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures with navies in
critical and vulnerable areas. The thousand-ship-navy concept encapsulates this
idea. It is an idea that has been misunderstood or mischievously misrepresented
but that if taken forward on the terms of broad equality outlined at the outset
could provide a workable platform for the suppression of maritime disorder.52
The presence of pirates and terrorists is a wake-up call. Their activities serve to
remind the Navy that it cannot stand offshore immune to the complex forms of
warfare that have appeared on land, where the lines between the criminal and the
political have been blurred. The heightened political content of that warfare also
means that the Navy cannot interpret the adjective “maritime,” as in “maritime
counterterrorism,” or even the broad sweep of “maritime security” as “naval” and
therefore take the lead role. It has a role, in many cases an underestimated one, but
as part of a larger interagency force that, under clear political leadership, is able to
draw on all elements of national power, including diplomatic, humanitarian, and
informational. For a navy like the U.S. Navy, though, working with all these ele-
ments is hard-wired into its blood.
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MARITIME TERRORISM
Focusing on the Probable
Richard Farrell
As groups prepare to memorialize the sixth anniversary of 9/11, Americansseem to have forgotten that terrorism has long had a prominent role in
American history. Geoffrey Blainey describes American anarchists and assassins
in the 1900s who were the equivalent of modern suicide bombers.1 Blainey re-
minds us that terrorism killed an American president (William McKinley) in
1901, a hundred years before 9/11.
Currently, there is a great deal of angst about maritime terrorism, but is it jus-
tified? Fueling the anxiety is the fact that the world’s oceans sustain the global
economy. At any given time, forty thousand vessels are chugging across the
world’s oceans—globalization’s superhighway—employing more than a million
seafarers of virtually every nationality. Over the last four decades, seaborne trade
has nearly quadrupled.2 The U.S. Maritime Administration reports that more
than seven million shipping containers enter American ports each year.3
Concerns about maritime security and the vulnerability of maritime assets
were reinforced by an incident in October 2001. At the southern Italian port of
Gioia Tauro, a suspected al-Qa‘ida terrorist was found inside a maritime ship-
ping container, equipped for the duration of the con-
tainer’s intended voyage. Intelligence sources say
other containers similarly fitted out were found at the
Italian port. This alarming discovery underlined the
tension between the needs of international security,
economic freedom, and global trade.4
Despite the headlines, articles, and books written
since 9/11, however, a terrorist attack at sea is not
After graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Richard
Farrell was a naval flight officer in several Pacific Fleet
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necessarily imminent. Various terrorism studies, particularly a RAND Corpora-
tion analysis in 1983, argue that terrorism is overwhelmingly a land-based phe-
nomenon.5 The National Targeting Center documented 651 terrorist attacks in
2004; however, only two were maritime attacks. The first was a suicide attack ini-
tially intended for Iraq’s Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal but actually conducted
against a small boat from the coastal patrol ship USS Firebolt (PC 10); the second
was the bombing of the Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, in the Philippines.6 Why
were there only two attacks in the seemingly vulnerable maritime domain?
Given the small percentage of terrorist acts at sea, is increased attention of lim-
ited maritime forces justified?
Several Department of Defense officials and executives in other government
agencies believe that tracking all worldwide maritime vessels is the key to defeat-
ing terrorism at sea. While having visibility of ship locations is an important
piece of the puzzle, however, more focus is needed on a different aspect of terror-
ism at sea. Maritime counterterrorism and antiterrorism should concentrate on
disrupting the movement of people, terror-related cargo, and financial support of
terror groups. Rather than using ships as weapons or targets, terrorists are using
criminal activities at sea to support land-based terrorism.
WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
Because of the requirement to capture headlines, terrorists are under constant
pressure to do something new. Terror groups also have access to media reports
detailing the economic impact of maritime trade on globalization. Conse-
quently, some maritime experts claim that a single well-aimed terrorist attack
could paralyze global maritime commerce.7 Others observe that most of the
world’s manufacturing capability is dependent on just-in-time delivery of com-
ponents; they claim that a major attack on shipping could interrupt just-in-time
deliveries and strike a staggering blow to the global economy.8
In contrast, this article seeks to show that a major maritime attack is not pre-
ordained. Maritime targets are harder to attack than those on land, and most
terror groups do not have the experience or expertise to do so successfully. The
few terror groups that do have maritime skills are unable to project their power
past their home turf and depend enormously upon their relationship with locals
to “blend into the crowd” after an attack.
The real issue to be confronted is the conservation of resources. The West has
a fixed stock of resources, people, and platforms with which to counter global
terrorism. The United States and its partners must focus on land-based terror-
ism and sever its support rather than invest maritime resources against unlikely
terrorist actions at sea.
* * * * * * *
F A R R E L L 4 7
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:34 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
53
War College: Summer 2007 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
This is not to say that terror groups do not consider seaports, commercial ship-
ping, and international cruise lines attractive targets.9 Al-Qa‘ida initiated a mari-
time terror campaign several months before 9/11, and many Americans believe
that it has the capability to conduct successful attacks on maritime targets today.
They assert that the suicide attacks in Yemen and the Persian Gulf demonstrate
al-Qa‘ida’s ability to terrorize global shipping.10 In January 2000, a U.S. Navy
warship made a port call in Yemen as part of a Central Command effort to in-
crease military-to-military contacts and cooperation.11 The guided-missile de-
stroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) found itself in al-Qa‘ida’s crosshairs: a
small boat loaded with explosives was prepared to ram into the destroyer. The
would-be suicide bombers pushed the boat down the landing and into the water.
However, the explosives weighed too much and sank the boat.12
The al-Qa‘ida cell involved held a meeting in Malaysia just days after the Sulli-
vans failure. Tawfiq bin Attash, an Osama Bin Laden lieutenant and primary
maritime planner, flew to Malaysia to attend the meeting and set up another at-
tack on a U.S. warship.13 That October, having reviewed tactics at the Malaysia
meeting, the cell pursued a second attack, in Aden, Yemen. This time it was suc-
cessful; a small-boat attack against the USS Cole (DDG 67) killed seventeen sail-
ors and severely damaged the ship.14
Another scheme to attack American warships was discovered in Singapore.
The cell planning the Singapore attacks was affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, an
Islamic terror group with links to al-Qa‘ida.15 Jemaah Islamiyah planned to at-
tack ships steaming along Sembawang, on Singapore’s north coast. Mirroring
the Cole tactics, the markings on a captured Jemaah Islamiyah map identified a
strategic kill zone where the channel was narrow. A warship would not have
room to avoid a collision with an explosive-filled suicide boat. Still, the attacks
were not accomplished, because the Jemaah Islamiyah cell could not implement
the plan by itself, lacking maritime capability and expertise. The plot was dis-
rupted shortly after 9/11, along with plans to conduct land-based terrorism
against American businessmen.16
In October 2002, the Limburg, a 299,000-ton oil tanker, was attacked during
an approach to the pilot station at Mina Al-Dabah, Yemen.17 One crew member
died, and ninety thousand barrels of crude spilled into the sea. Investigations
confirmed that a boat filled with explosives had rammed the vessel after failing
to find a U.S. warship.18 The most recent attack against American ships occurred
in August 2005. In it, al-Qa‘ida’s targets were the amphibious assault ship USS
Kearsarge (LHD 3) and dock landing ship USS Ashland (LSD 48) alongside a pier
in Aquaba, Jordan.19 The terrorists failed, killing a Jordanian guard but no
Americans.
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MARITIME TERROR GROUPS
One major reason for the small number of maritime attacks is that only a few
terror organizations have the capability to conduct them, even in their own areas
of influence. However, one terror organization with vigorous maritime exper-
tise is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Its maritime branch, the Sea
Tigers, has pioneered modern maritime terrorism. LTTE’s struggle for an inde-
pendent Hindu Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka has included hundreds
of maritime attacks and suicide bombings that have killed more than sixty-four
thousand people.20
The Sea Tigers have successfully executed small-boat suicide attacks since
1984. The Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs declares
that the Sea Tigers “have taken on the Sri Lankan Navy with unprecedented suc-
cess.” Its study claims that they have destroyed 30 to 50 percent of Sri Lanka’s na-
val coastal craft, an impressive statistic, as patrol boats are the mainstay of the Sri
Lankan navy.21 The Sea Tigers’ maritime terror tactics, wealth of experience, and
success with maritime terror have been studied by other terrorist groups, al-
though the LTTE’s own terror operations have been confined to Sri Lanka.22
Maritime terrorism is a serious regional security concern in Southeast Asia as
well. This area is of critical importance to the United States, because of the
amount of maritime trade passing through and its significance in its own right
to the global economy. Southeast Asia has a terrorist organization that pos-
sessed, until recently, robust maritime capabilities, the Abu Sayyaf Group, oper-
ating out of the Philippines. It conducted maritime attacks in the region for
years. The group followed an effective maritime attack doctrine. It executed
well-planned mobile operations and was adept in guerrilla tactics. It had rap-
port with and support from local fighters. It skillfully dispersed into small
groups when pursued and blended in with sympathetic local civilians. Abu
Sayyaf demonstrated a gruesome willingness to kill or injure Muslims in urban
terror operations designed to divert government attention from its own moun-
tain hideouts. It conducted information operations, including dissemination of
false information on VHF radio.23
Abu Sayyaf members and followers (regardless of faction) belong to Muslim
families with strong, centuries-old seafaring traditions. This is an important
distinction, one that separates the organization from al-Qa‘ida and other major
Islamic terror groups. Its mastery of the maritime domain and support of the lo-
cal population gave it ample capability to conduct maritime terrorism in South-
east Asia. In May 2001, Abu Sayyaf abducted three American citizens and
seventeen Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan. The incident received
international coverage because several of the victims, including one of the
Americans, were murdered and beheaded.24 The Dos Palmas incident triggered
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BALIKATAN 02-1, a joint operation aimed at destroying Abu Sayyaf. The end re-
sult was the neutralization of many Abu Sayyaf members in 2002, including the
reported death of one of its main leaders, Abu Sabaya, and the eventual death of
the head of the Sulu faction, known as Commander Robot.25 With their downfall,
a great deal of expertise on how to execute maritime terrorist attacks was lost.
Various analysts have examined Abu Sayyaf ’s historical and financial ties with
al-Qa‘ida.26 While connections are clearly documented, not much has come of
al-Qa‘ida’s outreach to Abu Sayyaf. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad
were sent before 9/11 to work with Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and create an
al-Qa‘ida spin-off.27 Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing, began training Abu Sayyaf members, and with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mu-
hammad, he helped set up the first al-Qa‘ida cell in the Philippines. However, in
1995 an accidental fire in their safe house compromised their plots and plans.
Ramzi Yousef was captured, convicted, and incarcerated in 1998;28 Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad was captured in Pakistan in 2003.29
MARITIME THREAT SCENARIOS
If few terror groups have expertise at sea, what are the threats to the maritime
domain? Concern has been voiced about several scenarios: smuggling terrorists,
weapons of mass destruction or WMD components in containers, dangerous
cargo ships used as weapons, attacks on oil tankers to disrupt global oil trade, at-
tacks on infrastructure around ports, and terrorist attacks on ferries.30
The George W. Bush administration gives WMD top priority, a concern re-
flected in the National Strategy for Maritime Security.31 The smuggling of a
WMD or components in a shipping container into a U.S. port is one of the most
specifically and frequently mentioned scenarios by legislators in Washington,
D.C.32 That is in concert with the president’s Maritime Security Strategy, but the
probability of a WMD attack via a container, though it cannot be reliably esti-
mated, is certainly lower than the probability of any other type of terrorist at-
tack.33 However, the potential consequences require serious attention, and the
United States has taken steps to mitigate the WMD threat.
Experts and legislators are concerned about a WMD smuggled in a container
on a truck, ship, or railroad; however, effective response is a double-edged blade.
Standardized shipboard containers have revolutionized maritime cargo. Be-
cause they can be off-loaded quickly from ships and loaded easily onto trucks or
rail cars, standardized containers have become indispensable to world com-
merce, as well as targets for crime and terrorism.34 Tracking shipboard contain-
ers is complicated by the amount of paperwork and the number of people
involved. The movement of each container is part of a transaction that can in-
volve up to twenty-five different parties: buyers, sellers, inland freighters and
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shipping lines, customs and cargo brokers, financiers and governments. A single
trade can generate thirty to forty documents, and each container can carry cargo
for several customers. A typical large containership can carry up to six thousand
twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEU),* associated with up to forty thousand doc-
uments. Approximately seven million TEUs arrived in America’s container ports
by sea in 2006, which translates into around seventeen thousand actual boxes a
day.35 To reduce the manpower required to process the numerous documents,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has accelerated development of a
new information management system, the Automated Commercial Environ-
ment. It will enable CBP to automate evaluation of high-risk shipments, includ-
ing cargo containers, as well as speed up customs filing processes for American
importers.36
Another major issue is that containers are “intermodal”—they can travel by
sea or on land, by road or rail. An intermodal system is difficult to regulate, be-
cause it crosses jurisdictional boundaries. On a ship at sea, a container comes
under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United
Nations body. On land or in a seaport, these containers pass into the hands of
national governments, which may have separate legislation for different trans-
port modes. All this creates a problem in implementing international regula-
tions.37 Despite these challenges, in December 2002 the IMO adopted more
stringent international standards for the security of ports and vessels, the Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security Code; however, some skeptics believe
the IMO lacks the resolve to enforce the code.38
Augmenting the IMO’s international security actions, the U.S. government
has taken several steps to keep track of container contents arriving in U.S. ports.
Programs such as the Container Security Initiative, the twenty-four-hour rule,†
and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism have increased the difficulty
of smuggling a WMD or components into American ports.39 Additionally, Op-
eration SAFE COMMERCE, a pilot project conducted by the Transportation Safety
Administration (TSA), verifies the contents of sea containers at their point of
loading, ensures their physical security in transit, and tracks them to their final
destinations.40
Container issues aside, terrorist groups face several technical challenges in
obtaining working WMD devices. First, it is difficult for them to get weaponized
nuclear, biological, or chemical materials.41 Additionally, as the North Koreans
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showed the world, it is extremely challenging to produce a substantial nuclear
yield even in highly controlled conditions.42 Also, attempting to build or deto-
nate a WMD device for terror attack is fraught with health hazards. If the WMD
materials are not assembled and conveyed in secure spaces or behind shielding,
the builders will be exposed to lethal doses of biological agents, toxic chemicals,
or radiation, or will suffer severe burns.43 Few nations, much less transnational
terror groups, have the facilities to create, assemble, or ship nuclear or biological
weapons safely. Finally, a nuclear device would likely require so much shielding
that it would be nearly impossible to move or hide from port authorities.44
Another container-related smuggling threat is a relatively weak radiological
bomb, or “dirty bomb.” Radiological bombs, made from less radioactive and
more common materials than standard nuclear weapons, are easier to build and
deploy. However, they would produce a much smaller physical impact and cause
fewer human casualties.45 They are adequate “fear” weapons but would not in-
flict the spectacular results that al-Qa‘ida seeks. Consequently, most terror at-
tacks are planned and executed with relatively accessible conventional
explosives.
Dangerous Cargo Ships
Another hot topic of maritime vulnerability concerns ships carrying dangerous
cargo. The Homeland Security Council has specifically included terrorist attacks
on ships with flammable and toxic cargos in its national preparedness standards.46
One author believes that a single LNG tanker exploding in Boston Harbor would
wipe out the city’s downtown areas. 47 Some maritime experts disagree, acknowl-
edging the security information about LNG tankers provided by several govern-
ment agencies but believing the concern overstated.48
A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements,
operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered
over the last sixty years.49 It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first-
century threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward—that in the highly
unlikely event of a very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or wa-
ter, significant effects will be felt in the immediate vicinity.50 However, the zone
of impact would not extend anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some
groups.51 As long as an LNG vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud
reaching a populated area would quickly find an ignition source and burn back to
the spill site before it could cover large numbers of people. If inflicting mass casual-
ties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and tankers are not good targets.52
Experts believe, however, that other dangerous cargos—such as poisonous
gas, ammonium nitrate, and other volatile chemicals—in bulk carriers could
pose a serious threat if the ships were seized by terrorists and used as weapons.
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Certain dangerous-cargo ships have come under close scrutiny from the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, in particular by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
has created security teams to assess fifty-five militarily and economically strate-
gic ports. It has also completed special assessments of several classes of vessels,
including ferries, LNG tankers, certain dangerous-cargo barges, and single-skin
tank vessels. Based upon these assessments, the Coast Guard will escort vessels
that are potential security threats; further, it has developed a port security
risk-assessment tool to establish risk-based profiles of incoming vessels.53
Tankers in Port or Offshore Facilities
A common scenario in Department of Defense exercises is an attack on an oil
tanker or coastal petroleum facility to disrupt oil trade. According to the Los An-
geles Times the Limburg attack may have been conducted to do just that, by caus-
ing consternation among oil tanker operators.54 The bombing caused insurance
rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300 percent and reduced Yemeni port ship-
ping volumes by 50 percent.55 Still, while this was bad news for Yemen, it did not
bring the global oil economy to its knees.
Contrast the Limburg incident with the Tanker War between Iran and Iraq in
the Persian Gulf between 1984 and 1987. Lloyd’s of London estimates that the
Tanker War seriously damaged 546 commercial vessels, killed about 430 civilian
mariners, and critically damaged the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Iran.56 But if
the campaign effectively crippled the Iranian oil industry for years, it encour-
aged oil stock building elsewhere, a rise in industrial production in consumer
countries, and an increase in production by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to stabilize global oil production and consump-
tion.57 A study on the five most recent shocks to the oil economy finds, “It is re-
markable, looking back at that turbulent period [1980–87] that the major stock
market indexes in the U.S. were little affected by the events in the oil market.”58
Given, then, that an all-out war between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf, with
nearly indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping, causing the loss of over five
hundred oil tankers, did not cripple the oil economy, it is a stretch to believe that
an isolated terror attack against an oil tanker could strangle it today. Certainly,
oil prices might spike; however, during the past five years shocks to the global oil
economy increased petroleum prices, but in each case market pressures eventu-
ally subsided and oil prices slid back to almost preshock values.59
Infrastructure around Ports
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the security of ports themselves has
emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on homeland security. Many
security experts believe ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack because of their
F A R R E L L 5 3
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size, their easy accessibility by water and land, and the tremendous amount of
cargo they handle.60
As a result of all this attention, U.S. ports have taken enormous strides to re-
duce their vulnerabilities. The Coast Guard has provided for each a “captain of
the port,” the lead federal official for the security and safety of the vessels and
waterways in his or her geographic zone;61 the arrangement would streamline
the command and control of any federal response. The Coast Guard and CBP
have improved the quality and timing of information to be provided by ship-
pers and carriers with which the vulnerability of ports and the terrorist risk to
ships are evaluated.62 In addition to Operation SAFE COMMERCE the TSA has
fielded the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), a tamper-
resistant biometric badge for workers requiring unescorted access to secure
areas of port facilities, outer continental shelf facilities, or vessels.63 The TWIC
is currently on track with an initial enrollment at a select few ports in March
2007. The Transportation Safety Administration predicts that it will be opera-
tional in 2007.64
Enforcement resources cannot be everywhere at all times. Security forces
must be enduring, sustainable, and able to accommodate both local and re-
gional requirements. On top of this, they must be flexible enough to adjust to
changing security levels. The post-9/11 environment has produced marine en-
forcement units with a special operations flavor, as opposed to merely patrol-
ling. For example, the Coast Guard has created active-duty, multimission,
mobile teams with specialized capabilities to close critical security gaps in the
nation’s strategic seaports.65
Despite the progress that has been made in strengthening port security, many
officials still describe seaports as “wide open”and “very vulnerable” to a terrorist
attack.66 In contrast to this claim is the fact that Congress provided over $650
million through fiscal year 2005 in direct federal grants to ports to improve op-
erational and physical security. This “plus-up” was in addition to the budgets of
the Coast Guard, CBP, TSA, and other federal agencies involved in port secu-
rity.67 Efforts by the U.S. government and the international community to im-
prove port security are proceeding at an unprecedented pace.68
Ferry Attacks
Policy makers and government officials frequently cite passenger ferries as a key
maritime security concern. In 2005, a congressman declared, “There is a serious
security gap in our ferry systems and we need to ensure that passengers on our
nation’s waterways are protected.”69 A RAND study in 2006 argued that attacks
on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists,
since they would be easy to execute, could kill many people, would likely draw
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significant media attention, and could demonstrate a terrorist group’s salience
and vibrancy.70
In a 2006 report, the Department of Justice identified ferry bombing as
among the most likely types of maritime terror attacks.71 It reached this conclu-
sion largely on the basis of the number of suspicious incidents reported at ma-
rine facilities in the Seattle area. However, the Seattle office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has suggested that the Justice Department’s high ranking of the
passenger ferry threat arises from more aggressive reporting of suspicious inci-
dents in that region than elsewhere in the country.72 FBI officials stated that they
have never been able to tie a specific suspicious incident to a terrorist group or
plan in the United States.73 While there appears to be a logical case for ferries as a
terrorist target, then, questions remain about actual terrorist activities related to
American ferries.74 Two positive by-products of all this attention are that it has
caused law enforcement to focus on ferries and that it has raised citizen aware-
ness with respect to out-of-the-ordinary activities on and near ferries. These two
trends will reduce the ability of terrorists to carry out a surprise attack on a ferry.
The fundamental implication of the attention and money being spent on the
previous scenarios is best summed up by a recent Congressional Research Ser-
vice report: “An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the
global maritime threat should be driven by what is probable rather than what is
merely possible. Sober analysis of the issue has been clouded amid anxiety cre-
ated by the global security climate with much of the discussion based on the no-
tion that maritime terrorists can strike any target with virtually any means
available.”75
Specifically—ships are being used as vectors for smuggling people and cargo
and laundering money to support land-based terrorism. Terrorist organiza-
tions, finding maritime attacks beyond their capability, are using maritime
cargo and ships as conveyances rather than as floating weapons. Like drug smug-
glers, terrorists are trying to blend in with the environment and not draw atten-
tion to their human cargo, containers, and financial support.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Thus, efforts to combat terrorism at sea should be focused on interdicting ter-
rorists attempting to sneak into the United States via a ship and on intercepting
terror-related materials aboard ships. By tracking people, cargo, and money, we
can disrupt a plan to use a small boat laden with explosives rather than simply
react to the attack.
Robert Bonner, former head of the Customs Service, has proposed that Amer-
ica create a new “electronic” (rather than physical), border, profiling the contents of
F A R R E L L 5 5
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containers in sophisticated data banks that collect and combine electronic docu-
ments existing in both government and commercial sources.76 He wants to con-
centrate on the top ten container ports; focusing on a few key ports and making
shipping companies face expensive delays unless they can validate cargo security,
he argues, are critical steps if the United States is to control containers.77
A great deal of information analysis on smuggled terrorists is still manpower
intensive. We need to leverage information technology and automate all sources
of maritime intelligence, freeing maritime analysts and operators to analyze the
bits of information that trickle in rather than having first to find the data and
package it in a usable format. As we share more information, we will have to auto-
mate its products in order to give everyone involved the ability to see the big pic-
ture and find previously hidden patterns or suspicious activities. We need to
automate our intelligence and operational inputs to enable peer-group review
of all source information.
Another issue absorbing a great deal of manpower is the attempt to find
anomalous behaviors. Terror groups, as we have seen, are interested in smug-
gling their operatives and terror-related materials and protecting their financial
backing, not in disrupting their primary method of transport. Like drug smug-
glers, they want to act in as normal and outwardly law-abiding a way as possible,
in order not to draw attention from authorities. Therefore, spending precious
capital on finding overt anomalies distracts from the war on terror and will
likely find only errant fishing vessels.
The war against terrorism is primarily a war of information. Interagency and
international cooperation is critical to putting together the pieces of the intelli-
gence puzzle. Progress has been made in breaking down the “stovepipes,” but
much more cooperation and free flow of information need to occur. The new
threat environment requires that the government not keep its security cards
close to its chest.78 Cooperation between credentialed agencies would help solve
a key problem—the inability of law enforcement officials and investigators in
the field to share their information with one another or other nations.79
Overclassification also requires attention. It is easy to stamp documents with
high classifications, to be “safe rather than sorry”; however, in doing so we cheat
ourselves out of the benefit of another organization’s analysis and viewpoint. We
need to move from a mind-set of “need to know” to one of “need to share.”
Another area requiring consistent American support is international collabo-
ration of maritime forces. U.S. maritime forces cannot be everywhere; they must
rely on partnerships for presence, information, and infrastructure. An example
of successful American outreach involves the Yemeni coast guard. Modeling it-
self on the U.S. Coast Guard, Yemen’s coast guard has established district bases
in the ports of Hodeidah and Aden. The three-year-old fleet has had a string of
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interdiction successes and has gained a regional reputation for tough law en-
forcement, particularly among those transporting undocumented workers.80
The United States must continue to take advantage of maritime forces offered
by international partnerships. For example, NATO ships are patrolling through-
out the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to nonmili-
tary traffic through the Strait of Gibraltar to help detect, deter, and protect
against terrorist activity. The operation, called ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, has evolved
out of NATO’s immediate response to 9/11.81 The alliance deployed its Standing
Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean on 6 October 2001 in a demonstration
of resolve and solidarity in the wake of the attacks, following the invocation of
Article 5, the collective-defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty.82
Recognizing critical gaps in their ability to identify and prioritize maritime
threats in the Malacca Straits, a zone of worldwide importance, several U.S.
combatant commands have partnered with the Republic of Singapore in an ini-
tiative called Comprehensive Maritime Awareness. The project utilizes technol-
ogy and information sharing to enhance maritime domain awareness in one of
the world’s busiest shipping lanes.83 Singapore’s involvement is critical; it is
astride major shipping lanes adjacent to the Strait of Malacca. This kind of inter-
national program for information sharing, technology, and maritime partner-
ship will help close the seams in Southeast Asia. If this initiative works, it will
need to be exported to all global shipping choke points.
We have made great strides in force protection, port security measures, and
multiagency cooperation, but we have accomplished only the easiest tasks. Agencies,
governments, and businesses in the maritime environment need to reach out to
each other and collaborate effectively. They need also to recognize that disruption of
criminal enterprises at sea is a lynchpin of security. Terrorists use smuggling, covert
financial mechanisms, and other criminal enterprises to support their land-based
activities.84 Turning a ship into a floating bomb may appear to be attractive to a
terror organization, but actually doing it is much more difficult than attacking a
land target. We must focus antiterror and counterterror efforts on what is most
probable—criminal activities at sea that support terrorism on land—rather
than on such a long-shot terror option as using a ship as a weapon.
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U.S. NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE BLACK SEA
Sending Mixed Messages
Deborah Sanders
Naval diplomacy—the use of naval power in peacetime to secure influence—by contemporary navies is seen by many as playing a vital and unique role
in promoting the international aims of governments.1 The U.S. Navy’s Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, clearly recognizes the diplomatic
utility of naval power: “Navies are not only critical, decisive, and enabling in
times of war, but they may be even more important in maintaining the peace.”2
Naval diplomacy includes what Sir James Cable calls “gunboat diplomacy,”
which is “the use of threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war,
in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an inter-
national dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the juris-
diction of their own state.”3
Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests in a particular re-
gion, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle reminders of their
states’ military might and commitment.4 Naval diplomacy can support allies, in-
fluence neutrals, deter potential enemies, protect in-
terests, and uphold international law.5 American naval
diplomacy and foreign policy goals were clearly linked
in the 1994 strategic concept paper Forward . . . from
the Sea: “Naval forces are an indispensable and excep-
tional instrument of American foreign policy. From
conducting routine ship visits to nations and re-
gions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger
demonstrations of support to long standing regional
security interests. . . . US naval forces underscore US
Dr. Deborah Sanders is senior lecturer in defense studies
at King’s College London, located at the Joint Services
Command and Staff College in the Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, where she specializes in relations
between Russia and Ukraine since the latter’s indepen-
dence. She regularly visits Ukraine and is currently
working on Ukraine’s contribution to stability and se-
curity in the Black Sea. Her most recent publication is
Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Can It Com-
plete Military Transformation and Join the U.S.-Led
War on Terrorism? (2006).
Naval War College Review, Summer 2007, Vol. 60, No. 3
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:35 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
67
War College: Summer 2007 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
diplomatic initiatives overseas.”6 Naval diplomacy, then, is a way in which the
United States can use its naval power to achieve desired effects and advance for-
eign policy goals.
Or so, at least, it is widely assumed. Using American naval diplomacy in the
Black Sea during the summer of 2006 as a case study, this article questions the
generally accepted view of the diplomatic utility of naval power. It argues that
naval diplomacy can be counterproductive: that it can not only fail to produce
desired political effects but cause unintended and unforeseen damage. In the
Black Sea, the fallout of naval presence may ultimately damage American inter-
ests. This article, focusing on the preparations for a joint U.S.-Ukrainian multi-
national exercise, will illustrate how diplomatic goals of American naval
diplomacy were thwarted by Ukrainian domestic politics and how naval pres-
ence itself exacerbated already poor relations between Russia and Ukraine.
EXERCISE SEA BREEZE
American foreign policy objectives in the Black Sea are to secure the region from
terrorists and other security threats, promote democracy and stability, and en-
sure the free flow of goods and energy in this closed sea.7 The establishment of
U.S. military bases in Bulgaria and Romania signals the American geostrategic
stake.8 In theory, naval presence operates along a spectrum of influence, by
means of, variously, coercion (deterrence or compellence), “picture building”
(that is, a mental picture, conveyed to potential objects of coercion), and coali-
tion building.9 Lacking declared adversaries in the Black Sea, U.S. naval presence
here has no intended coercive role—though, as will be seen, that is perceived dif-
ferently in Russia.
The United States does, however, face a number of security challenges in this
region: illegal migration, human trafficking, and drugs and weapon smuggling,
as well as “a potential front in the global war against terrorism.”10 In addition,
the Black Sea has become a vital route for energy and goods.11
It is in this broad context that U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea pursues the
third fundamental task, coalition building—“a range of activity expressly in-
tended to secure foreign policy objectives not by threatening potential adversaries
but by influencing the behavior of allies and potentially friendly by-standers”—
through sending messages, reducing risk of conflict, offering reassurance, im-
proving interoperability, and allowing states to act jointly against common
threats.12 An important vehicle for coalition building in the Black Sea has been,
since 1997, SEA BREEZE, a joint and combined maritime and land exercise with
the principal goal of enhancing the interoperability and maritime capabilities of
Black Sea states.
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In the summer of 2006, SEA BREEZE was to be hosted by Ukraine and the
United States and conducted off the Crimea with seventeen participating states.13
The American embassy in Ukraine stated in a press release that the exercise was
“designed to improve cooperation and coordination between countries in the
Black Sea Region.”14 An additional aim was to support the Ukrainian govern-
ment, engaged in the complex task of building democracy after the Orange Rev-
olution of 2004. The United States was among the first states to reject the
fraudulent presidential elections in Ukraine in November 2004, and since then it
has actively encouraged state building at all levels, including military.15 For its
part, Ukraine sees multinational exercises like SEA BREEZE as aiding its own for-
eign policy objective of NATO membership, demonstrating progress in military
modernization, and increasing interoperability with NATO forces.
The United States began preparations for SEA BREEZE 2006 by hosting an Ini-
tial Planning Conference at the Ukrainian Naval Institute in Sevastopol in Octo-
ber 2005.16 The objectives were to establish each participating nation’s training
needs, a plan of action and milestones, manpower and equipment requirements,
cost estimates and funding availability, host-nation capabilities and logistical needs,
and a command and control structure, as well as to draft exercise scenarios.17 Such
preliminaries are vital, but it appears that neither U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), directly responsible for the exercise, nor the U.S. embassy in Kiev
thought through the likely effect of the upcoming Ukrainian parliamentary
elections on the exercise or American coalition building.
THE EFFECT OF U.S. NAVAL DIPLOMACY ON UKRAINE
The relationship between naval diplomacy and domestic political factors is
complex. It has been argued that success is in the eyes of the “locals,” that the
psychological environment of a “target” state affects its decision makers and “in-
ternal opinion forming groups.”18 Naval diplomacy, then, must take account of a
state’s political, historical, economic, and military worldview;19 domestic politics—
the policy environment, the decision-making arena, and internal pressures—shape
the parameters and likelihood of what can be achieved.20 The routine planning
and routine preparation for SEA BREEZE 2006, which were to be caught up in a
messy political crisis in Ukraine, became a case in point.
On 26 March 2006 Ukraine held parliamentary elections to decide the com-
position and priorities of its government. After the Orange Revolution a consti-
tutional package of reform had been agreed upon whereby Ukraine would move
toward a parliamentary, as opposed to a presidential, system of government after
the March elections. The new prime minister, who would form a cabinet to run
the government, would no longer be appointed by the president but instead be
drawn from the political party with the most seats in the Ukrainian parliament,
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the Rada, and would have significantly increased powers. The recently elected
president, Viktor Yushchenko, however, would continue to direct Ukraine’s for-
eign policy and in addition would appoint three members to the new cabinet—
for the interior, foreign, and defense ministries.
In the parliamentary election the Party of Regions, associated with Viktor
Yanukovych, Yushchenko’s discredited rival in the October 2004 presidential
elections, won the most seats. With more than 32 percent of the popular vote
Yanukovych’s party took 186 out of the 450 Rada seats. He was closely followed
by the party of Yulia Tymoshenko (Yushchenko’s former prime minister, who
had been unceremoniously sacked), which won more than 22 percent of the
popular vote and 129 seats. In a sign of growing discontent with the pace and
shape of the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko’s own party, Our Ukraine,
received a mere 14 percent of the vote and eighty-one Rada seats. Finally, the
Socialist party, which would later prove crucial, won thirty-three seats.
No party, then, had won a clear majority in the Rada. The new prime minister
found himself unable to form a new government, creating a stalemate.
Yushchenko held exhaustive talks with his former ally Tymoshenko about join-
ing their respective parties to form the next government. Personal animosity and
mistrust as well as differences over priorities ultimately thwarted the attempt,
producing a political stalemate that threatened the sustainability of democracy
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in Ukraine when it became clear that rather than accept Viktor Yanukovych as
the next prime minister, the president was seriously considering dissolving par-
liament and calling for fresh elections.
It was during this political impasse—when the absence of either a working
government or parliament made impossible the constitutionally required par-
liamentary authorization of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil—that, on 27 May
2006, the U.S.-flag merchant ship Advantage arrived at Feodosiya with five hun-
dred tons of construction material and equipment for use in that year’s SEA
BREEZE exercise. The cargo was for a temporary multinational training base to
be built at Starry Krym in the Crimea. U.S. Marine reservists and Navy person-
nel were also deployed to help the Ukrainian navy assemble hangar-type can-
teens and utility rooms.21
Inevitably, SEA BREEZE 2006 became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev
over the formation of a new coalition government.22 Within two weeks the ship
would be forced out of port, its equipment and cargo impounded by Ukrainian
customs, and the reservists forced to fly home, their mission unachieved. Absent
parliamentary approval of the exercise, the legality and constitutionality of
preparations for it were soon questioned. This political ambiguity and
postelection infighting created an ideal opportunity for the opposition party to
criticize the government. The Party of Regions called the unloading of Advan-
tage in Feodosiya an example of “brutal contempt” by the government for the
constitution. Amid similar media allegations, the foreign and defense ministers
(appointed by the president), as well as the prosecutor general, were forced to
declare on their own authority these preparations permissible under Ukrainian
law.23 The foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, stated that no Ukrainian law had
been breached, as Advantage was “a civil ship and consequently . . . subject to inter-
national trade law.”24
If the preparations for the exercise (largely involving the landing of foreign
military forces) were permissible under the constitution, formal authorization
would still be needed from the Rada. The foreign minister agreed that the exer-
cise could only begin after parliament had given its approval. On 4 August 2006
the Rada finally met and authorized the landing of foreign troops on Ukrainian
territory for the purpose of multinational exercises. But it was too late—SEA
BREEZE had been scheduled to begin two weeks before: the political atmosphere
had been poisoned, Yushchenko’s bargaining position in the formation of the
postelection government had been weakened, and discontent over Ukraine’s
foreign policy orientation had been brought to the surface.
The declared foreign policy goals of President Yushchenko were (and remain
today) full European Union and NATO membership, closer relations with the
United States, and, at the same time, a strategic partnership with Russia. His
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government had, however, been heavily criticized for failure to inform the public
of, and gain its support for, the plans to join NATO.25 Surveys in Ukraine have
shown that the majority of the Ukrainian people are opposed to NATO member-
ship, especially in the eastern part of the country and in the Crimea, where the
Russian Black Sea Fleet is based. The government’s attempt in this context to se-
cure parliamentary approval for the off-loading of Advantage became a light-
ning rod for a widespread campaign against the government’s proposed foreign
policy in general. Residents of Feodosiya blockaded the city’s port, protesting
what they saw as an attempt by NATO to establish a presence in the Black Sea.
Displaying placards with anti-NATO slogans, pickets prevented the American
reservists from preparing for the exercise, ultimately forcing them to abandon
the attempt. Within two days of the arrival of Advantage the Ukrainian defense
minister was forced to deny media reports that its landing party was to build a
NATO base near Feodosiya.26 Nonetheless, the public perception of SEA BREEZE
as a NATO rather than a multilateral, U.S.-sponsored operation took hold; the
day after the arrival of Advantage the Feodosiya town council declared the town
a “NATO-free area”;27 a week later the Crimean parliament declared the penin-
sula a “NATO-free territory.”28
The acrimonious debate about NATO membership soon spread to the feud-
ing political parties in Kiev. Public discontent in the Crimea was exploited fully
by opposition parties in the capital to embarrass the government and to force
concessions on NATO membership. Yevhen Kushnaryov, Rada member from
the Party of Regions, told a public protest at the Feodosiya seaport that Ukraine
was “faced with attempts to bring NATO into Ukraine by force.”29
Allegations in the press that Yushchenko’s government reacted too slowly to
the public protests now damaged the president. It took Yushchenko almost a
week to sign measures to deal with the crisis and decree preparations for the ex-
ercise. Only on 3 June did he confirm the exercise, call upon local councils to
abide by Ukrainian law, and direct local governments to take urgent measures to
maintain public order.30 The authorities in Kiev were also censured for failure to
provide sufficient information or counter misinformation about the planned
exercise.31 President Yushchenko blamed a lack of military coordination and
failure of the defense ministry to settle all the details of the exercise with local
authorities and international parties.32
The Party of Regions called for a referendum on NATO membership; Viktor
Yanukovych—finally seated as prime minister on 4 August on the basis of a coali-
tion with the Socialist Party—signaled that membership was unlikely to take
place for two or three years.33 In fact, the accord between the Party of Regions
and the Socialists spoke of “advancing” toward, rather than joining, NATO.34 In
2005 President Yushchenko and his team had worked tirelessly to fulfill the
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NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and had committed themselves to signing a NATO
Membership Action Plan by the end of 2006. Prime Minister Yanukovych and
his cabinet have radically altered that policy. During a visit to Brussels in Sep-
tember 2006, Prime Minister Yanukovych stated that Ukraine was not yet ready
to implement a formal plan for NATO membership; instead, Ukraine would fo-
cus on deepening its partnership with the alliance.35
CASTING A SHADOW: THE EFFECT ON NEIGHBORS
The strategic importance to Moscow of the Black Sea should not be underesti-
mated. Russia has more than twenty-five thousand personnel and almost two
hundred ships in the Black Sea. President Vladimir Putin declared that the
“Azov–Black Sea basin is in Russia’s zone of strategic interests”; the Black Sea, he
explained, “provides Russia with direct access to the most important global
transport routes, including economic ones.”36 Russia’s interest in the Black Sea
can also be explained by the historical importance of the Crimea, in particular
the port of Sevastopol, to its national identity. The Crimea is intrinsically con-
nected to the Russian nation’s foundational myths, some of them propagated by
the Soviet Union and then taken up by the Russian Federation.
Uneasy at the American presence in the Black Sea, the Russian Federation re-
fused to take part in the first SEA BREEZE, in 1997. A foreign ministry spokesman
stated that it would send only observers: “Russia still does not agree with the idea
of holding the exercises and has no plans to participate in them.”37 More re-
cently, poor relations between Russia and the United States in general, as well as
NATO and U.S. attempts to secure interests in the Black Sea, have increased Rus-
sian sensitivity to American naval presence in the region. Attempts by Russia to
build a strategic partnership after the 9/11 attacks failed, and U.S. support of the
democratic revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan strained relations.
By May 2006 Vice President Richard Cheney was accusing Russia of back-
pedaling on democracy and using its oil and gas to blackmail neighbors.38
The idea of pursuing an integrated Western strategy toward the Black Sea re-
gion has in fact steadily gained ground since the NATO Istanbul Summit of July
2004. The enlargement of the alliance to include Bulgaria and Romania raised
the issue of how it was to protect security and stability in the Black Sea. Re-
sponding to this prospect, the Russian defense minister, Sergey Ivanov, at a
meeting with his Turkish counterpart challenged expansion of NATO naval pa-
trols to the Black Sea; regional security, he declared, “should be ensured by the
forces of the Black Sea states.”39 Subsequent American efforts to initiate alliance
counterterrorism patrols have been blocked by active Russian participation in
the Black Sea Force—established in 2001 by the six littoral states for search and
rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine clearance, environmental protection, and
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goodwill visits. In July 2006 the Russian navy, represented by a large assault ship,
took part in the sixth iteration of a Black Sea Force exercise series, with Bulgaria,
Georgia, Turkey, Romania, and Ukraine.40
Russia has also been an avid supporter of Black Sea Harmony, a Turkish ini-
tiative to set up a naval force to combat terrorism in the region. In September
2006, under that rubric, Russian ships conducted a joint mission with the Turk-
ish navy.41 This patrol was specifically meant to “demonstrate Russian naval
presence in the Black Sea navigation areas.”42 It was to be, said Sergey Ivanov, the
Russian defense minister, Russia and Turkey, the two Black Sea countries pos-
sessing modern navies, that “are responsible for security in the Black Sea area.”43
Black Sea Harmony is accordingly viewed by many as an attempt to prevent
NATO from extending its successful multinational ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR series
from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.44
If this exercise in naval diplomacy was casting a shadow over Ukraine’s neigh-
bors, it was also exacerbating already difficult relations between Ukraine and
those neighbors. Relations between Russia and Ukraine had been particularly
strained. Even a deputy in the Russian Duma (parliament), Vladimir Ryzhkov,
acknowledged that meddling by President Putin in the Ukrainian 2004 presi-
dential election had alienated millions of Ukrainians.45 Also, in early 2006 the
Russian Gas Company, Gazprom, announced that it had cut off supplies of gas
to Ukraine. Only under pressure from Europe could Russia and Ukraine work
out a compromise.46 The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Rus-
sian government of economic pressure and blackmail.47
Feelings were still raw when the arrival of Advantage produced public pro-
tests. The Duma, aided by the Russian media, saw an opportunity to criticize
Ukraine’s NATO orientation directly. The Ukrainian defense minister, in turn,
alleged that the protests showed that certain Russian forces were meddling in
Ukraine’s internal affairs.48 The Ukrainian Security Council too believed that
foreigners, particularly Russians, were participating in the demonstrations in
the Crimea. The Russian media were also accused of whipping up public feeling
about NATO;49 for instance, Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies found them-
selves forced to deny Russian media reports that Ukrainian special forces had
been sent to Feodosiya to deal with the anti-NATO protests.50
The chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Re-
lations, Andrey Kokoshin, cautioned against what he saw as attempts by politi-
cians in Ukraine to drag the country into NATO.51 The Duma itself went even
farther, resolving that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would “lead to very negative
consequences for relations between our fraternal peoples.”52 The Ukrainian for-
eign ministry replied that the “edifying tone of the commentaries in the context
of cooperation of Ukraine with NATO used by the Russia side [during this
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:38 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
74
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 26
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/26
crisis] exceeds the limits of common international communication standards.”53 It
asserted that as a sovereign democratic state Ukraine had an inherent right to make
its own decisions about security and which security structures it would join.54
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
Plainly, navies need to prepare for and conduct presence operations more ef-
fectively than was done in this case study if they are to achieve desired diplo-
matic effects. The first lesson to emerge from this case study has already been
recognized by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S.
Navy—the need to improve cultural awareness within the service. Admiral
Mullen envisions that American sailors “will be expected to understand and
foster cooperation in cultures far different than our own.”55 Military personnel
engaged in planning for and participating in future coalition-building exercises
will clearly need to understand the culture, history, and sensitivities of host
states as well as of their neighbors. In Ukraine, plans for future exercises will
need to consider the complex and rapidly changing political environment in
the former Soviet Union as well as Ukraine’s difficult relations with its larger
neighbor—the Russian Federation.
The second lesson is the danger inherent in the “routinization” of naval di-
plomacy. The mechanics of deploying assets into a theater to prepare for naval
diplomacy tend to become standardized, but the political contexts in which ex-
ercises take place are inherently dynamic, if not volatile. Consideration needs to
be given to the political contexts in which even smaller, more routine recurring
exercises are conducted.
Third, some agency must be made responsible for developing and imple-
menting a vigorous information campaign to support an exercise. During the
crisis over the arrival of Advantage, both U.S. European Command and the
American embassy in Kiev produced detailed press briefings in an attempt to
contradict media misinformation and address general lack of public under-
standing of SEA BREEZE. However, this effort was too little and too late to chal-
lenge the campaign of opportunists to damage the Ukrainian government and
its foreign policy.56 To be effective—that is, to ensure that the correct message is
being sent and being understood—naval diplomacy must be supported by an
extensive and well thought out information campaign within the recipient state,
a program that targets the media, security stakeholders, the public, political fac-
tions, and interest groups.
Fourth, the United States would do well to encourage states with which it en-
gages in coalition-building exercises to undertake public-awareness campaigns
detailing the domestic advantages of participation. In the absence of a Ukrainian
public information campaign about SEA BREEZE, the public was easily confused
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by suggestions in the local and Russian media that the operation was actually an
attempt to build a permanent NATO base in the Crimea.
During 2006 European Command held workshops with Russian leaders
aimed at fostering military relations and planning bilateral training events for
2007.57 These meetings suggest that there is already recognition within the
United States of the last, fifth, lesson—the need to reach out to neighboring
states that might be affected by littoral operations. Problems with SEA BREEZE
2006 suggest that such outreach is a vital element of any successful naval pres-
ence operation, certainly in the Black Sea—to overcome and mitigate the
“shadow” effect. One such meeting was held in May 2006, before SEA BREEZE.
Rear Admiral Dick Gallagher, director of European Command’s European Plans
and Operations Center, commented that during four years of high-level meet-
ings with the Russian Federation military he had come to recognize the desire on
both sides to “not only communicate but to actively understand each other.”58
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NAVAL RESPONSE TO A CHANGED
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Maritime Security in the Mediterranean
Commander Alan Lee Boyer, U.S. Navy
EUCOM’s greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in
preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield.
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES
The capacity of the European Command to contribute to security and stabil-ity in its Mediterranean area of responsibility depends on its ability to de-
velop and execute operational concepts and capabilities that are appropriate to
the security environment in which it operates.1 In the maritime domain of the
Mediterranean, the threats are largely transnational in character and can be ef-
fectively dealt with only in cooperation with regional partners. The central chal-
lenge is not in locating and destroying enemy naval forces but in maintaining
good order at sea.2 Essentially, the task is to ensure access to the maritime com-
mons by all lawful actors and to inhibit the activities of illegal or hostile ones. If
European Command (EUCOM) and its partners are able to do that, the com-
mon interests of security and peaceful economic use of the Mediterranean Sea
will be advanced.
The key issue for EUCOM is: What concepts and type of forces should it pursue
in this connection? This question is best answered through the logic depicted in
figure 1.3 By following this logic, strategic and operational planners should be able
to assess where they are today and determine what type
of forces will be needed in the future. The first step con-
sists of two parts: assessing the security environment
and determining strategic objectives and requirements.
Requirements are derived from objectives and are
based on threats. Typically they come from official se-
curity strategies or policy statements. The next step is
to determine the nature of the strategic and operational
challenges that must be overcome. The planner can
Commander Boyer is a member of the Naval War Col-
lege’s National Security Decision Making faculty. A
1987 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he is a sur-
face warfare officer who has served in a wide range of
operational billets in five surface ships. He has pub-
lished recently in China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly
and this journal. Commander Boyer holds a master of
arts in national security and strategic studies from the
Naval War College.
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then go about how to deal with them. This is done by developing operational con-
cepts.4 The operational concept, in turn, gives rise to required capabilities, which
can, finally, be used to determine the forces or means the combatant commander
will need.
This article applies that methodology to the role of naval power in the Medi-
terranean over the next five to fifteen years. In doing so, it will address the fol-
lowing questions:
• What operational concepts should be developed to meet the operational
challenges of a security environment largely determined by transnational
threats and globalization?
• What capabilities do such concepts require the United States and its partners
to develop?
The goal of this paper is to come to grips with how to think about the process of
developing operational concepts for the use of naval power in the Mediterra-
nean area.
NATURE OF THE MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The Mediterranean Basin is geographically, culturally, and politically diverse
(see table 1). At its center is the Mediterranean Sea itself, which connects the
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 1
PLANNING METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS
Note: An expanded view of the third box in Owens, “Strategy and the Logic of Force
Planning,” fig. 2, “The Logic of Force Planning,” p. 490.
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Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea and Red Sea variously through the Strait of Gi-
braltar, the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal. Along its northern
shore are several liberal democracies, of which Turkey is the region’s only secular
democracy with a Muslim majority. Its eastern shore is occupied by two liberal
democracies, Israel and Lebanon, and the authoritarian state of Syria. Several
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states dominated by large Muslim popu-
lations occupy the Mediterranean’s southern shores.
The basin’s diversity and history have created two distinct approaches to deal-
ing with security challenges. Northern states generally take a cooperative-security
approach, creating a web of institutions, organizations, and frameworks—for
instance, NATO, the European Union (EU), Council of Europe, Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Barcelona Process (Euro-Med partner-
ship), 5+5 Dialogue, and Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Medi-
terranean. Southern states, which generally distrust their neighbors, historically
have tended either to go it alone or form short-term alignments with
like-minded states. They have generally viewed cooperative-security forums and
arrangements with suspicion due to their strong focus on national sovereignty.5
However, over the last decade, as problems fueled by globalization have arisen,
intraregional political and security cooperation has increased on both sides of
the Mediterranean, especially through the Barcelona Process and NATO’s Medi-
terranean Dialogue.6
B O Y E R 7 5
Features Data
Countries (21)
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Slovenia,
Spain, Serbia and Montenegro, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia, plus the Gaza Strip
Sea surface 965,000 sq. miles or 2,500,000 km2
Length (east–west) 2,500 miles or 4,000 km
Width (north–south) 500 miles or 800 km
Total length of coastline 27,963 miles or 45,000 km
Population of coastal nations (mid-2005) 461,300,000
Depth of water
Average 1,500 meters, deepest point 5,267 meters (about 3.27 miles) in
the Calypso Deep in the Ionian Sea
Urbanization of coastline 65 percent in 2000
Major straits Strait of Gibraltar, Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, Suez Canal
Institutions involved in security NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, International Maritime Organization (IMO)
TABLE 1
PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
Source: United Nations Environmental Program, White Paper: Coastal Management in the Mediterranean (Split, Croatia: Priority Actions Programme, 2001), p.
7; Population Reference Bureau, 2005 World Population Data Sheet (Washington, D.C.: 2005), pp. 6–12.
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Economically, the Mediterranean Sea functions mainly as a resource and a
medium of transportation. As a resource, it provides food and supports local
economies through its fisheries and mineral resources in the seabed. Over forty
thousand boats fish the waters of the Mediterranean, harvesting around 500,000
tons annually.7 The primary minerals extracted are oil and natural gas, mostly
found off the shores of North African states, with smaller amounts near south-
ern Europe.8
The Mediterranean’s importance as a maritime highway has increased over
the last two decades due to globalization. Between 1990 and 2004, American,
European, and North African seaborne trade increased 71, 45, and 9 percent, re-
spectively. The quantity of crude oil and crude-oil products—which constitute
over 40 percent of world seaborne trade—increased by 42 percent during the
same period.9 Approximately 7.3 million barrels per day of oil (17 percent of
seaborne oil) transits the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, Sumed pipeline,
and Bosporus Strait.10 In addition to oil, large amounts of natural gas are moved
across the Mediterranean.11 According to the European Commission, nearly 90
percent of the external trade of the EU and 40 percent of its internal trade goes
by sea.12
The globalization of trade has not only driven up the volume of Mediterra-
nean seaborne transport but changed its nature. Mediterranean transport is no
longer primarily regional or even European; it is now an integral part of a trans-
national global maritime system. This development has decreased the cost of
7 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MAP 1
MEDITERRANEAN REGION
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sea-based trade; dramatically increased the volume of goods moved by sea;13 fa-
cilitated a “just enough, just in time” operating philosophy;14 and dispersed the
ownership of the world’s merchant fleet away from major traders like the United
States.15
Past and Current Threats
Until the 1990s, the operational priority of the U.S. and Mediterranean navies
was finding and defeating hostile naval forces of other states. In World War II,
this involved everything from escorting merchant ships to sinking warships and
submarines. During the Cold War, missions evolved to locating, tracking, and
collecting intelligence on other naval forces, primarily those of the Soviet Union,
but they still focused on state actors and the threats they posed.
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus has been changed by globalization
and the demise of great-power competition among European states. These phe-
nomena have moved the security focus to threats emanating from weak states
and transnational actors. In March 2005, General James L. Jones, the EUCOM
commander, described the changed security environment in this way: “The new
security menace is transnational and characterized by enemies without terri-
tory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of ter-
rorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking,
uncontrolled refugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas.”16
While these transnational threats have, of course, existed for some time, the
changing structure of the international economic and political system has ren-
dered them more likely to affect adversely the security and the economic pros-
perity of the United States and Mediterranean nations.
Specific Maritime Security Threats and Challenges
Mediterranean maritime threats and challenges fall into four broad areas: terror-
ism, immigration and human trafficking, illicit trafficking in drugs and conven-
tional weapons, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Terrorism. Maritime terrorist attacks have been rare, especially in the Mediter-
ranean. Yet terrorists have been active in the region. Such groups as the Kurdish
PKK, Hezbollah, and Hamas have used the sea to channel funds and materiel for
operations in Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel and the Palestinian territories, respec-
tively. More recently, al-Qa‘ida has used the Mediterranean to support opera-
tions ashore and has planned attacks on ships in the Mediterranean.
In February and August 2001, al-Qa‘ida operatives were found by Italian au-
thorities aboard two Tonga-flagged vessels. In May and June 2002, Morocco cap-
tured three Saudi men—led by Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda
Al-Nasheri, Osama Bin Laden’s former chief of maritime operations—who were
actively plotting suicide attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Strait of
B O Y E R 7 7
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Gibraltar.17 According to intelligence officials, Al-Nasheri’s maritime strategy
had four major elements. The first was to use inflatable Zodiac-type speedboats
to attack ships. The second was to blow up medium-sized vessels near other
ships, including passenger liners if warships became too difficult to approach.
The third involved private planes (bought or stolen from flying clubs and small
airports) loaded with explosives. The last called for training underwater demoli-
tion teams to attack ships.18
An additional concern is that al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups might pro-
cure commercial vessels to carry legitimate cargo in order to raise money for their
operations. These vessels could ferry personnel, weapons, and information for
their organizations or other paying terrorist groups. Terrorists and other illegal
actors might also infiltrate the ranks of the world’s 1.2 million seafarers. Recent
International Maritime Organization (IMO) studies have shown that it is fairly
easy for unscrupulous persons to acquire forged or falsified seafarer certificates
and identity documents.19 Governments have traditionally granted relatively lib-
eral travel rights to seafarers through non-immigrant crew-list visas or simply
upon presentation of their documents, potentially affording terrorists a way to
bypass normal immigration and visitor controls.
Immigration and Human Trafficking. A major humanitarian, economic, and se-
curity challenge for the Mediterranean region is the movement of people. Every
year hundreds of millions pass through the region’s ports.20 Most are legal travel-
ers, but hundreds of thousands attempt to cross borders illegally. Italy estimates
that approximately seventy thousand illegal aliens enter across its sea borders an-
nually.21 Morocco arrested 28,500 illegal immigrants between January and No-
vember 2005, and Libya stopped over forty thousand that year. The majority
originate from sub-Saharan Africa, but they also come from Asia, the Maghreb,
Syria, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and India. The major transit routes are across the
Strait of Gibraltar, especially through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta (a ninety-
minute ferry ride to the Spanish coast) and Melilla, from Libya and Tunisia (via
the island of Lampedusa and Malta to Italy), from the Canary Islands, from Alba-
nia and the Balkans (across the Adriatic to Italy, from Turkey toward Calabria and
Sicily), and across the Adriatic from Greece. Several thousand vessels smuggle
illegals across the Mediterranean each year.22 Many are overloaded or in poor con-
dition, resulting in hundreds of immigrant deaths every year.
Human trafficking is big business in the region. Those seeking illegal passage
reportedly pay between two and six thousand euros to cross the Mediterranean
from North Africa.23 Spanish authorities estimate that attempts to cross the Strait
of Gibraltar generate annual net turnover of thirty million euros.24 Transporters
range from small-time operators in the west to transnational criminal networks in
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the east. Terrorist organizations like the Kurdish PKK and al-Qa‘ida reportedly
engage in human trafficking to fund their primary operations.25
Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and Conventional Weapons. Migrants are not the only
illicit traffic in the region; also in play are drugs and conventional weapons.
Europe consumes approximately 33 percent of the world’s illicit drugs.26 Most of
its drugs transported by sea flow into southern Europe. Some, like cocaine, come
from as far away as Colombia. Cocaine shipments usually travel through Brazil
to the Canary Islands, where they are typically smuggled by Moroccan middle-
men into Spain. Other drugs, such as cannabis resin, originate mainly in Mo-
rocco. Heroin is customarily routed by sea from Asia through Turkey to Italy and
other parts of Europe.27 Drug trafficking, based on cases recorded, is one of the
most important activities of organized crime groups and networks in Europe; it
is a major criminal problem in Armenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.28
The Mediterranean also has a long history of trafficking in conventional
weapons and explosives. In recent years most of this activity has occurred in the
eastern Mediterranean, due to armed conflicts in the Balkans and the Palestinian
territories.29 Weapons traffickers include small freelancers as well as larger and
more sophisticated transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
Evidence of illicit weapons trading includes the April 2004 seizure by Italian po-
lice of a United States–bound Turkish-flagged ship carrying eight thousand
AK-47 rifles and the discovery by Turkish authorities of a Paraguay-bound con-
tainer holding five hundred AK-47s. Perhaps the largest case involved the
Comoros-flagged vessel Baltic Sky in June 2003. Acting on intelligence from
NATO, the Greek coast guard seized the Baltic Sky en route from Tunis to Sudan
and found undeclared cargo comprising 680 tons of industrial-grade explosives
and eight thousand detonators.30
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A major security objective for the
United States and its regional partners is nonproliferation. In the maritime do-
main, the problem has two dimensions. First, hostile nonstate actors may exploit
the sea to transport WMD for use against the United States and its allies.31 Second,
states and entities acting under state cover could use the sea to transport WMD
materials. A good example was the network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist
A. Q. Khan; it frequently used merchant vessels to transport WMD materials be-
tween states and other entities.32
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
In addition to understanding the security environment, planners must identify
the strategic objectives and requirements they must pursue. The two sources of
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strategic guidance for European Command planners are American and NATO
security strategies and policies. Consideration should also be given to the secu-
rity strategies of U.S. partners, in order to identify where they are consistent
with or conflict with U.S. and alliance documents.33
The primary unclassified American strategic documents relevant to naval
planners are the National Defense Strategy, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,
National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, and National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.34 The key NATO policy documents
are the NATO Partnership Plan against Terrorism, NATO’s Military Concept for
Defense against Terrorism, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, the alliance’s Strategic
Concept, and the Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue.35 The
EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) of 16
December 2002 and European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003 also pro-
vide valuable information on EU and NATO cooperation and security priorities.
American strategic requirements are threefold.* The first requirement is to
prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, or hostile
states to commit terrorist, criminal, or hostile acts against the United States, its
people, economy, property, territory, allies, or friends.36 Strengthening alliances
and partnerships is the second requirement.37 The third requirement is to de-
fend the United States forward—that is, to prevent enemies from attacking the
homeland by defeating them overseas.38
NATO requirements since 2001 have focused heavily on the threat of terror-
ism and WMD.39 Like the United States, NATO views the security environment
as changed and the main security threats as stemming from nonstate actors and
weak or failing states. A primary objective of the alliance is to detect and deter
terrorist activity and prevent the proliferation of WMD. A second objective is to
strengthen security and build stability through stronger relationships and co-
operation on security concerns that NATO shares with the EU, Russia, Ukraine,
the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and those of the Mediterranean and
broader Middle East.40 A major NATO goal for cooperation is to develop the ca-
pabilities of its partners to deal with security threats, whether in partnership
with NATO or by themselves. Improving interoperability and transforming ex-
isting military capabilities to meet the changing security environment is the alli-
ance’s final objective.†
Strategic guidance is important because it tells EUCOM planners what is im-
portant and in what priority. By matching the strategic guidance against an
8 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* U.S. strategic requirements are presented in more detail in table A-1, available in the online version
of this article.
† For additional detail on NATO requirements, see table A-2 in the online version of this article.
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assessment of the security environment, planners can determine the nature and
types of challenges they must overcome. Some of the challenges will be strategic,
others operational.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
Many of the maritime challenges facing EUCOM arise from the nature of the se-
curity environment in the Mediterranean. The first challenge is geography. The
Mediterranean Sea has twenty-eight thousand miles of coastline. Any effort to
try to control or regulate it has to deal with the reality of hundreds of points
from which vessels can get to sea.
The second challenge concerns the type of threats that must be combated. Es-
sentially there are two, threats to vessels on the sea and threats from the sea.
Though related, they require different responses. Protection of vessels at sea, due
to the globalization of maritime transport and trade system and the transna-
tional nature of the threat, is no longer just about protecting vessels flagged by
one’s own country. Because goods transported to a country are often not carried
by vessels flying that nation’s flag, major trading nations like the United States
must now be concerned about vessels under the flags of states like Panama, Ba-
hamas, Cyprus, and Liberia, with neither the means nor will to protect them.41
This means the challenge is about how to ensure that vessels vital to the global
economy and the prosperity of the United States can transit the maritime com-
mons without being harmed. Relatedly, it is about how the United States and its
partners can prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from using the sea to do
harm ashore or to fund their operations.
In both cases the maritime paths and means employed by criminals and ille-
gal immigrants are likely to be the same ones used by terrorists and WMD
proliferators, all these among the tens of thousands of ships navigating the waters
of the Mediterranean every year. Sorting through thousands of contacts to iden-
tify the handful engaged in harmful or illicit activities can be very problematic.42
The third challenge is political. The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by
twenty-one countries. Their national governments and numerous organiza-
tions, such as NATO, the EU, and IMO, deal with security in the Mediterranean.
Any effort to secure the maritime commons will involve multiple jurisdictions
and stakeholders. In this light, a central question arises: Are there common in-
terests sufficient to generate the political will that can bring cooperation and ac-
tion? Two common interests that might anchor a “maritime consortium” as a
basis for action are prosperity and security.43 Even if all parties agree to take such
action, however, there remains the challenge of developing a strategy that will
assure interoperability among numerous civilian and military security organi-
zations and national jurisdictions.
B O Y E R 8 1
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Interoperability is largely a political problem that manifests itself in rules of en-
gagement, legal structures, and resource allocations, but it also has an important
technical component.44 Any concept of operations that relies on cooperation to
deal with maritime threats in the Mediterranean must not only be able to generate
and sustain the political will to act but address the technological issues that follow.
As figure 2 shows, the technical impediments to interoperability are numer-
ous. The main challenge is how to create, with current and future technologies,
“situational awareness,” which in this connection is the ability to identify, pro-
cess, and comprehend critical elements of information in and around the mari-
time domain.45 Two elements are needed: a complete intelligence picture and a
real-time operational picture. Information, data-management, and communi-
cations systems support both. The problem is connecting the sources of informa-
tion to decision-support systems in ways that enable decision makers to deploy
8 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
• Technology gap between the United States and its partners
• Multiple communications systems and a lack of common IT
architecture accessible by the United States and partners
• Correlation of data from multiple sources and types of databases
(civilian, government agencies, military, and coast guards)
• Information systems that can be controlled, handled, or used with
ease by coalition partners
• Information systems unable to display or manage details on
vessels or their cargoes, crews, and passengers
• Displaying, tracking, and providing real-time information on
thousands of maritime contacts
• Decision-making tools able to distinguish abnormal, hostile, or
illegal activity from peaceful/lawful
• Information assurance that supports the sharing of information
across classified and unclassified systems
• Rapid communication of transit information between commercial
vessels and military, coast guard, and customs units
• Operational units without broadband systems or the bandwidth
needed to access the COP
• Response forces with the right technologies to respond rapidly
with the correct level of force.
FIGURE 2
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO CREATING INTEROPERABILITY
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operational forces against correct targets at the right time. In an ideal world, a
single database would contain all information on the maritime domain, and
a single communications system would give decision makers and operational
units access to a common operational picture (COP) and associated intelligence.46
For EUCOM and NATO to create such a network, connecting all twenty-one re-
gional nations, NATO, the EU, and numerous private-sector actors, may be a
“bridge too far,” for both political and technical reasons. If so, a less centralized
network will be needed that is capable of getting the right information to the
right decision makers in a timely manner. Either way, the technology used needs
to be interoperable across the entire spectrum of cooperation. This means it
must be able to connect information from commercial sources to police and na-
val forces at the national, regional, and international levels.
A subelement of the technological problem is classification and protection of
sensitive information. The United States and every other nation operating in the
Mediterranean uses classified display and information systems; many NATO
and other partners cannot access certain alliance or other national systems. So
the network to be created must operate at the unclassified level and protect sen-
sitive information.
Once the political and technological obstacles to a COP and complete intelli-
gence picture are solved, there remains the challenge of how to preempt or rap-
idly respond to threats at sea and from the littorals. One answer might be a larger
U.S. naval presence. However, much of the work will likely take place in territo-
rial waters (within twelve nautical miles of land). Even if coastal nations let
American or NATO units take initial action in their territorial waters, legal dis-
position of apprehended vessels and persons presents a problem. It requires le-
gal authority and a place to incarcerate persons and securely store seized
material. NATO, per se, does not have territory on the Mediterranean—its
members do; therefore, it must rely on the willingness of its members to act and
follow through—which is not always forthcoming.
The last challenge EUCOM must address is resources. European Command
and its partners operate in a resource-constrained environment. Defense spend-
ing in Europe is down, and the U.S. defense budget, while it has increased dra-
matically since 2000, is not likely to continue to rise.47 EUCOM, NATO, and EU
planners will have to find a way to use current assets more effectively and apply
future resources to the capabilities needed to support the operational concepts
they develop.
CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
European Command’s current operational concept for maritime security is to
use existing operations and security arrangements to improve cooperation in
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order to combat terrorism and other illicit activities at or from sea, build the ca-
pacity of partners, and improve information sharing. By leveraging such secu-
rity frameworks as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean
Dialogue, and bilateral arrangements, EUCOM is attempting to build on past
cooperation and common interests.48
The main operation being used is Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE).
OAE was launched in October 2001 by NATO, under Article V of the Washing-
ton Treaty, as a part of its response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the
United States.49 OAE’s stated purpose was to detect, deter, and protect against
terrorist activity. Initially, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR focused on naval presence and
surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea using naval forces as-
signed to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force
Atlantic.
In February 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expanded the operation
to include escorting merchant shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.50 One of
the main reasons was to prevent further terrorist operations like the attack on
the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002. The
thirty-six-mile-long Strait of Gibraltar is vulnerable due to its narrowness and
the large volume of commercial traffic.51 Escort operations were suspended on
10 December 2003, recommenced on 29 January 2004, and were again sus-
pended on 29 May 2004.52
In April 2003, the NAC decided to expand OAE’s mandate to vessel queries
and compliant boardings.53 Typically, queries are conducted by aircraft and sur-
face units assigned to Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR. All information gathered is
passed to the Maritime Component Command Headquarters in Naples
(CC-MAR Naples) and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, United King-
dom. If anything suspicious is learned, the vessel in question may be boarded
and inspected by NATO forces. Where there is intelligence or evidence of terrorist-
related activity, OAE forces are deployed to the area and readied for action,
which must be authorized by the NAC. During compliant boardings, if irregu-
larities unrelated to terrorism are found the information is passed to law en-
forcement authorities for action at the vessel’s next port of call. OAE forces
shadow the vessel until action is taken or it enters territorial waters on its way
into port. When a vessel refuses boarding, NATO works with national authorities
to see that it is inspected once it enters an alliance member’s territorial waters.54
On 16 March 2004, the NAC expanded OAE operations yet again to cover the
entire Mediterranean Sea, and in October NATO adopted a new operational pat-
tern. Since then, according the joint task force commander, Vice Admiral
Roberto Cesaretti,
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the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to
target specific vessels of interest. In this way, it is now possible to deploy surface
forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as tracking and boarding of
vessels. The new operational pattern maintains a proactive posture. Moreover, re-
sources may be supplemented in periodic surge operations. At these times, augmen-
tation forces, such as one of the Standing Maritime Groups of the NATO Response
Force, join Task Force Endeavour to provide an enhanced presence and more inten-
sive surveillance capability.55
Based on this pattern of operations, OAE forces are utilized for the following
tasks: helping deter and disrupt any action supporting terrorism at or from the
sea; controlling choke points—the most important passages and harbors—by
deploying minehunters from Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Groups
to carry out preparatory route surveys; providing escorts through the Strait of
Gibraltar when necessary; and enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue and
other NATO programs to promote bilateral and multilateral relations.56
Typically around a dozen ships from NATO navies are assigned to Joint Task
Force ENDEAVOUR. This dedicated force gives NATO a visible presence at sea to
deter terrorism and other illicit activities in the sea lanes and to react to a broad
range of contingencies, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance,
and disaster relief.57 In addition, the operation also improves interoperability,
builds capacity, and generates cooperation and information sharing.
At the strategic level, NATO also uses ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as a vehicle for po-
litical engagement with non-NATO states. The June 2004 NATO Summit in Is-
tanbul invited non-NATO countries (among them Russia, Ukraine, and
Mediterranean Dialogue countries) to participate in OAE. Since then, Russia,
Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Croatia, Sweden,
and Finland have expressed interest in joining the operation on some level.
Levels of participation include political discussions and intelligence sharing as
well as providing forces. Ukraine formally agreed to participate in OAE at the 21
April 2005 meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Vilnius.58 It will share
intelligence and send surface units to OAE and Strait of Gibraltar operations in
2007.59 Russian participation has consisted of the assignment of a liaison officer
to the Joint Informational Analysis Center (JIAC), at-sea training, and surface
patrols by the Black Sea Fleet frigate Pitlivy in September 2006. Russia has also
delegated to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet authority to approve compli-
ant boardings of Russian vessels by OAE forces. Georgia’s participation so far
has been limited to coordination and information sharing. The Albanian mili-
tary has committed itself to sharing of intelligence with NATO. Of the Mediter-
ranean Dialogue countries, Israel and Morocco have been the most active. In
February 2006, Israel agreed to share intelligence with NATO, send an officer to
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the JIAC, and provide logistical support by allowing OAE forces to make port
calls in Haifa without diplomatic clearance. It also finalized an Individual Co-
operation Program with NATO, under an enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue ar-
rangement, on 16 October 2006. Morocco has been sharing information with
NATO. Tunisia has established daily information sharing via secure fax between
its maritime operations center and CC-MAR Naples. Finally, at a 7 April 2006
meeting in Rabat between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners, Algeria,
Israel, and Morocco agreed to join in naval counterterrorism patrols.
An OAE-affiliated undertaking, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH),
was launched on 1 March 2004 by the Turkish navy. The objective is to ensure
the “smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish straits as well as maintaining
navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea
maritime domain” until a Black Sea Force is able to assume this and other mari-
time security duties on a permanent basis.60 Turkey is attempting to use OBSH
as a way to bring regional cooperation to the support of security and stability in
the Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine have formally announced their intentions to
participate.
OAE-OBSH cooperation consists of shadowing and trailing contacts of inter-
est and suspect ships, as well as information exchange—primarily via NATO
C4I* channels. In this way the United States is able to leverage its NATO relation-
ship with Turkey to obtain more information on Black Sea traffic before it ar-
rives in the Mediterranean. NATO also uses OBSH as another way to build
capacity within regional navies (in this case, those of Bulgaria, Romania, and
Ukraine).
Both the United States and NATO have been hoping to expand OAE into the
Black Sea since 2005. The United States officially requested that OAE’s mandate
cover the Black Sea on 23 February 2006. Two months later Washington reversed
its position and dropped the idea.61 Turkey has opposed such an expansion, fear-
ing it would threaten the 1936 Montreux Treaty, and has declared that existing
Black Sea naval structures are more than able to provide security in the region.62
Another significant government activity in the Mediterranean is the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI). The focus of the PSI is to prevent the proliferation of
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. So far, over sixty countries
have indicated support and over forty have participated in nineteen training exer-
cises.63 Between September 2003 and June 2006, six PSI maritime exercises took
place in the Mediterranean.64 PSI represents another way in which European
Command can generate practical cooperation and interoperability with NATO
and non-NATO partners in the Mediterranean.
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* C4I: command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
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An international initiative by which EUCOM is attempting to improve its
maritime domain awareness is the International Maritime Organization’s Auto-
matic Identification Systems (AIS) initiative. Regulations adopted by the IMO
in 2000 required ships to carry AIS—a shipboard broadcast system, a continu-
ous and autonomous transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band.65 AIS
allows ships to track and identify each other and exchange pertinent navigation
information with one another or facilities ashore. Transmissions vary from two
seconds to six minutes depending on the ship’s speed and the type of data. AIS
information can be graphically displayed on a computer or overlaid onto a radar
display or electronic chart display and information system. Many coastal coun-
tries and commercial companies maintain shore-based AIS receivers to monitor
shipping traffic. Several commercial companies also provide access to
near-real-time AIS data over the Internet for an annual fee.66
By providing valuable information about routes, cargo, and ships themselves,
AIS can increase situational awareness, efficiency, and safety, and decrease the
burden of monitoring and controlling coastal and offshore waterways. Naval
forces and command centers can merge AIS into the common operational pic-
ture. Since 2006 European Command, with the assistance of the Department of
Transportation’s Volpe Center, has been testing ways to integrate AIS data and
other commercial data streams into American and NATO C4I systems. Recent
successes include live transmission of data from a cell phone in Egypt and the di-
rect feed of AIS data from a submarine under way.
The use of Automatic Identification Systems does not guarantee “visibility”
of all vessels; ships engaged in illicit activity can always turn their AIS off. Even if
all vessels keep their AIS on, there is no guarantee that their transmissions will
be picked up, for two reasons. First, AIS transponders transmit their informa-
tion in the VHF band, meaning that vessels well out to sea may not be in range of
a shore station; second, no international mandate requires countries to build
such stations, and there are not now enough to provide for 100 percent coverage.
Nevertheless, by comparing whatever AIS data is received to other sensor input,
maritime security forces can identify neutral and friendly contacts and elimi-
nate them from consideration, focusing on a smaller number of unidentified
contacts.
FUTURE EUCOM MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Any future operational concept for maritime security must make assumptions
and predictions on how future security trends and strategic requirements may
evolve. The best way to reduce uncertainty in this process is to examine how the
sea has been used in the past and is being used at present for human develop-
ment. As depicted in figure 3, there are five such means, or ways. By examining
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how society values each use, planners can make reasonable projections on the
capabilities required in the near and middle terms.
If society is to enjoy all five uses, someone must maintain good order at sea.
“Good order at sea requires a range of activities extending from law enforcement
at one end of the spectrum to the defense of security at the other.”67 Naval and
coast guard forces and civilian agencies all have responsibilities along this spec-
trum. The key challenge for naval planners and their partners is to determine
which should be conducted by naval forces and which by others.
Traditionally the fo-
cus for Western navies
has been the use of the
sea to advance political
power or dominion. The
sea has typically been
seen as a battleground in
the struggle for power
between states, or occa-
sionally nonstate enti-
ties. The business of
navies was to fight other
navies and carry out na-
val diplomacy;68 respon-
sibi l i ty for ensuring
good order for all other
purposes has been gen-
erally assigned to coast
guards and c iv i l i an
agencies. Historically
this outlook dominated
the creation of maritime operational concepts for Western navies, but since the
end of the Cold War and especially since 2001, operational concepts have
changed.69 Of the remaining uses of the sea, two—the sea as an environment and
a resource—have increased in importance over the last several decades.70 The
last use—the sea as a primary means of exchanging information and values be-
tween societies and nations—has decreased in importance, and its influence will
be more indirect than in the past, due to the advent of inexpensive air travel, tele-
vision, satellite communications, large undersea cable networks, and
cyberspace.71
Recent maritime operations in the Mediterranean have reflected the changing
order of importance in the five uses of the sea. As a result, EUCOM’s maritime
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FIGURE 3
GOOD ORDER AT SEA
Note: How the sea has been and is now used to advance human development. Threats to the use of the sea for ex-
changing information not listed; they would include anything that impedes the passage of vessels. Adapted from
figure 10.3 in Till, Seapower, p. 310.
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concept of operations has been changing. In the next decade it is likely that a new
operational concept will emerge, one built on three pillars. The first pillar, leverag-
ing existing security frameworks to build cooperation and capacity, will be a con-
tinuation of the current concept. NATO will continue to be central to this pillar,
and a further maturing of cooperation between NATO, the European Union, and
other partners can be expected.
Pillar two—creating maritime domain awareness, or MDA, in a coalition
environment—will be at the heart of any new concept of operations. MDA is the
effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that
could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the nation.72 It
creates the situational awareness needed to allow the United States, its allies, and
its partners to take early actions against hostile actors and guarantee access to
the maritime commons.
The third pillar, the ability to preempt and respond rapidly to threats at sea
and from the littorals, is enabled by the first two: cooperation and MDA together
create the ability to deter, preempt, interdict, and respond to maritime threats.
Some of this capacity will reside in American units, but the majority will have to
come from regional navies, coast guards, customs services, and other national
security services.73 As we have seen, a larger U.S. naval presence in the Mediterra-
nean region will not, of itself, dramatically improve the ability of the United
States or the alliance to preempt, interdict, or respond to maritime threats, be-
cause most of the work would take place in territorial waters. European Com-
mand’s capacity to respond will therefore depend on its own ability to conduct
combined operations and on the capabilities of its partners.
If this concept (figure 4) is to work, several things need to happen. First, co-
operation and information sharing between Mediterranean nations, private
shipping companies, port authorities, NATO, EU, EUCOM, and international
institutions and agencies will have to become routine, the normal way of doing
business. The military task of collecting knowledge about maritime activity, es-
tablishing a baseline upon the basis of which intelligence can be analyzed and
unusual activity be revealed, can be completed only in close cooperation with
the commercial sector.74
Second, the United States, either the European Command or working in the
NATO framework, will need to take the lead in creating a multinational inter-
agency network that links all the elements, from sensors to decision makers to
operational forces. Central to this process will be improving the effectiveness of
the Joint Information Analysis Center in Naples.75 JIAC will need to capitalize
upon initiatives like the Italian navy’s Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Cen-
tre;76 it must also connect with regional military command centers and such
nonmilitary entities as the Western Sea Border Centre, Eastern Mediterranean
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Sea Borders Centre, and
the European Union’s
FRONTEX. 7 7 So far,
JIAC’s ability to collate
and analyze data and
disseminate it as action-
able intelligence has not
met expectations, largely
as a result of a lack of fo-
cus on the maritime do-
main and small maritime
analysis capability.78
Third, the concept
should not solely focus
on terrorism. The sea is a
medium for transport
and, inevitably, numer-
ous illicit activities. Of-
ten the means and paths
traveled by criminals and illegal immigrants are used also by terrorists and WMD
proliferators. It can be hard from a distance to distinguish one illicit activity from
another. Making good order at sea—that is, the elimination of illicit activity—the
objective of the concept is likely to produce better results and may be the best way
to guarantee long-term political buy-in by Mediterranean states.79
Fourth, the concept needs to develop technological and political means to
generate complete operational and intelligence pictures. The system will have to
operate at the unclassified level but use secure links, processing large volumes of
information and passing it quickly to a large number of users. Traditional classi-
fied systems are not a viable option; classified information is not actionable in
the multinational and interagency environment. Whether the network uses
commercial encryption methods, Internet protocols, or some other technology,
it must be affordable, reliable, easy to use, and widely accessible, and it must pro-
vide enough security to allow confidence in the data it contains. The United
States and other nations will still have and use their own classified systems, but
the network that enables MDA cannot be based solely on them. How well its pro-
tocols and procedures handle sensitive and classified information will be critical
to success.
Lastly, political understandings and legal authorizations need to be in place at
the international, regional, and national levels. The situational awareness of-
fered by MDA is of no value if executives lack legal authority or organizational
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FIGURE 4
CURRENT AND FUTURE MARITIME SECURITY
OPERATING CONCEPTS
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arrangements to take action. Operationally, this means military and civilian
forces must be free to cooperate across jurisdictions without constant requests
for permission. Considerable progress has been made over the last few years, but
much more work needs to be done.80
Required Capabilities and Attributes
Future American and allied forces will need a wide range of capabilities to im-
plement such a maritime security operational concept.81 These capabilities must
lead to unity of effort between U.S. forces and their partners and to a focus on
good order at sea. They fall into four areas. The first is cooperation and integration
between U.S. forces and their military and civilian partners. Knowledge of capa-
bilities, political restrictions, and legal authorities is the second capability area.
Generating actionable intelligence through MDA is the third.82 Within it are
eleven subordinate capabilities:
• “Long-dwell-time” surveillance of major choke points, high-traffic zones,
and areas of interest
• Detection and monitoring of a large number of vessels, people, cargoes,
and activity at sea and in port, in real or near-real time
• Integration of JIAC with other regional maritime command and coordination
centers and development of a maritime analysis capability at the JIAC
• Information connectivity to decision makers and operating forces in a
multinational and interagency environment
• Analysis and decision-making tools to sort abnormal from normal activity
(e.g., unclassified data mining and anomaly detection)
• Wide-area telecommunications
• Common database sharing
• Fusion of the intelligence picture with the common operational picture
• Accessibility of the COP to all partners (civilian and military)
• Display and integration of commercial AIS data in the COP
• Real-time access by boarding teams to biometric and other databases
allowing them to identify terrorist and criminal suspects immediately
(implying an ability to collect biometric information).83
The last capability needed to support a maritime security operational con-
cept as envisioned here is deterrence, preemption, and interdiction of, and re-
sponse to, illicit activity at sea and in the littorals. This point too has subordinate
capabilities. The first is the ability to deploy force packages tailored to specific
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threats (right type and amount of force at right time). To this end operational
forces need to be fast, scalable, networked, and interoperable. Interoperability
between U.S. naval forces and the NATO Response Force is a subcapability in it-
self, as would be a NATO Response Force capable of operations at sea ranging
from law enforcement–related actions, such as boardings, to more traditional
combat missions. Response forces generally must be able to respond to threats in
the littorals, close to shore, in straits, pierside or at anchor, and, as noted, must be
able to receive and transmit biometric data.
These capabilities and their component tasks constitute a framework upon
which planners can determine what they will need to combat maritime threats
in the Mediterranean. Force structures may vary, but all will have to be net-
worked, interoperable, and adaptable.84
Risks and Uncertainty
No operational concept can be complete without addressing risk and uncer-
tainty. Clearly, no one can predict the future with complete accuracy.85 However,
the central challenge of ensuring good order at sea will remain. The tools that
globalization provides transnational actors will continue to challenge states. Ac-
cordingly, the number of different paths that events will take over the next five to
fifteen years is limited. The real uncertainty lies not in what will need to be done
but in the ability of the United States to create a maritime coalition capable of
dealing with what the future brings.
So the question is: Can the United States, specifically European Command,
create a coalition with the right capabilities to deal with maritime threats to
American and allied interests? The answer depends on how well EUCOM under-
stands the limitations of the United States and of its partners and how well it
mitigates risk. The cooperation needed to build domain awareness and the ca-
pacity to respond to threats in a multinational environment are difficult to cre-
ate. Any concept of operations that relies on multiple partners to deliver on their
promises is bound to be problematic, for reasons ranging from a lack of political
will to a lack of resources on the part of any player, including the United States.
Local corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, friction, chance, differing inter-
ests, and the difficulty of keeping track of constantly moving vessels, cargoes,
and people at sea also threaten the ability to execute the concept.86
The risk can be reduced and chances of success improved by a combination of
strategies. First, the concept should not have an “American face”: U.S. planners
should support NATO, allied, and private initiatives whenever possible. Second,
priority for resources should go to assets that will enable others to succeed and
to capabilities partners cannot develop themselves—for instance, bandwidth
needed to connect a regional MDA network, software to manage and
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disseminate (without cost to users) a common operational picture, AIS stations,
and certain operational expenses of partners. Third, surveillance and tracking
should focus on contacts of interest and anomalies, not attempt to follow every
vessel under way in the Mediterranean; normal behavior and lists of trusted ves-
sels can filter out vessels that need not be watched. Fourth, international and re-
gional maritime initiatives (like AIS and the Marine Electronic Highway
program) that create greater transparency in the maritime domain and promote
cooperation between commercial and government sectors should be encour-
aged and supported.87 Lastly, the decision-making process in planning and exe-
cution should be open, including partners at all levels and stages and respecting
their interests and sensitivities.
Today’s security environment presents many challenges for U.S. combatant
commands. To overcome them these commands must craft and execute opera-
tional concepts that align strategic requirements with resources. In the maritime
domain, their concepts should produce forces and procedures flexible enough to
respond to changes in how the sea is used for human development. Naval plan-
ners need to develop a broader perspective of maritime activities; all are interre-
lated. They also need to remember that naval forces are a means to an end—to
advance American interests. In the Mediterranean, this means maintaining
good order at sea in order to ensure economic prosperity and defense of the
United States and its regional allies against those who threaten them. This task is
not one the United States can accomplish on its own.88 NATO, regional states,
commercial enterprises, and other regional and international entities all have
roles to play.
N O T E S
1. Epigraph: James L. Jones, Commander United
States European Command, Statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1,
2005, p. 3, available at www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/congress/.
2. Good order at sea is about safeguarding the
sea from misuse of all sorts. In some cases
this means protecting commercial vessels
from piracy and in others it may mean pro-
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tional Defense Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 49–53.
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D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004),
pp. 1–16, 384; Till, Seapower, pp. 311–14.
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tions. See Till, Seapower, p. 353; James J.
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WEU press release, 7 December 2005, avail-
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eral Mohand Tahar Yala (commander of Al-
gerian naval forces), Rear Admiral Abdelaziz
Aichouche (Royal Moroccan Navy), Rear Ad-
miral Mohamed Kamel Bouhaouala (Tunisian
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.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14
.htm.
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Maritime Security, U.S. Navy’s FORCENet
Functional Concept, Command and Control
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Joint Integrating Concept, and Command and
Control Joint Functional Concept. All joint
concepts are available at www.dtic.mil/
futurejointwarfare/index.html#, and FORCENet
Functional Concept at forcenet.navy.mil/
concepts/fn-concept-final.pdf.
85. Colin Gray, “How Has War Changed since
the End of the Cold War?” Parameters (Spring
2005), p. 16.
86. Friction “is the force that makes the appar-
ently easy so difficult.” Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1976), p. 121.
87. A marine electronic highway (MEH) is a sys-
tem of technology, people, and processes that
enables third-party access to marine environ-
mental and operational data and information
in real or near-real time. It embodies tools to
record, store, manage, model, analyze, and
access oceanographic and other data and to
present the results as textual and graphical in-
formation to a broad base of expert and
nonexpert users. The first MEH demonstra-
tion project (2004–2008) is being conducted
in the Straits of Malacca by the IMO, Singa-
pore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, funded by the
World Bank’s Global Environmental Faculty.
Randy Gillespie, “Global Marine Electronic
Highway: Proposed Vision and Architecture,”
Canadian GeoProject Centre, available at
www.acops.org/Gillespie.pdf.
88. U.S. Defense Dept., The National Defense
Strategy of the United States, p. 19.
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B O Y E R A - 1
National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Key objectives relevant to the maritime domain
• Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
“We will promote the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing ac-
cess to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.”
• Strengthen alliances and partnerships
“Expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us, and we will help partners increase their
capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.”
National Military Strategy (NMS)
Objectives:a
• Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression
“Our first line of defense is abroad and includes mutually supporting activities with U.S. allies to counter threats close
to their source.”
• Prevent conflict and surprise attack
“Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that enhance and expand multi-
national partnerships.”
• Prevail against adversaries
National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)
Principles that provide overarching guidance to the NSMS (p. 7):
1. Preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority.
2. Facilitate and defend commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping.
3. Facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and
material.
Objectives relevant to EUCOM
• Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts
“Detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and prevent
its unlawful exploitation for those purposes” (p. 8).
“If terrorists cannot be deterred by the layered maritime security, then they must be interdicted and defeated, prefera-
bly overseas” (p. 9).
• Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures
Strategic actions to achieve NSMS objectives (p. 13)
• Enhance international cooperation
• Maximize domain awareness
• Embed security into commercial practices
• Deploy layered security
• Assure continuity of the marine transportation
system
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (NPMDA)b
The oceans are global thoroughfares that sustain our national prosperity and are vital for our national security (p. 2).
Purpose of MDA: to facilitate timely, accurate decision making (p. 7)
MDA Goals:
• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter, and defeat threats as early and distant from U.S.
interests as possible;
• Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the full spectrum of maritime threats;
• Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and the efficient flow of commerce.
“First step . . . is to ensure GMCOI stakeholders, at all levels, know what they can do to help, how they can do it and,
most importantly why Maritime Domain Awareness is in their collective best interest” (p. 3).
“MDA is the critical enabler that allows leaders at all levels to make effective decisions and act early against a vast array
of threats to the security of the United States, its interests, allies, and friends” (p. 20).
TABLE A-1
U.S. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES
Notes
a. National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 2–3.
b. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, pp. 2–20.
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B O Y E R A - 2
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism—Prague Summit (21 November 2002)
Specific actions listed in the Action Plan (paragraph 16):
• Intensify consultations and information sharing
• Enhance preparedness for combating terrorism
• Impede support for terrorist groups
• Enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management
• Assistance to partners’ efforts against terrorism
NATO Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism (NMCDAT)
Roles for NATO Military:
1. Antiterrorism (defensive/passive measures)
2. Consequence management
3. Counterterrorism (offensive/active measures)
4. Military cooperation—Specifically stated, NATO must harmonize its procedures and efforts with civil authorities within
nations in order to maximize its effectiveness against terrorism.
Istanbul Summit Communiqué and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, July 2004
1. Elevated the MD to a genuine partnership whose overall aim will be to contribute toward regional security and stability
and complement other international efforts through enhanced practical cooperation, and whose objectives include:
• enhancing the existing political dialogue;
• achieving interoperability;
• developing defense reform;
• contributing to the fight against terrorism.
2. Formulated basic strategy: expand and strengthen practical cooperation in priority areas. Specifically:
a. Military-to-military cooperation in order to achieve interoperability
b. Combating terrorism and new security threats: intelligence sharing, participation in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR
(detect, defend, deter, and disrupt terrorist activity in Mediterranean), preventing the proliferation of WMD and its
means of delivery
c. Border security
d. Civil emergency planning
e. Defense reform.
3. Established the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative—Goal to offer cooperation to Middle East Region.
TABLE A-2
NATO STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES
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EXPECTATION, ADAPTATION, AND RESIGNATION
British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916
Jon Tetsuro Sumida
In mid-July 1914, a trial mobilization of the active and reserve warships of theRoyal Navy, which had been planned the previous fall, put virtually all of Brit-
ain’s effective naval forces on a war footing. This event coincided with the in-
creasingly rancorous great-power dispute precipitated by the Balkans crisis. The
deteriorating European political situation prompted the Admiralty to delay the
dispersal of the bulk of the fleet after the conclusion of the exercise. On 28 July,
with hostilities against Germany a strong possibility, Britain’s manned and ready
naval forces were ordered to their war stations. On 4 August, war between Brit-
ain and Germany began. Fortuitous preparedness foreclosed the possibility of
naval debacle from surprise attack. With Britain’s first-line naval strength poised
to fight, the stage was set for a full-scale encounter with the German battle fleet.
Many on both sides expected a major battle to take place within days, but the
German navy did not sortie. Subsequent German operational reticence would
keep its main body beyond the reach of British guns
for nearly two years.
For much of this time, the Royal Navy entertained
hopes of fighting and winning a decisive battle. By the
spring of 1916, however, the vision of achieving an in-
dustrial Trafalgar had been given up, replaced by the
view that such a victory was not worth the risks that
would have to be taken to impose action on an unwill-
ing opponent. In May 1916, however, chance and cir-
cumstance resulted in a major encounter between the
main naval forces of Britain and Germany off the
Dr. Sumida is associate professor of military and Euro-
pean history at the University of Maryland. He is the
author of In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance,
Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914,
and Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Com-
mand: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan
Reconsidered. He has completed a third monograph,
Engaging the Clausewitzian Mind. Professor Sumida
has been a Distinguished Visiting Professor in the De-
partment of Military Strategy and Operations at the
National War College.
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coast of Denmark. The outcome of the battle of Jutland, however, was inconclu-
sive. In spite of large superiorities in numbers and firepower, moreover, the Brit-
ish battle fleet not only failed to destroy its adversary, but suffered heavier losses.
Historians have attributed the causes of this unsatisfactory result to several fac-
tors, including weaknesses in British operational command and Admiralty or-
ganization, and defective materiel.1 In addition, much has been made of what
can be called British tactical sterility—that is to say, British battle fleet tactics of
the period are portrayed as simple, unimaginative, and, above all, unchanging.
The present article will challenge the conventional portrayal of early British
wartime naval tactical planning by considering the interlocking technical, stra-
tegic, operational, and intelligence factors that shaped tactical intent. The exam-
ination of the interior mind of Britain’s naval leadership is based on the author’s
recently published findings on prewar British naval tactical planning, and
mainly primary sources covering the war. The inquiry will address the following
three questions: What form did the leadership of the Royal Navy expect a major
fleet action to take, and why? When reality did not correspond to expectations,
how did the leadership of the Royal Navy respond? And finally, what circum-
stances conditioned the responses? The story to be told is not one of action but
of the changing attitudes that informed potential action.2
Arthur J. Marder, the author of the standard account of early-twentieth-century
naval policy, depicted a Royal Navy that on the outbreak of war was commanded
by admirals who were tactically unprogressive, self-satisfied, and thoughtless.3
Marder’s assessment was based upon the memoirs of prominent naval officers
and politicians.4 Such apparently authoritative testimony was, however, cor-
rupted by a combination of partisanship, ignorance, and perhaps fading mem-
ory. A considerable body of documentary evidence supports a very different
view of the state of tactical thinking in the Royal Navy in 1914. By this time,
more than a decade of rapid technical development and comprehensive tactical
experiment had provided the basis for two different tactical outlooks. The first
school of thought, which will be called the “agnostic opportunists,” believed that
a future major sea battle with the German navy could take any number of differ-
ent forms and that the British fleet thus needed to be prepared to operate effec-
tively under a broad range of tactical conditions. The second school of thought,
which will be called the “clandestine preempters,” believed that the Germans
would seek to fight the one kind of naval battle in which they could expect to
achieve major success in spite of their inferiorities in numbers and firepower
and that the British battle fleet should thus develop specific countermeasures in
secret in order to surprise and thereby defeat its opponent under these particu-
lar circumstances.
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The agnostic opportunists were centered in the First Fleet of the Home Fleet.
Their titular and spiritual leader was Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, its com-
mander in chief. Callaghan had taken this position in November 1911 and
served until July 1914. The timing and span of Callaghan’s tenure in command
of the Home Fleet is significant. At the beginning of his tour, much fewer than
half of his first-line capital units consisted of all-big-gun battleships; in 1913,
two out of his four battleship squadrons were still made up of the older
predreadnought-type battleships; and in July 1914, the third dreadnought battle-
ship squadron was still at half strength. Dreadnought battleships were much
more heavily armed and faster than their predreadnought stablemates, but the
combination of the two types in a single formation meant that full advantage
could not be taken of the dreadnought’s superior qualities. Callaghan also had to
contend with the fact that gunnery efficiency changed considerably over his
term of office. In 1911, shortcomings in gunnery equipment and technique had
raised serious questions about big-gun effectiveness. While these difficulties
were largely rectified by prototypes of improved materiel and the development
of new methods of firing, as late as July 1914 only half the available dreadnought
battleships were equipped and trained to achieve what was believed to be
state-of-the-art gunnery. The wide disparity in gunnery capability even among
the dreadnought battleships thus further complicated tactical preparation.
Finally, beginning in 1912, the introduction of torpedoes whose range at high
speed was much greater than that of their predecessors greatly increased the vul-
nerability of the battle line to serious losses from underwater ordnance fired
from either enemy battleships or destroyers.5
Callaghan was responsible for Britain’s main battle fleet in the event of war,
which could come at any time. His problem insofar as tactical planning was con-
cerned, therefore, was immediate—how to fight with the forces in hand. Given
the combination of difficult circumstances facing him in the moment, Callaghan
appears to have focused his energies on maximizing technical efficiency—that
is, getting each of the differing elements of his command to realize its highest at-
tainable level of combat capability—rather than on formulating a tightly inte-
grated tactical scheme.6 This loose functional arrangement allowed new ships
and improved equipment and technique to be introduced with minimal disrup-
tion of readiness to fight. Tactical coherence, to the degree that it existed, was a
matter of shared attitude in three general areas. In the first place, Callaghan be-
lieved that a fleet action would involve considerable sparring at a distance as well
as the possibility of a hammer-and-tongs slugfest at medium and short ranges,
which caused him to order a substantial increase in the amount of ammunition
issued to all dreadnoughts.7 In the second place, Callaghan was by no means
confident that even the latest methods of gunnery were applicable under all the
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various conditions of range and visibility that were likely to occur in a real naval
battle, and he thus insisted that his gunners keep up practice in a variety of
methods of gunlaying (that is, pointing) and fire control.8 In the third place,
Callaghan was convinced that under favorable circumstances destroyers could
sink battleships with torpedoes; as a consequence, he planned to attach substan-
tial flotilla forces to the battle line and use them offensively.9 A measure of tacti-
cal success, if not decisive victory, was to be achieved by a combination of
propitious circumstances and general competence in gunnery and fleet
maneuver.
The clandestine preempters were based at the Admiralty. Their de facto chief
was Vice Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, most of whose career as a flag officer had
been spent at the Admiralty as director of naval ordnance from 1905 to 1907,
Third Sea Lord and controller (that is, overseer of navy materiel procurement)
from 1908 to 1910, and Second Sea Lord (that is, in effect, director of naval per-
sonnel) from 1912 to July 1914,
with only short breaks in between
with the fleet. While in charge of
the Admiralty’s technical depart-
ments as DNO and controller,
Jellicoe had directed the course of
improvement in gunnery ma-
teriel and technique. From late 1911 through mid-1912 he had commanded a
battleship squadron that spent much of its time testing new gunnery equipment
and methods. Where Callaghan’s main concerns about tactical practice were im-
mediate, Jellicoe’s were prospective. For most of the decade that preceded the
outbreak of war, his attention day to day had been devoted to the advancement
of gunnery capability beyond a state of critical imperfection. For years Jellicoe
had struggled with recalcitrant technical problems in gunlaying, fire control,
ordnance, and warship design. Overcoming these difficulties, he believed, was
vital in order to deal with two major threats to Britain’s battle fleet. The first,
which has already been mentioned, was the danger posed by long-range torpe-
does. The second, which requires explanation, was what was believed to be the
German intention to fight a medium-range action with a combination of big
guns, quick-firing guns, and torpedoes.
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office
and the driving force behind German naval expansion, was an outspoken pro-
ponent of aggressive tactics. Tirpitz, who was responsible for naval administra-
tion and shipbuilding, had no control over operations. His views on how the
battle fleet should be used nevertheless shaped British assessments of German
operational intentions. British naval intelligence reported that the Germans
1 0 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
By late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a
long-range engagement to disrupt German
intentions but also under the right conditions
to resort to a medium-range fight to achieve a
decisive victory.
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believed that their fleet would be able to win a decisive battle at medium ranges
(roughly seven to eight thousand yards). The Germans were apparently con-
vinced that their ships would be able to close to medium ranges without suffer-
ing significant damage because British gunnery would be thrown off by the
quick change of range during the approach. After closing, the Germans would
turn onto a course parallel to the British line, which would keep the range con-
stant and thus maximize the accuracy of fire. At this point, the German fleet—
with its faster-firing though lighter-caliber big guns, a large superiority in
medium-caliber guns, and battleship torpedo batteries that were twice the size
of their British counterparts—would be capable in theory of inflicting much
greater damage than it would suffer in return in spite of its numerical inferior-
ity.10 To counter this threat the British fleet either had to develop the capacity to
hit when ranges were long and changing, and thus stop or cripple the German
fleet before it could bring its weapons into action, or devise means to fight and
win a medium-range action without suffering heavy losses from German gun-
nery and torpedoes. The third possibility, retreat in the face of a German ad-
vance, was rejected as morally unacceptable.11
For several years, Jellicoe favored efforts to accomplish the first of the two al-
ternatives, namely, to hit effectively at long ranges that were changing.12 But in
1912 he concluded that recently adopted and forthcoming new gunnery equip-
ment and methods would not only enable a British battle line to overpower a
German opponent at medium ranges but would do so in a way that neutralized
the torpedo threat. Improved gunlaying and sight-setting equipment promised
a dramatic increase in the Royal Navy’s practical rate of accurate big-gun fire at
short and medium ranges. The introduction of heavier-caliber big guns and
better armor-piercing projectiles would make the more accurate and rapid fire
even more deadly. Also, defensive deployment of all available cruisers and de-
stroyers was to provide the means of stopping at a distance German flotilla at-
tacks on the battle line, whose shooting would thus be undisturbed by
maneuvering to avoid torpedoes. The prospective net gain in firepower was
enormous: with the proper gunnery equipment and well-drilled crews, the Brit-
ish dreadnoughts coming into service from 1912 onward could, when steaming
on a straight course, place more than ten times the weight of projectile on target
than earlier dreadnoughts. This would be enough to shatter the German battle
line in no more than six minutes, which was less time than it took for a
high-speed torpedo to traverse the distance between the opposed forces at me-
dium range. On the assumptions that German gunnery technique was no better
than that of the Royal Navy before 1912, that tight British security had concealed
the improvement in British gunnery, and that accordingly the Germans would
seek a medium-range engagement on parallel courses, the British battle fleet
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would be able to deliver an overwhelming hail of fire, after which all ships could
turn simultaneously in response to a single signal to avoid oncoming torpedoes.
Following this turn, the line could be reformed by a second signal, which would
be made in the absence of firing and thus under conditions that favored accurate
transmission and receipt of the order.13
Jellicoe’s scheme must have been attractive for several reasons. The agnostic
opportunists envisioned a battle of complex offensive maneuver by battleships,
cruisers, and destroyers. Coordinating such an action required a very high de-
gree of tactical skill throughout the fleet, as well as complicated signaling. Tacti-
cal errors by subordinate commanders or breakdowns in communications
would produce at the very least some confusion, at worst complete disorganiza-
tion, which would open the possibility of defeat in detail. Even if order was
maintained, British gun crews that had been trained to fire at long as well as me-
dium ranges might lack the practiced skill required to outshoot or even match
opponents who had concentrated all their energy on maximizing speed and ac-
curacy at medium range. If the British battle line stayed on the same course for
much longer than six minutes at medium range, it was likely to suffer heavily
from torpedoes as well as gunfire. The program of the clandestine preempters, in
contrast, called for offensive action by battleships that did not maneuver, with
cruisers and destroyers providing a defensive screen; that approach posed rela-
tively simpler command and control problems, called for gunnery methods that
would give the British battle line firepower superiority under the very tactical
conditions that would be sought by their German opponents, and offered a rem-
edy to the torpedo threat.
A consensus within the Admiralty in favor of Jellicoe’s tactical scheme ap-
pears to have been formed in late 1912. Because German cognizance of the Royal
Navy’s plan and the capabilities upon which it was based would compromise its
effectiveness, knowledge of its existence was restricted to a select few. Keeping
the plan secret was made easier by the fact that the British fleet was ill prepared
to execute it. By mid-1913, only one battleship squadron out of the four in the
First Fleet of the Home Fleet was made up of ships suitable to fight the kind of
medium-range battle envisioned by Jellicoe. But ships under construction that
would come into service in the next two years could be formed into a second
squadron, while the older, less heavily armed dreadnought battleships could be
given the new sight-setting equipment, which would enhance significantly their
ability to shoot accurately and rapidly at medium ranges. In the spring of 1914,
Jellicoe was informed that he would succeed Callaghan as commander in chief
of the Home Fleet at the end of the year. By this time, the Home Fleet would be
only a few months away from having a second full squadron of battleships fitted
with state-of-the-art gunlaying and sight-setting equipment and armed for the
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most part with big guns that were much larger than those in the German fleet.
The remaining dreadnoughts would, had the war not begun in August, most
likely have been fitted with the new sight-setting equipment;14 only one squad-
ron would have been made up of predreadnoughts. With all that brought to fru-
ition and three-quarters of the battle fleet thus more or less appropriately
equipped, Jellicoe would have commanded a force with a credible capacity to ex-
ecute his vision of decisive battle at medium range.
By the spring of 1914, the British view of a medium-range engagement had
been broadened to include the possibility of an engagement between two lines of
battleships on parallel courses but moving in opposite directions. Little attention
had been given to this contingency until Captain William Wordsworth Fisher,
commander of the dreadnought battleship St. Vincent, submitted a memoran-
dum on the subject to Callaghan in April 1914. Callaghan observed that “action
on opposite courses at medium range will afford excellent opportunities for long
range torpedo fire.” This was because the opposed fleets would be advancing rap-
idly toward torpedoes launched by their opponent, which meant that the distance
the torpedo had traveled by the point of impact would be much less than the range
to the target had been at the point of firing. The threat of torpedoes under the cir-
cumstances described could not “be eliminated short of leading the van out of
torpedo range,” which “might be impossible without exposing the rear to the fire
of a larger number of enemy ships.” That being said, Callaghan believed that supe-
rior British gunfire would be capable of rendering the enemy battleships incapa-
ble of either effective gunfire or torpedo attack, although he did not mention the
greater difficulty of aiming guns when the change-of-range rate was high, as
would be the case when fleets were steaming on opposed courses. He was con-
vinced, moreover, that such an action would give the British forces an opportunity
to smash the leading ships of the German battle line and thus disrupt the entire
enemy formation. Callaghan concluded that battle on opposite courses was possi-
ble either in the form of a meeting engagement in bad weather or in good weather
through deliberate action (for unspecified reasons). What Callaghan may have
had in mind was the transformation of a pursuit action into a battle on opposite
courses by a simultaneous turn by a retreating German fleet, whose motive was to
maximize the effectiveness of its superior torpedo armament.15
The orderly transition from one tactical regime to another that was planned
for late 1914 was disrupted by the decision of the Admiralty in the last week of
July to replace Callaghan with Jellicoe immediately in the likely event of war
with Germany. Jellicoe objected strenuously to this ruling, and with cause. He
could not fight the kind of battle that he wanted with the fleet that existed. If a
major engagement against the German navy was to be fought in the near term, it
would have to be executed along the lines worked on by Callaghan, in which case
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the incumbent admiral, with two years’ experience in office and the confidence
of his subordinates, was the better choice. Winston Churchill, the First Lord, re-
jected Jellicoe’s demurrals, however, and Jellicoe reluctantly accepted the ap-
pointment, which became effective on 4 August, the day war was declared.16 On
this date he took command of the first-line fighting ships of the Home Fleet, a
force that was designated the Grand Fleet. The Admiralty’s reasoning is still mys-
terious. It may well be that Britain’s naval leadership believed that the Germans
would keep their navy in port during the early months of the war and that
Jellicoe, as the leader of the clandestine preempters, was the best man to use the
time to prepare the just-mobilized battle fleet to achieve a decisive victory along
the lines formulated in 1912. In any case, German operational reticence, com-
pounded by British operational caution, practically eliminated the possibility of
a major fleet action in the fall of 1914.
Although Tirpitz called for the immediate offensive deployment of the battle
fleet, he was unable to persuade the operational leadership of the German navy
to risk a major clash prior to the reduction of the Grand Fleet’s numerical ad-
vantage by the action of German destroyers, submarines, and mines.17 Con-
versely, Jellicoe feared that British losses to those threats would set the stage for a
German sortie to fight a battle at medium range, the outcome of which might
well be unfavorable, given yet-to-be rectified materiel shortcomings.18 He thus
instructed his command in August and September that he would exercise cau-
tion when threatened by torpedo attack or mines, even to the point of giving up
what appeared to be opportunities for decisive action. In contrast to Callaghan,
Jellicoe made it clear that the primary function of destroyers was to prevent or
disrupt enemy destroyer attacks on the battle line. Jellicoe stated a general inten-
tion to fight at what could be called “very high medium range”—that is, nine to
twelve thousand yards. But he also warned that “it may be necessary to close the
range or otherwise maneuver the fleet to avoid indecisive action.” Nevertheless,
Jellicoe called for deliberate shooting at ranges that were well above ten thou-
sand yards, in the hopes of throwing the German fleet “into partial confusion
before its attack can be developed, with consequent loss of initiative and inter-
ference with their prearranged plan [i.e., closing to medium range].”19
In October, Jellicoe expressed these same views to the Admiralty, after which he
declared his intention to “pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper
course to defeat and annihilate the enemy’s battle fleet, without regard to unin-
structed opinion or criticism.”20 The short-term prospects of achieving this objec-
tive, however, were not good. In October, the Grand Fleet lost one of its
dreadnought battleships to a mine, three more were crippled by engine defects,
and a fifth was in dock refitting. All five vessels, moreover, were of the latest type,
which thus cut the battleship force capable of using the new methods of gunnery
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to full effect by half. In November, yet another first-class dreadnought battleship
was disabled by engine trouble, and in December two others (including one of the
units that had suffered engine problems in October) were damaged by collision.
These losses were mitigated by the addition of four new battleships, which re-
quired, however, some months to work up to the same standards of efficiency as
older units.21 Thus the Grand Fleet’s ability—measured in battleships of the ap-
propriate kind and level of effectiveness—to fight a medium-range engagement
effectively was even less during the last three months of 1914 than it had been at
the beginning of the war. In late December, indeed, the Second Battle Squadron—
the only unit that was fully equipped and trained to execute Jellicoe’s tactical
ideas—was at half strength (see table). These circumstances were exacerbated by a
severe shortage of destroyers. In early December, Jellicoe reported that in view of
S U M I D A 1 0 9
Units
Actual Early
August 1914
Actual Late
November 1914
Actual Late
December 1914
Actual Late
January 1915
Nominal
January 1915
Nominal
January 1916
1st Battle
Squadron
1 A
2 B
5 C
1 A
2 B
4 C
1 A
2 B
5 C
1 A
2 B
4 C
1 A
2 B
5 C
1 A
2 B
5 C+
2nd Battle
Squadron
8 A 7 A 4 A 6 A 8 A 8 A
3rd Battle
Squadron
8 D 7 D 7 D 6 D 8 D 7 D
4th Battle
Squadron
1 A
1 B-
3 C
1 A/1 A-
1 B
3 C
2 A/2 A-
1 B
3 C
3 A
1 B
3 C
4 A
1 B
3 C
4 A
1 B
3 C+
5th Battle
Squadron
* * * * * 3 A
Total by Category
10 A
2 B
1 B-
8 C
8 D
9 A/1 A-
3 B
7 C
7 D
7 A/2 A-
3 B
8 C
7 D
10 A
3 B
7 C
6 D
13 A
3 B
8 C
8 D
16 A
3 B
8 C+
7 D
Total Effective
Units [A, B, C+]
at Medium
Range
12 12 10 13 16 27
COMPOSITION OF BRITISH BATTLE SQUADRONS IN TERMS OF GUNNERY EFFECTIVENESS AT
MEDIUM RANGE, AUGUST 1914–JANUARY 1916
LEGEND
Maximum effectiveness [proper guns, mountings, fire control] = A
Maximum effectiveness but not worked up = A-
High effectiveness [proper mountings, fire control] = B
High effectiveness but not worked up = B-
Good effectiveness [proper fire control] = C+
Poor effectiveness [lack of proper guns, mountings, fire control] = C
Very poor effectiveness [predreadnought] = D
Note: C units were probably being upgraded to C+ as they refitted from the fall of 1914 through 1915. Actual figures take into account ships under repair or re-
fit. Nominal figures do not.
Sources: F. J. Dittmar and J. J. Colledge, British Warships 1914–1919 (London: Ian Allan, 1972), pp. 15–19; Jellicoe, Grand Fleet, pp. 168, 185, 199.
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the more than two-to-one superiority in destroyer numbers enjoyed by the Ger-
mans, he would have no choice but to “adopt the objectionable and difficult one
of turning the battle fleet away when the attack takes place.” This, he observed,
would upset gunfire and possibly forfeit “a position of tactical advantage.”22
During the first five months of the war, the German navy’s decision to confine
its operations to battle-cruiser raids and forays with submarines and light sur-
face craft while keeping the battle fleet back meant that the Grand Fleet’s weak-
nesses with respect to a medium-range battle did not matter. The Admiralty,
however, did not believe that German operational diffidence would last. By as
early as October 1914, according to the official history of the Royal Navy, Brit-
ain’s naval leadership had concluded that the Germans would
husband their fleet for some sudden blow when the long winter nights would give
them the best chance of evasion and surprise. Now that their failures in France had
forced them to recognize that the war would not be the short and brilliant affair they
had expected, they were already having to give anxious attention to the question of
food supply, and however prudently inclined the High Command of the navy might
be, its hand might at any time be forced into some desperate attempt to diminish the
stringency of the blockade, or to deter us from sending further troops to France.23
By early 1915, the Grand Fleet’s ability to fight a medium-range engagement
had improved significantly, for several reasons. First, the four new battleships
had completed their workups and could be considered fully effective. Second, by
late 1914, British naval signals intelligence was able to give warning of German
warship movements, which enabled Jellicoe to reduce the time spent at sea in an-
ticipation of enemy activity, with the result that the crippling loss rate of the pre-
vious fall from engine wear decreased substantially.24 Third, the ability of
perhaps at least a few of the older dreadnoughts to fight at medium ranges had
been much improved by new-model fire control equipment, the fitting of which
had been given a high priority after the outbreak of war;25 as a consequence, the
Grand Fleet from January 1915 onward almost certainly had available a signifi-
cantly greater number of all-big-gun battleships that were more or less equipped
to hit hard and rapidly at medium ranges than it had had in late 1914 (see table).
Fourth, destroyer reinforcements to the Grand Fleet substantially reduced the
German advantage in this category of warship.26
On 12 January 1915, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, informed
Jellicoe that there was “some ‘movement’ going on in the German High Seas
Fleet—nothing at all definite, but nevertheless enough to arouse suspicion.”27
The Admiralty also had good reason to believe that when the Germans acted,
they would seek a medium-range engagement. Notice to the Grand Fleet was
given in the form of a complete translation of a recent redaction of the German
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Tactical Orders, which was taken seriously by Jellicoe.28 This pamphlet, which
was printed for distribution in January 1915, stated that German battleships
would close to fight at ranges of 8,800 to 6,600 yards, that torpedoes would be
fired at this range, and that decisive victory at any cost was the objective.29
Jellicoe may also have been influenced by intelligence reports indicating that the
German battle fleet had devoted considerable time to practicing rapid course re-
versals through simultaneous turns;30 that could have indicated a German inten-
tion to transform a retreat into a medium-range battle on opposite courses.31
The Second Battle Squadron was best equipped to deal with the high and vary-
ing change-of-range rates that would characterize such conditions; for this and
other reasons it may have been designated to lead the fleet into battle, as was to
be the case at Jutland.32
Jellicoe seems to have responded with an instruction to the Grand Fleet pre-
scribing methods of gunnery that were suitable for a medium-range battle and
conversely discouraging the use of director firing, a centralized system of aiming
all the guns of the main battery of a capital ship, which was essential for accurate
shooting at long range.33 Moreover, Jellicoe stressed not only the general impor-
tance of fast firing but its specific importance with respect to those battleships
that were best equipped to carry it out. This instruction, dated 18 January 1915,
stated that
experience has shown that under really favourable conditions firing by direct
gunlaying is superior to director firing both as regards rapidity and accuracy of fire,
markedly so in the matter of rapidity in ships fitted with quick elevating valves and
presses [to train, elevate, and depress the gun barrels], as are the latest ships, if there
is an awkward yaw [lateral motion of the ship’s bow] and roll. . . . The fact is that in a
turret ship the director is in some respects more difficult to handle well than is a gun,
and therefore an awkward motion, yaw, turns, particularly with a second-rate direc-
tor layer, often results in inaccurate or a reduced rate of fire. . . . It cannot be too
strongly emphasized that volume of accurate fire is the object to be aimed at—the
ship which first succeeds in hitting hard gets halfway to victory. We know the Ger-
mans shoot well, no one doubts that the advantage of early hits is thoroughly appre-
ciated by them, and that they will do their utmost to develop initial superiority of fire
by rapidity, which as our guns are more powerful, is their only chance of succeeding.
. . . It follows, therefore, that our system must be that which, under the condition ex-
isting at the time, will enable the highest rate of accurate fire to be developed.34
In February 1915, following the tactical victory of the British battle cruisers
under the command of Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty over their German counter-
parts at Dogger Bank, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the commander of the
German battle fleet, was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. During the first
two weeks of March, the combination of signals intelligence and this change in
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leadership prompted the Admiralty to warn Jellicoe of a possible German battle
fleet sortie.35 In the meanwhile, the Grand Fleet conducted gunnery exercises
replicating the conditions of a medium-range fight.36 An exercise of 9 March en-
visioned an action in which a fleet that “desires to engage at long range” was op-
posed by one that “desires to close to 11,000 yards or less.” The exercise of 12
March involved a battle in which visibility was assumed to be only ten thousand
yards.37 Following these experiments, Jellicoe added a gunnery addendum to the
Grand Fleet Battle Orders on 20 March 1915. “At all ranges,” he declared, “the
early development of accurate rapid fire is the object to be kept in view.” Jellicoe
made clear that he expected gunners to resort to rapid independent fire, a
method of shooting that was most effective at medium ranges, as well as rapid
salvos. Also, given the likelihood
that the poor visibility conditions
typical of the North Sea might re-
strict shooting to medium ranges,
he insisted that “ships must be
prepared to open rapid fire from
the outset in order to make sure of establishing initial superiority.”38 Jellicoe’s
misgivings about director gunnery were also still in evidence in the late spring.
On 20 April, Jellicoe discouraged the use of directors improvised because of de-
lays in the supply of factory models “except under conditions when the ordinary
method of firing [that is, direct laying, in which each turret’s crew aimed its own
guns] cannot be employed.”39 It is, he observed on 27 May, “more difficult to handle
a director well than it is to lay a gun.”40
British expectations that the Germans would seek a decisive fleet action
peaked in April. “In my view,” Fisher wrote to Churchill, the First Lord, on 31
March, “there are many indications—of which the recent cruise of the German
Fleet is an example—that under their new Commander-in-Chief we may antici-
pate a more forward and aggressive policy in the North Sea, and therefore we
must be prepared for all eventualities.”41 In mid-April, the crisis seemed to have
arrived. On 15 April, Fisher warned Jellicoe that “VON POHL HAS SOMETHING
ON! That is quite certain!”42 The next day, Fisher wrote, “Von Pohl is assuredly up
to something.”43 The Germans, however, aborted their deployment. “We really
thought,” Fisher confided to Jellicoe on 17 April, “the battle would be joined
to-day! Everything pointed to it. . . . They had arranged not to return till dawn of
[the] 19th or night of [the] 19th, and suddenly a very urgent and immediate or-
der [was] given for the whole Fleet to return home.”44 A second scare followed a
week later, but again the German fleet withdrew to its base after staying well be-
yond the reach of Jellicoe’s forces.45 These events convinced Fisher that a battle
fleet showdown with the Germans was unlikely. There would, he declared to
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Jellicoe on 23 April, “NEVER be a battle with the German High Seas Fleet unless
von Pohl goes north specially to fight you, and that he never will! That’s the situa-
tion and you can’t alter it!”46
There remained the possibility that luck or good intelligence would enable
Jellicoe to intercept the German battle fleet, which might then be engaged at a
distance as it attempted to withdraw. As early as 2 April, the Grand Fleet carried
out a gunnery exercise in which battleships fired at sixteen thousand yards.47 It
should be noted, however, that Jellicoe restricted ships whose gun crews had not
been fully worked up to methods of firing best suited to a medium-range fight, a
decision implying that mastery of these techniques had priority over those
needed for effective gunnery at long range.48 Gunnery exercises on 6 June were
carried out at no more than twelve thousand yards, and perhaps less, with appar-
ently good results.49 Jellicoe thus informed Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the First
Sea Lord, on 16 June, “If only we could get our chance to finish off the High Seas
Fleet now, I feel we are in the pink of condition. But we must exercise patience.”50
In late June, tabletop war games in the battleship Benbow explored the nature of
an engagement between the British and German battle fleets at eighteen thou-
sand yards, with the former in pursuit of the latter.51 There are no records of the
proceedings, but on 23 June 1915 Jellicoe informed Beatty that the participants
had “certainly learned lessons.”52 In early August, the Grand Fleet carried out
gunnery exercises that involved shooting at seventeen thousand yards for newer
dreadnoughts and twelve thousand for the older units, whose main-battery guns
were smaller.53 This was followed in early September by an exercise at sea that
dealt with the case of a retiring German fleet.54
Firing at extended ranges, where the percentage of hits to rounds fired would
be low and thus quick decisions would be improbable, meant that pursuit, even
if successful, would be protracted. This would give the Germans ample opportu-
nity to launch attacks with their destroyers and possibly even to maneuver in
ways that would draw the Grand Fleet into a minefield or submarine ambush.55
Arthur James Balfour, Churchill’s successor as First Lord, advised Jellicoe that he
was convinced that the problem posed by a German retreat covered by mines
and submarines was insoluble. Jellicoe, in his reply of 10 July, did not answer his
chief ’s concerns directly but did make it clear that he would never advance with-
out a full destroyer screen.56
Given his record of caution and recent declaration of prudent conduct in the
face of threats from underwater ordnance, Jellicoe must have been surprised and
offended by a suggestion from Beatty in early August that the Grand Fleet had
focused on the use of heavy guns to the point of denying the powers of the mine
and torpedo their due. This provoked a strong response from Jellicoe on 7 Au-
gust. He insisted that he had been “most fully alive, ever since the war began, to
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the extremely important part which mines and submarines are likely to play in
the fleet action, if fought where the Germans want it.”57 At the same time, Jellicoe
categorically rejected the charge that the Grand Fleet was “obsessed with the
idea . . . that we place reliance in our guns alone,” insisting that indeed some
members of his command placed “too little reliance on the gun.”58 Given the
German numerical superiority in destroyers, Jellicoe believed he had no choice
but to deploy his own flotilla defensively, which meant that decisive victory, if it
was to be had at all, would have to be produced by the action of heavy gunnery.
Beatty, in his reply to what he regarded as a rebuke for perceived defeatism, con-
ceded on 12 August that the Grand Fleet’s gunnery advantage was “at present . . .
our only asset” and endorsed the proposition that “decisive victory is the only
thing to aim at.”59
Looking to effective gunnery as the main source of decisive victory, however,
raised difficult issues. In September 1915, Frederic Dreyer, the captain of a battle-
ship in the Second Battle Squadron and Jellicoe’s chief gunnery adviser, ob-
served that the “experience of the War must have shown the Germans that they
have little or no hope in clear weather of getting their Battle Line to so close a
range as 8,800 to 6,000 yards from the Grand Fleet.” Dreyer argued that British
rangefinders and associated fire control equipment could in clear weather pro-
duce “excellent results” at up to fifteen thousand yards and “good results” from
fifteen to seventeen thousand yards.60 But poor weather conditions in the North
Sea limited visibility more often than not, and in any case the rate of hitting from
above ten thousand yards was far less, even under ideal conditions, than it was at
seven to nine thousand. This meant that British ships would require a much lon-
ger time to inflict heavy damage while steaming on a straight course than in a
medium-range engagement, which would expose them to torpedoes fired by
German battleships or destroyers. German torpedoes at their high-speed setting
had a maximum range of roughly ten thousand yards. Dreyer thus argued that
the British battle line should maintain a distance of 13,500 yards from German
battleships and accompanying destroyers, which was far enough to avoid torpe-
does from the former and allow defensive action by British cruisers and destroy-
ers against the latter. Should the British screening units fail to intercept the attack-
ing German flotilla, Dreyer insisted that the Grand Fleet “must turn away . . . even
if this means losing the High Sea [sic] Fleet (better than losing the Grand Fleet).”
Dreyer concluded, “If we deployed at 18,000 yards in very clear weather we
should, with our superior Fleet speed, be able to close in to 13,500 yards with all
guns bearing . . . —before Fire is ordered to be opened at about 15,000 yards—
unless the Germans open fire before we arrive at that range.”61
Dreyer’s counsel, which by his own admission represented a compromise be-
tween countering the torpedo threat and meeting the requirements of gunnery,
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offered little hope of decisive results. Commander Roger Backhouse, a member
of Jellicoe’s staff, believed, on one hand, that 13,500 yards was too low to ensure
security against German destroyers, while on the other hand, he was convinced
that assuming the German flotilla threat could be neutralized the fighting range
should be from ten to twelve thousand yards. This, he argued, would allow deci-
sive results to be obtained in good time.62 Jellicoe, for his part, had no alternative
but to accept action that would most likely have to take place at ranges consider-
ably greater than those at which his main batteries could hit consistently. Al-
though the documentary record is sparse for the fall of 1915, it appears that
gunnery exercises in October and later were for the most part carried out at
ranges above fifteen thousand yards.63 By this time, long-range hitting capability
had been greatly improved by the fitting of directors in the majority of the
dreadnought battleships.64 That being said, continued belief in the possibility of
a medium-range engagement seems to have prompted a test of the Grand Fleet’s
capacity to shoot accurately with methods of fire control that facilitated high
rates of shooting. This exercise, which took place in late December, was appar-
ently reassuring.65
The general revised edition of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders of December
1915 established rules of engagement that balanced the views of both Dreyer
and Backhouse. “In weather of good visibility,” Jellicoe maintained, “the range
should be between 15,000 and 10,000 yards; the later being reached as the en-
emy’s fire is overcome; in the early stages of action I do not desire to close the
range much inside 14,000 yards.”66 The torpedo threat was to be avoided by
keeping the range long. “The torpedo menace,” Jellicoe warned,
must always be borne in mind. . . . Until the enemy is beaten by gunfire it is not my
intention to risk attack from his torpedoes, although [it] is always possible that if we
were inferior in strength on meeting it might become necessary to close sufficiently
to attack by torpedoes. Such a movement would, however, be ordered by me, and
generally speaking it is to be understood that my intention is to keep outside torpedo
range of the enemy’s battle line.67
Jellicoe made it clear, as he had in his instructions of August 1914, that effec-
tive long-range shooting was important in order to disrupt German deployment
for a medium-range engagement.68 Nonetheless, Jellicoe added to the orders a
section declaring that circumstances could arise in which the leading squadron
would be “gradually closing with a view to obtaining decisive results with gun-
fire and for the purpose of firing their torpedoes, but not being followed to that
closer range by our center or rear.”69 Here again Jellicoe may have been thinking
specifically of the Second Battle Squadron, at this date still the only squadron
of the Grand Fleet made up completely of ships with heavier main batteries
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and, with one exception, the latest fire control equipment (see table and note
32), and which would, as noted, be deployed in the lead at the battle of Jutland in
1916.
It would thus appear that by late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a
long-range engagement to disrupt German intentions of fighting at medium
range with both their battleships and flotillas, but also under the right condi-
tions to resort to a medium-range fight with his best squadron to achieve a deci-
sive victory. The fact that a medium-range battle was still considered a serious
possibility would explain why the revised edition of the Royal Navy’s Manual of
Gunnery, which was released in January 1916, covered fire control methods and
gunlaying practices that were appropriate to a medium-range as well as
long-range battle.70 Also, Jellicoe at
this point probably had reasons to
believe that the German battle
fleet might seek action in the near
future. The Germans’ abandon-
ment of their unrestricted subma-
rine campaign against merchant shipping in September 1915, after the objection
of neutral powers, most likely prompted some expectation of compensatory ag-
gressive action by the surface fleet. The onset of the second winter of the war may
also, as in the year before, have given rise to the belief that the Germans would ex-
ploit bad weather and poor visibility to conduct battle fleet operations. Finally,
British intelligence may have learned of the bitter dissent in Germany between
proponents of action and advocates of caution in the government and fleet.71
By the spring of 1916, the inactivity of the German battle fleet through the
very season that in theory most favored the success of an inferior force had at last
convinced the leaders of the Grand Fleet that decisive battle was unobtainable.
Queried by Jellicoe on the issue, Beatty replied on 14 April 1916, “I think the
German Fleet will come out only on its own initiative when the right time comes,”
by which he meant a sortie to engage an inferior British force. “I am firmly con-
vinced,” Beatty added, “that under no circumstances could we ever by taking the
initiative induce them to commit themselves to an action which in any way
could be considered decisive.”72 Two days before, Jellicoe had informed Admiral
Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, that all the important strategic benefits of
destroying the German battle fleet were being achieved by its confinement to
harbor. For this reason, Jellicoe argued, “it is not, in my opinion, wise to risk un-
duly the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet in an attempt to hasten the end of the
High Seas Fleet, particularly if the risks come, not from the High Seas Fleet itself,
but from such attributes as mines and submarines.”73 The balance of his letter
was devoted to examining the chances of attacking the German battle fleet in its
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harbors or home waters with aircraft and mines. The prospects for achieving
major success with such operations, Jellicoe concluded, were not good.74
The belief that the Germans would sooner or later seek a decisive engagement at
medium range largely determined the character of British tactical thinking
about a battle fleet action in the North Sea during the first twenty months of the
war. British tactical preparation during this period went through four stages.
From August to December 1914, the Grand Fleet lacked the material means for
the decisive victory at medium range envisioned by the clandestine preempters
prior to hostilities. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander in chief of the Grand
Fleet and the leader of the clandestine preempters, was thus compelled to adopt
a cautious battle plan based upon fighting at long range, which made a decisive
action in the near term unlikely. From January to May 1915 the Grand Fleet’s
ability to fight the medium-range action called for by the clandestine
preempters before the war was improved significantly by the commissioning of
new battleships, reduced losses from mechanical defects, modernization of
older units, and destroyer reinforcements. During this time, Jellicoe welcomed
the prospect of a head-to-head encounter with the German battle fleet, and he
was probably prepared to commit his command to a medium-range battle in or-
der to achieve a decisive victory. German refusal to challenge British control of
the North Sea with their battle fleet, however, forced Jellicoe to modify his tacti-
cal planning. From June through October 1915 the Grand Fleet conducted a se-
ries of gunnery and tactical experiments to explore the possibilities of fighting a
long-range action against a German opponent who was unwilling to fight at me-
dium range, while simultaneously maintaining the capacity to fight a medium-
range battle in the event of a German change of heart or a meeting engagement
in poor visibility. From November 1915 to April 1916, the Grand Fleet was more
or less prepared to fight either a medium-range or a long-range engagement de-
pending on circumstances, adopting what was to a degree the approach of the
agnostic opportunists.
Six assessments can be made on the basis of the foregoing analytical sum-
mary. First, British tactical preparations before and during the war were driven
by the need to address the threat posed by a specific enemy whose tactical inten-
tions were highly dangerous. Second, during the war, British tactical practice
altered when the German navy did not behave as expected, which is to say that in
spite of the lack of a major battle, British tactical thought was dynamic, not
static. Third, the development and maintenance of the capability to outfight the
German battle fleet at medium range was the primary objective of British tacti-
cal preparation up to the end of 1915, and probably through the spring of 1916;
meeting the requirements of a long-range action took second place, which may
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explain the defects in British gunnery at long range eventually exposed by the
battle of Jutland. Fourth, the response of the clandestine preempters to the
threat posed by a German fleet determined to fight a medium-range engage-
ment was well advised, because the German navy’s operational leadership might
have decided to heed Tirpitz’s call for a naval offensive, in which case a British
battle fleet unprepared to fight at medium range could have been roughly han-
dled, if not defeated. Fifth, the fact that the British battle fleet was ill prepared to
fight a medium-range action in the first five months of the war suggests that
Tirpitz’s argument for the aggressive deployment of the German battle fleet had
more in its favor than has previously been supposed. Sixth and finally, given the
effort invested in developing and maintaining the ability to fight effectively at
medium range, it seems likely that had the opportunity presented itself at the battle
of Jutland, Jellicoe would have reached for decisive victory through a medium-
range fight.
The story of Britain’s naval “agnostic opportunists” and “clandestine
preempters” in the early twentieth century illustrates what might be described as
the fundamental dilemma of operational planning. On the one hand, belief that
future hostilities will pose a range of different circumstances can promote prep-
aration of the armed forces for a diverse set of actions, with the drawback that
the consequent division of effort with respect to both equipment and training
will preclude the achievement of levels of tactical proficiency needed to achieve
decisive victory. On the other, the conviction that the future is predictable can
lead to the preparation of the armed forces to fight one kind of engagement, but
at the risk that such a course will produce serious or even critical weaknesses
should events transpire differently than had been anticipated. Choice of opera-
tional approach, in other words, is a matter of having to consider the advantages
and drawbacks of two problematical alternatives. This policy quandary might be
expressed in terms of the opposition of two well-known maxims, Jomini’s insis-
tence upon concentration of force as the basis of all military success, and Voltaire’s
observation that “the best is the enemy of the good.”
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REVIEW ESSAY
THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGY
William C. Martel
Ikenberry, G. John, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Forging a
World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st
Century: Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Se-
curity (plus seven Working Group Reports). Princeton, N.J.:
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
27 September 2006. 96pp. Available at www.wws.princeton
.edu/ppns/report.html
The Princeton Project on National Security describes itself as a “three-year, bi-
partisan initiative to develop a sustainable and effective national security strat-
egy for the United States of America.” Consisting of the final report and seven
working group reports (on Grand Strategic Choices, State Security and Trans-
national Threats, Economics and National Security,
Reconstruction and Development, Anti-Americanism,
Relative Threat Assessment, and Foreign Infrastruc-
ture and Global Institutions), this study, like so many
others, wrestles with the great unresolved problem
that plagues contemporary policy makers and schol-
ars: What is the central organizing principle behind
American national security policy?
Declaring that their aim was to “write a collective
‘X article’” (a reference to George Kennan’s “The
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in Foreign Af-
fairs in July 1947), the codirectors of the Princeton
Project sought to “do together what no one person in
our highly specialized and rapidly changing world
William C. Martel is an associate professor of interna-
tional security studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts Uni-
versity, Medford, Massachusetts. He received his
doctorate in international relations from the University
of Massachusetts (Amherst) and was a postdoctoral fel-
low at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Govern-
ment. Formerly a professor of national security affairs
at the Naval War College, Dr. Martel has held the Alan
Shepard Chair of Space Technology and Policy Studies;
directed a number of studies on space and policy issues
for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of Secre-
tary of Defense; and was a member of the professional
staff of the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C.
His most recent book is Victory in War: Foundations
of Modern Military Policy (2007).
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could hope to do alone.” The central arguments of this study fall into several pre-
dictable categories. Beginning with the premise that the world lacks a “single or-
ganizing principle for foreign policy” and seeking to remedy this deficiency by
bringing order to the chaos surrounding grand strategy, the project stipulates
that the “basic objective of U.S. strategy” is to “protect the American people and
the American way of life.” It describes “three more specific aims” of American
strategy as a “secure homeland,” “healthy global economy,” and “benign inter-
national environment.”
The study goes on to define “six basic criteria” that must be implemented.
This strategy must be “multidimensional,” “integrated,” “interest-based rather
than threat-based,” “grounded in hope rather than fear,” “pursued inside-out,”
and “adapted to the information age.” What emerges from this framework is the
commonsensical and unremarkable conclusion about the fundamental princi-
ple of American foreign policy—that “America must stand for, seek, and secure
a world of liberty under law,” because a world inhabited by “mature liberal de-
mocracies” will make the American people “safer, richer, and healthier.” To im-
plement “liberty under law,” the project proposes three broad sets of policies.
First, governments must be brought up to PAR (acronym for “popular, ac-
countable, and rights-regarding governments”). Reaffirming that “democracy is
the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty,”
U.S. strategy must foster the “preconditions” necessary for successful liberal de-
mocracies, and those conditions go “far beyond” merely holding elections.
Second, a liberal order must be built that, resting on a system of international
institutions, diminishes the ability of one state to wield unilaterally the power
that breeds “resentment, fear, and resistance.” The ability to build this liberal or-
der depends on establishing a global “concert of democracies” that will “institu-
tionalize and ratify the ‘democratic peace.’”
Third, the United States, and presumably the self-selected members of the
concert of democracies, must rethink the role of force in international politics.
Beyond the sensible argument that “liberty and law must be backed up by force,”
the study holds that the United States must retreat from the principle of military
primacy, while building the collective military might of the liberal democracies.
If successful, the United States can avoid the destabilizing consequences that
flowed from great-power competition during the Cold War. In practical terms,
the study recommends that policy makers and scholars update the doctrine of
deterrence and “develop new guidelines on the preventive use of force against
terrorists and extreme states.”
The analytical framework developed in Forging a World of Liberty under Law
concludes with a discussion of “major threats and challenges,” which fall into the
usual categories of the Middle East, global terror networks, the proliferation and
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transfer of nuclear weapons, the rise of China and order in East Asia, global pan-
demics, sources of energy, and a protective infrastructure.
In addition to the final report, several of the working group reports also merit
examination. The report of the working group on grand strategic choices,
cochaired by Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins University and G. John
Ikenberry of Princeton, focuses on the eminently worthy question: “Toward
what ends should America use its power, invest its resources, and concert its en-
ergies?” Among its several key findings are that “East Asia is likely to pose the
greatest challenges to the United States”; that Washington needs to “move toward
an Asia-centric grand strategy”; and that the “ongoing war in Iraq” is the “main
stumbling block” toward a strategic shift in American strategy. If these conclu-
sions appear commonplace, so too are some of the report’s recommendations—
such as that the United States “ought to be very careful” about the preemptive
and preventive use of force, “institutions are the tools of American power [and]
we must relearn the benefits of multilateralism,” and the war on terrorism is a
“global counterinsurgency” rather than a “clash of civilizations.” The argument
that the United States should rebuild a “series of new grand bargains” with other
democracies, however, is worthy of deeper consideration.
The report of the working group on anti-Americanism, cochaired by Tod
Lindberg of the Hoover Institution and Suzanne Nossel of the Security and
Peace Institute, examines the rise of anti-Americanism and its effects on Ameri-
can policy. It discusses the varieties of anti-Americanism, its effects and implica-
tions for violence and its economic and political impacts, responses to
anti-Americanism, and recommendations for dealing with the problem. Not a
systematic analysis of global public opinion, this report essentially restates data
collected by the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys since the late 1990s. Its entirely
predictable conclusion is that “many forms of anti-Americanism may be ad-
dressed only through changes in substantive U.S. policies.” However, since this
analysis concludes that it is “difficult to measure how much tangible friction
anti-Americanism” creates for U.S. foreign policy, its broad observations are
hardly reassuring unless we know whether anti-Americanism is a transient phe-
nomenon or simply a reaction to Washington’s current policies toward Iraq and
in waging the global war on terror.
By far the most analytical and interesting report is that on economics and na-
tional security, cochaired by Adam Posen of the Institute for International Eco-
nomics and Daniel K. Tarullo of Georgetown University. Against the backdrop
of the relative economic influence of Asian states whose power is “shifting grad-
ually but steadily,” the report proposes that the United States integrate economic
policy into national security policy in its governmental and interagency pro-
cesses, arguing that the importance of integrating these policies is “self-evident.”
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It discusses the reasons for integration and examines impediments and chal-
lenges to the United States in formulating and implementing global economic
policy. Also outlined are suggestions for strengthening linkages between eco-
nomic and national security policies. Fundamentally, the report suggests that
“traditional foreign policy thinking [about economics as a tool of statecraft]
must change” because the influence of economics in national security is on the
ascent.
Outlined are four “generally valid assumptions”: “globalization of the econ-
omy increases both U.S. capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities”; Washington’s
“ability to restrict commerce and technology transfer to other countries is more
limited”; “international economic development and integration should en-
hance U.S. national security”; and “U.S. economic policy mistakes” affect na-
tional security. Also examined are five “mistaken or misleading assumptions”
about economics and national security: American security is “threatened by rel-
atively faster economic growth in other parts of the world”; “economic develop-
ment policies abroad” enhance U.S. security; globalization has made the U.S.
economy “vulnerable to the fate, practices, and whims of other countries”; as
has been prosaically observed, “economic trends and capabilities are changing
rapidly”; and as has been more trenchantly noted, economic globalization
makes “economic sanctions and similar measures applied by the United States . . .
more effective.” As the study concludes, “it is more accurate to say that a global-
ized economy magnified the effects of our own policies, positive and negative.”
Each of these developments has had profound consequences for national se-
curity. One is that U.S. interagency processes fail to integrate economic policy
into the “guiding principles” that policy makers should use to balance properly
economic and traditional security interests. Arguing that policy makers have
generally dismissed economic policy as a “lower” form of security policy, this re-
port identifies the National Economic Council as precisely the type of “institu-
tional bridge” needed to integrate economics and foreign policy. This report also
outlines significant economic problems facing the United States, notably budget
deficits, low personal savings rate, its status as the world’s largest debtor nation,
and Washington’s dependence on global markets for investing in the United
States and thereby supporting its spending habits. All these trends mask the dan-
gerous possibility that the ability of the United States to harness its economic
power in pursuit of global “goods” is in decline. In addition, highlighted by
China’s gradual ascent into the ranks of the most powerful states, the report ex-
amines how China’s growth as a potential global superpower could have signifi-
cant implications for U.S. policies. In broad terms, it argues that Washington
must carefully redefine how it uses economic power to support a broad global
agenda.
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All in all, Forging a World of Liberty under Law offers a comprehensive analysis
of how to organize American thinking in the aftermath of the Cold War. The ar-
chitects of this study are to be commended for the breadth and depth of their
systematic efforts to examine the principal problems in global politics. That
said, policy makers and scholars must consider several criticisms as they con-
template whether this study provides the intellectual foundations for a funda-
mental realignment of U.S. national security policy.
The study elevates the idea of promoting liberal democracies and organizing
them into a “concert of democracies” as the paramount objective of American
strategy. However, this emphasis on democracy, liberty, and the rule of law is a
long-standing principle in American strategy. The defeat of totalitarian regimes
in World War II, the Marshall Plan, NATO and various other alliances, and the
enduring legacy of promoting and supporting democracies are as central to
American foreign policy as any principle in the history of the republic. Thus, the
Princeton Project’s proposal that the pursuit of liberty under law establishes a
“grand strategy for making America more secure” merely reaffirms a deeply en-
shrined precept in this society’s core beliefs about foreign policy, but does not
represent a new organizing principle for U.S. strategy or a conceptual
breakthrough.
A problem with the Princeton Project’s emphasis on liberty under law and its
corollary, liberal democracy, is its decidedly imperial overtones, implying the
need to exercise imperial oversight for countries that have yet to “make the
grade” to democracy. Two prominent examples: the United States must bring
“governments up to PAR,” and Washington’s role is critical because “without
U.S. leadership and determination, the best we can hope for is a series of half
measures.” While this is not to suggest that U.S. strategy should avoid serious
commitments and responsibilities in its efforts to promote freedom and liberty,
policy makers and scholars are prudent to avoid any language or intonations
that others could interpret as evidence of an imperial design in American for-
eign policy. Such undercurrents only erode support for American policies.
The section on the role of force appears determined to strike out in new direc-
tions. However, most of its thinking is derived from classic approaches to strate-
gic analysis. Beginning with the unremarkable proposition that “liberty and law
must be backed up by force,” this study proposes that the United States “should
work to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies” in order to
“prevent a return to great power security competition.” But is it consistent,
much less prudent, as the study seems to imply, for the United States to maintain
a “high level of U.S. defense spending” while shifting decisions about military
intervention in this “cooperative rules-based order” to the judgment of such lib-
eral democracies as, say, France?
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In its analysis of the role of force, the study’s conclusion that “deterrence is out
of fashion” rests on the truisms that bipolar competition between nuclear-armed
superpowers is no longer the central organizing principle of deterrence and that
the intersection of such terrorist organizations as al-Qa‘ida and nuclear weapons
is the stuff of which international catastrophes are made. It is confusing, however,
when the study declares that deterrence is no longer fashionable and then asserts
quite reasonably that “the United States must ensure that our deterrent remains
credible.” Which principle is true? Either deterrence is out of fashion or deterrent
forces must remain credible. The study’s analysis of the conditions that ought to
govern the use of force—last resort, “overwhelming confidence in the intelligence
and in the prospects for success,” the ability to “deal adequately with the after-
math,” and “approval from the U.N. Security Council” or “broadly representative
multilateral body, such as NATO” (all transparent references to the 2003 invasion
of Iraq)—is neither innovative nor terribly illuminating.
Indeed, the discussion on military force draws so heavily from present Ameri-
can difficulties in Iraq that its conclusions on defense planning seem more like
generalities or mere clichés than serious analytical propositions. One exception,
however, is the section that discusses the “preventive and preemptive uses of
force.” This argument is thought provoking, because it means that policy makers
should understand the differences between using preventive force against ter-
rorists and using it against states.
This work is notable for the panoply of problems addressed and its proposed
range of solutions. Sometimes there is so much detail (almost at an engineering
level, in contrast with Kennan’s far simpler and more elegant style) that the
reader is easily distracted. Since the study virtually leaves no problem in contem-
porary international politics untouched, one wonders if such a broad focus
weakens the overall impact of its analysis. On the editorial level, the profusion of
clever phrases in the study, such as “bringing government up to PAR,” is unnec-
essary and distracting.
To understand to what extent Forging a World of Liberty under Law succeeds
in developing an intellectual architecture for American national security policy,
let us consider its strengths and weaknesses. There are several notable strengths.
The study tackles what virtually all scholars, strategists, and policy makers see
as the central intellectual challenge created by the current strategic vacuum.
Simply put, there is no more important problem to be addressed by the Ameri-
can national security and foreign policy communities than establishing the or-
ganizing principles of American foreign and national security policies. But
perhaps of greater analytical importance, the Princeton Project elevates one
strategic principle above all others in the conduct of foreign policy. That is, it ar-
gues, to the virtual exclusion of competing principles, that the unifying purpose
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of American policy is to promote democracy, liberty, and a shared sense of
multilateralism and cooperation. This precept correctly defines, to my mind, the
central organizing principle on which Washington ought to base its policies for
dealing with the rest of the world. The study’s emphasis on multilateralism and
cooperation is consistent with well established, if atrophied, principles in inter-
national politics. Its examination of this critical problem is, even by the stan-
dards of such studies, comprehensive and detailed. The study’s final report is
brimming with positive principles, suggestions, and policies for redefining the
core concepts in U.S. national security, reorganizing the institutions and pro-
cesses that govern statecraft, and ensuring their effective implementation.
As to weaknesses, although the project’s authors planned to write a histori-
cally transcendent and innovative study, the work often borders on a pretentious
and excessively self-conscious tone. The problem is that studies become histori-
cally significant more often by accident than by deliberate intent to write a
“monumental” document. That is, it is preferable to write the study that helps to
define American strategy than to declare one’s intention to do so. Frankly, the
argument is unconvincing, as the study states, that the world is too complex for
one individual to bring order to strategy. This is, of course, the nature of conven-
tional thinking until someone, in fact, fills the intellectual void.
One is struck, for instance, by George Kennan’s modest and elegantly written
article (only seven thousand words), which established in analytically concise
terms the basis for the Cold War policy of containment. His aim was simply to
understand and effectively counter “official Soviet conduct.” The resulting pol-
icy of containment was predicated on the “long-term, patient but firm and vigi-
lant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Implicit was the principle
that the struggle with the Soviet Union ultimately threatened the survival of the
United States. By contrast, the challenges in the current international order,
while significant, hardly put at risk the survival of the United States, unless one
concludes that al-Qa‘ida’s as yet unfulfilled desire to acquire nuclear weapons
poses an existential threat to the United States. Since Forging a World of Liberty
under Law deals with a world where challenges reside more on the managerial
than the existential side of the ledger, the problem is how best to manage Ameri-
can power and responsibilities, not steeling the nation’s resolve to contain a mil-
itary superpower bent upon our destruction.
This study’s suggested framework for American strategy, which it elevates
above other approaches in grand strategy, promotes democracy and “liberty un-
der law.” But American strategy, at least since the end of World War II and argu-
ably throughout the twentieth century, has been entirely and thoroughly
consistent with the broad historical architecture of promoting democratic val-
ues. As noted earlier, many instruments of American policy consciously and
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explicitly promoted the development of an international order based on liberty
and freedom. To cite one prominent example, the Atlantic Charter, signed by
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 14
August 1941, declared that war was the only choice if the principles of democ-
racy, freedom, and self-determination were to be defended (see the full text at
www.politicalresource.net/atlantic_charter.html).
More recently, President George W. Bush’s second inaugural address reaf-
firmed the nation’s fundamental declarative policy as one of promoting liberty
and freedom (which the study does not mention). On 20 January 2005, Bush de-
clared that since the “survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the
success of liberty in other lands . . . it is the policy of the United States to seek and
support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture.” It is permissible to debate the finer points of its implementation,
but how much more clearly could the principle of promoting liberty and free-
dom be stated?
The Princeton Project argues that “the United States lacks a clear statement of
national security principles with broad bipartisan support” for governing its be-
havior and policies. We can debate whether the United States needs new strate-
gic principles and whether partisanship weakens the nation’s foreign policy, but
it is difficult to defend the proposition that liberty and freedom constitute a new
strategy for the United States. In fact, the Bush administration’s decision to pro-
mote liberty and freedom as a declaratory policy is a counterpoint to the argu-
ment that promoting liberty is somehow novel. The study could be interpreted
to mean that the United States should rededicate its foreign policy to liberty and
freedom; analytically, however, this is a bit of a stretch.
This study relies unnecessarily on rhetorical flourishes to imply that current
U.S. policies are misguided and misdirected. Its authors can be forgiven for har-
boring this sentiment. From the occupation of Iraq, the global war on terrorism,
and general discontent with American policies globally (drawing on the analysis
presented in the working group report on anti-Americanism), one senses in
American politics a weariness among both the public and the intelligentsia. By
virtue of its discontent with the tenor and direction of American policy, the
Princeton Project manifests unhappiness with the Bush administration through
subtle yet systematic criticisms of current U.S. policies. While this tendency is
understandable, the study’s inclination to criticize current policies is discon-
certing and distracting, for two reasons. First, to establish new principles for and
a bipartisan consensus on national security a study ought to draw credibility and
unanimity entirely and singularly from its analysis of international events and its
implications for the United States, rather than criticize the current policy. The
other criticism is historical in nature. Consider the neutral, analytical tone
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adopted by Kennan, who never criticized President Truman’s policies when, in
the late 1940s, the administration and Congress had just begun to formalize the
policy of containment. How easy it would have been to cavil as evidence
mounted that Washington lacked a coherent policy for confronting the histori-
cally daunting challenges posed by Stalin’s policies and about which Churchill
had been warning Roosevelt since 1943.*
This study’s overall impact is weakened by the uneven style in the working
group reports and the lack of evident, systematic connections with the final re-
port. Those linkages are missing, opaque, or simply unclear. Those reports un-
fortunately follow their own approach and organization; their overall quality
and impact would have been immeasurably greater had they followed the same
format. For example, some contain summaries of key findings and some do not.
Some articulate major principles, some do not. This masks a more worrisome
problem, however: since the final report putatively draws substantively from the
efforts of the working groups, it is difficult to explain why disparate approaches
and styles were not discouraged.
I offer three broad principles to help scholars, policy makers, and the public
evaluate the value of Forging a World of Liberty under Law in charting new direc-
tions for American national security. One is that while this study reviews in nor-
mative terms the broad intellectual outlines of its preferred vision of American
foreign policy, it is striking and in a sense reassuring just how conventional its
thinking really is. The emphasis on promoting democratic principles is hardly
new or revolutionary, and its analysis of the principles that should guide mili-
tary intervention is similarly conventional. A notable exception is the study’s
analysis of the dangers posed by what it called “major threats and challenges,”
which merit serious consideration.
In strategic terms, the study draws essentially the same conclusions previ-
ously drawn about American foreign policy. Is it perhaps the case that despite
the current partisan divide over Iraq, American policy might after all be more on
track with this polity’s historic approach to foreign policy than we realize? While
I understand that this observation is debatable, we have an obligation to ac-
knowledge that possibility.
The project’s objective is so important in historical terms that while one can
raise serious analytic questions about its weaknesses, the broader purpose that
animated this study suggests that all observers should reflect carefully on its
R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 3 1
* John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1985), reports (p. 479) that in March 1944, “The P.M. . . . said that it was now obvious our efforts to
forge a Soviet-Polish agreement had failed and that he would soon have to make a cold announce-
ment in Parliament to this effect. It all seems to augur ill for the future of relations between this
country and the U.S.S.R.”
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arguments and conclusions. If participants in the defense and foreign policy
communities were to focus their energies on defining American strategy rather
than debating partisan differences, the tone enveloping foreign policy debates
would likely become more balanced. If this study represents an early step toward
transcending domestic differences about foreign policy, and if it helps steer
American society toward a new bipartisan consensus on grand strategy, it will
have been a significant accomplishment.
This is an important work in the field of national security. Despite several an-
alytic weaknesses, it explicitly tackles the transcendent problem of redefining
the foundations of American grand strategy. It also contributes to the ongoing
search for new organizing principles for security at a moment when various
forces threaten U.S. security. While it has by no means resolved this central prob-
lem, Forging a World of Liberty under Law is a notable accomplishment in the
continuing intellectual search for the principles that will define American strat-
egy in a world whose forces must be restrained.
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BOOK REVIEWS
AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of Military Strategy. Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2005. 504pp. $40
This first English-language volume on
strategy by China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was translated by a team of
experts at the Academy of Military Sci-
ences from the original Chinese-language
version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by
two major generals with significant
ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers
to China’s powerful Central Military
Commission (CMC) and Politburo
Standing Committee, this volume un-
doubtedly reflects elements of critical
policy trends in Beijing and hence mer-
its close examination by foreign re-
searchers and policy makers. Since this
book has deliberately been made acces-
sible to an overseas audience, it is im-
portant to reflect on what message its
English-language publication may be
intended to convey.
The 2001 Chinese-language version is
used to educate senior PLA decision
makers, including those on the CMC, as
well as officers who may become China’s
future strategic planners. Now in its
fourth printing, it can be read along
with a variety of other texts, such as the
more operationally and tactically fo-
cused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue),
published by China’s National Defense
University in 2000, the better to under-
stand actual PLA doctrine. The closest
U.S. equivalent to these volumes collec-
tively might be Doctrine for Joint Opera-
tions (Joint Publication 3-0).
Part One surveys China’s historical ex-
perience and development of military
theory. The authors describe the cur-
rent age as an “era of sea,” in which
maritime states, like their predecessors,
will employ Mahanian and other strate-
gies to “actively develop comprehensive
sea power” and “expand strategic depth
at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese per-
spectives on the laws and conduct of
war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deter-
rence,” deserves particular attention, as
it clearly provides a rationale for many
elements of the PLA’s modernization
program that have been overlooked by
many foreign analysts. Part Three ex-
amines future warfare and the implica-
tions for China, including recent PLA
experience and combat guidelines.
Throughout the volume, the continuing
relevance of the People’s War is empha-
sized as a foundation of Chinese mili-
tary strategy.
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It is this third section that will be of
greatest interest to Western scholars
seeking insights into PLA thinking
about China’s strategic situation. The
authors of this volume believe that
China, both a land and a sea power,
faces multifaceted strategic opportuni-
ties and challenges. Despite its eighteen-
thousand-kilometer coastline, China is
currently constrained by the world’s
longest island chain, centering on stra-
tegically, politically, and economically
vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from
China’s only disputed territory, how-
ever: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of
maritime territory, “one ninth of
China’s national land territory,” re-
mains under contention. The authors
also identify energy supply security as
critical to China’s national develop-
ment. Their statement that the South
China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves
equivalent to that of [the] Middle East”
conflicts with Western assessments,
however, leaving the reader wondering
about the true strategic underpinnings
of Beijing’s claims.
The authors foresee possible threats to
China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights,
and great cause of reunification,”
threats that, should all other measures
fail, may necessitate a defensive (and
therefore inherently just) war on
China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air
spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local
wars” may well require the PLA to con-
front a technologically superior adver-
sary. Accordingly, the authors suggest
emphasizing preemption; employment
of a broad spectrum of military tech-
nologies, including asymmetric “trump
card” weapons; and integration of civil-
ian and military forces in missions (e.g.,
“guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that in-
corporate political, economic, and legal
warfare. While this volume raises as
many questions as it answers, it is never-
theless a welcome contribution to a vi-
tal field in which so little authoritative
information is available.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College
Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The
PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York:
Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125
Peter Howarth, an Australian former
diplomat and intelligence analyst, pres-
ents an excellent mix of strategic the-
ory, political dynamics, and tactical
detail in considering the Chinese sub-
marine fleet. His treatment demon-
strates a keen understanding of both
parts of the phrase “politico-military
strategy,” and it is the type of thinking
that Jeffrey Record of the Air War Col-
lege recently opined is too often miss-
ing in the American community.
Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if
only because one gets to visit so many
old friends in strategic theory, such as
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett,
Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie,
Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René
Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and
Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse-
tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu.
Like so many others who write about
China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sen-
sational claims on the subject, presum-
ably thereby justifying the work and
attracting attention. However, what dis-
tinguishes Howarth from so many oth-
ers who have searched and found
reasons to be alarmed at the conven-
tional naval power of China is that he
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tempers the sensational with frank as-
sessments of China’s limitations.
At the heart of this examination of Chi-
nese submarines, practically speaking, is
the potential showdown over Taiwan.
While Howarth notes that “China, like
Germany, is handicapped by geogra-
phy,” he points out that the defense of
Taiwan is equally handicapped by
oceanography: its narrow and crowded
seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His
frankness, however, about such U.S.
problems as naval drawdown, global re-
sponsibility, vulnerability of surface
ships to missile saturation, and the dif-
ficulties of operations in narrow seas
gives one new pause.
As an example of what is best about his
work, Howarth considers not only the
tactical problems for China, Taiwan,
and the United States (including the
exact requirements for successful sub-
marine warfare against a carrier-based
navy) but also the proper political con-
text of that potential conflict—that a
politically free and economically pros-
perous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at
the heart of the legitimacy of the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Returning to
the intersection of tactics and strategic
judgment, Howarth includes in his final
chapter an economical summary of the
logic by which Chinese decision makers
might be optimistic enough about their
chances for success to initiate a conflict
with Taiwan.
One weakness in this confluence of pol-
itics, strategy, and tactical matchups is
that Howarth exaggerates the strategic
influence of the great thinkers on policy.
His demonstration of how submarine
warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches,
suggesting as it does that submarine
warfare fits perfectly with preformed
Chinese strategic preferences. The logic
of a preemptive surprise attack is part
of the Chinese strategic culture, he says,
but one does not have to cite the num-
ber of wars per year in which the Ming
dynasty engaged, for example, in order
to support the conclusion that “the
Pentagon has some justification in con-
sidering that the risk of Beijing resort-
ing to force to try to resolve the Taiwan
issue is growing with the modernization
and transformation of the PRC’s mili-
tary capabilities.”
Howarth is better off with his more ele-
gant logic that submarines are designed
for the task of concealment and sur-
prise and that surprise is a good tactic
when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern
and Western war planners have both
made use of the submarine and have
appreciated it for the qualities for which
it is designed, regardless of whether
they were Chinese or their ancient an-
cestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.
Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to
blend classic strategic thinking with
current politics and tactical complexi-
ties that is informative, intelligent, and
provocative in this book. It is recom-
mended for any library on naval affairs
or Asian conflict, and good reading for
both U.S. and Chinese war planners.
PETER J. WOOLLEY
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp.
$125
Given the importance of the Taiwan is-
sue for U.S. foreign and security policy
in East Asia, it is striking that relatively
little has been written on Taiwan’s de-
fense reform and modernization
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 3 5
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:51 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
143
War College: Summer 2007 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
programs, especially in contrast to the
substantial amount of work scholars
and policy analysts have produced in
recent years on Chinese military mod-
ernization and its implications for re-
gional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s
Security: History and Prospects, which
provides a comprehensive and well
written assessment of recent develop-
ments in Taiwan’s defense establish-
ment, represents an important step in
filling this gap.
In this work, Cole—a respected China
scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for
thirty years and is now professor of inter-
national history at the National War
College—examines the changes cur-
rently under way in Taiwan’s armed
forces and defense bureaucracy. The
main purpose of Cole’s thorough and
well researched study is to assess
changes in Taiwan’s defense posture
and their implications for the island’s
security. After presenting a brief history
of Taiwan’s military and an overview of
the Chinese military threat, Cole ex-
plains that Taiwan in recent years has
been unwilling to increase the level of
resources devoted to its own military
capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorga-
nizing its defense bureaucracy and its
military is professional and well trained,
the growing asymmetry in defense
spending between Taiwan and China is
resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
long-standing qualitative edge over the
Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues
quite persuasively that the cross-strait
military balance is tipping toward
China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security
challenge represented by the accelera-
tion of Chinese military modernization.
Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend
itself on its own and may not even be
able to hold out until the U.S. military
could intervene decisively.
Cole also includes a brief discussion of
the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwill-
ingness to do more to counter China’s
growing military capability. He argues,
first, that many officials in Taiwan be-
lieve Chinese military threats lack cred-
ibility and, second, that decision
makers in Taipei are convinced that the
United States would come to Taiwan’s
assistance even if they turn out to have
underestimated China’s willingness to
use force. According to Cole, the U.S.
decision to send two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region during the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only
convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan
would likely result in American military
intervention but also led Taipei to the
same conclusion. Given the assump-
tions that China lacks the willingness to
use force and that U.S. intervention is
virtually assured in the unlikely event of
a cross-strait conflict, many politicians
in Taiwan conclude that the island does
not really need to invest its own scarce
resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s
Security makes an important contribu-
tion to scholarship and policy analysis
by providing a readable and informative
assessment of a previously understud-
ied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan
relationship.
MICHAEL S. CHASE
Naval War College
Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The
Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
385pp. $36.95
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Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of
China commonly compare this emerging
Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose
unification upset the European great-
power concert ushered in after Waterloo,
and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts
like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations
fired by the works of Alfred Thayer
Mahan, hurled Germany into naval
competition with Great Britain, the
dominant naval power of the day, with
fateful results. References to Mahan are
now routine among Chinese strategic
thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod
Beijing onto a similar path to sea
power, and will similar results ensue?
Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus
professor at Japan’s Doshisha Univer-
sity. Asada’s masterful book From
Mahan to Pearl Harbor reminds us that
Asian maritime history also offers com-
pelling lessons on how the rise of a new
sea power, in this case imperial Japan,
can disturb a settled nautical equilib-
rium. In effect, the book is an intellec-
tual history of the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the
book traces the influence of Mahanian
theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the
decades after The Influence of Sea Power
upon History appeared in 1890.
Asada attributes the IJN’s use and mis-
use of Mahan to a combination of fac-
tors—bureaucratic rivalry between the
army and the navy, groupthink within
the naval hierarchy, and an abdication
of leadership by senior officials, to
name three. By the onset of World War
II, the navy had convinced itself that
war with the United States was fated
and that Japan could overcome Amer-
ica’s overwhelming material superiority
by cultivating a warrior ethos in the
ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disre-
garded key aspects of Mahanian theory,
in particular the material foundations
of sea power, as they contemplated
Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes an
ideal companion to David C. Evans and
Mark R. Peattie’s Kaigun, which reviews
the strategies, tactics, and technologies
deployed by the IJN between the ser-
vice’s inception in Meiji Japan and the
outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro
Sumida’s Inventing Grand Strategy and
Teaching Command, a spirited defense of
Mahan against his detractors, would
make a useful supplement and counter-
point to Asada’s analysis.
Asada’s account is not impervious to
criticism. First, linking deeds with
words and words with thoughts is no
simple matter for historians. His many
references to Japanese officers, say,
“echoing” Mahan or acting out of
“Mahanian navalism” invite critics to
quibble. The author establishes that
many Japanese mariners were reared on
Mahan, but how do we know they were
acting on Mahanian precepts on some
particular occasion if they did not say
so? Second, Mahan was prone less to
“stark racism” than to the clash-of-
civilizations rhetoric that dominated fin
de siècle Americans’ views of Asia.
Still, these are minor faults in an in-
valuable work. Will China, like imperial
Japan, succumb to Mahanian determin-
ism? How should America respond?
These are questions worth pondering,
and From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes
a good place to start.
JAMES R. HOLMES
Barrington, Rhode Island
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King, Iain, and Whit Mason. Peace at Any Price:
How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-
nell Univ. Press, 2006. 228pp. $27.95
Iraq’s undiminished insurgency has cast
an unmistakable pall over the U.S. mili-
tary’s nation-building mission, which
until recently seemed a core compe-
tency for the Department of Defense.
Both advocates and critics of America’s
efforts to bring peace, order, and good
government to Baghdad agree that the
aftermath of the Balkan wars of the
1990s offers examples of what was not
done in the wake of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM’S epic Phase III success in
spring 2003. The idea that extended
U.S. military operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo have resulted in long-term po-
litical successes built on well executed
nation-building is accepted almost
without question. But is it so?
Peace at Any Price poses that difficult
question and provides a richly disturb-
ing series of answers that should be of
interest to anyone concerned with the
ability of Western governments and or-
ganizations to bring stability to failed
states, even with overwhelming military
force at their disposal. The authors,
both veterans of UN nation-building in
Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom
in their survey of Kosovo after more
than five years of NATO protection and
UN largesse.
What King and Mason find in that trou-
bled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan
statelet (which is legally part of Serbia
but under international occupation, now
inching painfully toward independence)
is a witches’ brew of nationalism, cor-
ruption, and criminality that bodes ill
for the future of Kosovo and surround-
ing states. The authors begin with a close
look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting
that swept through Kosovo, resulting in
hundreds of civilian casualties and large-
scale destruction of property and, above
all, shattering any hope of reconciliation
between Kosovo’s Albanian majority
and dwindling Serb minority. Five years
after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE
to save the Albanians from the Serbs,
NATO troops had to defend the Serbs
from the Albanians, and not always with
much ardor or success.
King and Mason’s account is balanced
and just, sparing no group, least of all
the UN, the European Union, or NATO,
from fair criticism as to how Kosovo
has been governed since mid-1999. This
is not a history text—it leaves out all
but a limited, necessary understanding
of how Kosovo became so troubled by
the end of the 1990s—but rather a de-
tailed telling of how ineffective Western
political and military institutions have
been at transforming Kosovo into any-
thing resembling a law-abiding or self-
sustaining society. The authors spend
considerable time detailing the depths
of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to
the petty, that continue to cripple daily
life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare
Western nongovernmental organizations
from critiques of their naïveté and ineffec-
tiveness in dealing with mutual Albanian-
Serb fear and loathing.
Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful
guide on how the international com-
munity can do better the next time it is
confronted with a Kosovo. King and
Mason’s counsel is wise and well taken,
ranging from how to improve war ter-
mination to ensure a lasting peace, to
how security and the rule of law must
be established before democracy can
take root, and above all to how “bad
habits, “ including local “traditions” of
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banditry, criminality, and interethnic
violence must be altered, by force if
necessary, if Western governments and
organizations expect to make failed,
war-torn states into bona fide members
of the international community.
One only wishes that this little gem of a
book had been published earlier.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Loveman, Brian, ed. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Secu-
rity Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp.
$27.95
It does not take exceptional analytical
talent to recognize that U.S. policies in
the Andean region of South America
face severe challenges, especially those
dealing with the war on drugs. Neither
does it take an exceptional historian to
recognize that the United States has all
too often paid insufficient attention to
its regional neighbors and partners.
Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery
of international relations to recognize
that South America is becoming in-
creasingly important to the safety, well-
being, and future prosperity of the
United States. For all these reasons, a
clear explanation of U.S. policies in the
region and evaluation of those policies’
track records and potential future con-
sequences are especially welcome.
To a degree, and despite a somewhat
incendiary title, Addicted to Failure pro-
vides a portion of the needed under-
standing. Its editor asked a rather
impressively credentialed group of ana-
lysts to examine each of the countries in
the Andean region and the role that
U.S. policy has had in shaping those
states’ political futures. These analyses
follow Brian Loveman’s own overview
of U.S. policies in the entire region. A
chapter devoted to the European Union’s
efforts follows a state-by-state review,
and the book concludes with an exami-
nation of a possible preemptive U.S.
intervention in Colombia on the scale
of operations currently being con-
ducted in Iraq.
However, this volume is not a resound-
ing success. Loveman’s introductory
chapter is a case in point. His basic ar-
gument seems to be that U.S. policy,
whether crafted by Republican or Dem-
ocratic presidents, formed during or after
the Cold War, altruistic or operational
in nature, intentional or accidental, has
been consistently wrong. U.S. policy,
Loveman argues, has for decades made
matters worse for Andean states. There
are two problems here. First, Loveman’s
disdain for past and present U.S. actions
actually begins to obstruct and detract
from his central argument. Readers ex-
pecting to find a more academic and
objective analysis may question the ob-
jectivity of the author at the expense of
the merit of his argument. The second
problem is even more serious. Loveman
seeks to prove his contention with offi-
cial U.S. reports and documents, but
the quotations are highly selective and
all too often presented without context.
Indeed, had an equally passionate voice
argued the distaff side of Loveman’s ar-
gument, this would have been a most
interesting volume.
Luckily, the next six chapters are differ-
ent. Authored by well known and re-
spected scholars, they draw a compelling
picture of U.S. policy in the Andean re-
gion. Although all are worthy, Orlando
Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan
policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis
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of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high
points of the book. Obando does an es-
pecially fine job reviewing the successes
and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug
policies.
Addicted to Failure effectively raises sev-
eral significant issues for the reader to
mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug
policy been a costly failure that has made
the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo
Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier?
Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion-
arias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats
to the United States beyond those asso-
ciated with drug trafficking? If the cur-
rent policies are counterproductive,
what are the correct policies? Loveman
does not provide convincing answers to
the first two questions and does not ad-
dress the third.
At the end of the day, Addicted to Fail-
ure is a book that should not be disre-
garded. It encourages readers to plunge
deeper into the complexities of South
America. For while Loveman and his
authors may not offer any answers, it is
clear that the United States will face in-
creasingly complex challenges from this
part of the world in the years ahead.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Taylor, Lewis. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in
Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997. Liverpool,
U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. $32.50
In Shining Path Lewis Taylor provides
compelling evidence that the attitude of
the people can be decisive in war. That
point will not surprise students of war-
fare; they will recall that two great strat-
egists stressed the central importance of
having the people on your side. Focusing
primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl
von Clausewitz coined the notion that
war’s dominant tendencies make a
“paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole
comprises primordial violence, hatred,
and enmity, a blind natural force. The
passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to
be kindled in war must already be in-
herent in the people.” Concentrating on
guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung fa-
mously wrote that “in the relationship
that should exist between the people
and the troops, the former may be lik-
ened to water and the latter to the fish
that inhabit it.”
In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to
understand and respect the rural popu-
lation on the parts of the guerrillas (the
Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”)
led by Abimael Guzmán and of the gov-
ernment of Peru came close to dooming
the efforts of both sides in the bloody
conflict. After the end of hostilities, a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
concluded that more than sixty-nine
thousand Peruvians had been killed in
the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the
Shining Path responsible for the major-
ity of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao
made clear that the end of warfare was
not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor
shows how close the combatants came,
through their own excesses, to defeating
their own causes.
Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin
American sociology at the University of
Liverpool, does not adequately high-
light the strategic implications of his
subject. In fact, reading his book leaves
unanswered the questions of why he
wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses
his study narrowly on the northern
highlands of Peru, which were a partic-
ularly brutal locus of armed action. Al-
though he acknowledges that generalized
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violence occurred in 1992 in twenty-
one of Peru’s twenty-four departments,
he ignores other important areas of the
conflict. He also writes as though the
war in Peru proceeded without an inter-
national context, except for the intellec-
tual contribution of Mao Tse-tung.
True, the Cold War had ended by the
time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán,
but many observers think the agents
could not have succeeded without the
help of outside intelligence. In addition,
U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs
not only disrupted a source of support
to the Shining Path but also relieved
economic pressure on the government
of Peru when it was sorely stressed by
the conflict.
The Peruvian war provides insights for
the future of revolutionary movements
in Latin America—in countries with
elected governments and when no sup-
port will be available from a Cuba or a
Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold
War. Fortunately, any reader interested
in those issues, as well as in a systematic
treatment of the strategic lessons of two
decades of conflict in Peru, can find an
excellent source in Cynthia McClintock’s
1998 Revolutionary Movements in Latin
America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s
Shining Path, published by the United
States Institute of Peace Press.
PAUL D. TAYLOR
Naval War College
Matheson, Michael J. Council Unbound: The
Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and
Postconflict Issues after the Cold War. Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.
422pp. $19.95
When a longtime Department of State
attorney and former member of the
prestigious International Law Commis-
sion takes the time to recount his con-
siderable firsthand observations of the
performance of the United Nations,
Naval War College Review readers do
well to take notice. At a time when a
new U.S. geographic command is being
stood up in Africa and military forces
find their planning and operations cen-
ters increasingly visited by coalition,
interagency, international, and non-
governmental organizational represen-
tatives, it is indispensable to have a
clear understanding of the evolving role
of the UN Security Council and its
technical commissions and tribunal in-
vestigators. Matheson provides us with
an insightful description, one that
nicely serves that purpose.
The book is arranged in seven chapters
and five appendixes. The first chapter
provides a straightforward description
of the UN Charter provisions that serve
as the framework for action by the Se-
curity Council. It is complemented by
chapter 2, which describes the council’s
jurisdiction and mandate as the institu-
tion charged with the “primary respon-
sibility for maintenance of international
peace and security.” The next three
chapters provide general descriptions of
the three principal modalities of Secu-
rity Council actions: sanctions, peace-
keeping and governance, and use of
force. The growing importance of UN
technical commissions is then described,
followed by an examination of the UN
role in prosecuting international
crimes. The book is well indexed and
includes summaries of some of the key
council resolutions and a bibliography
that will prove useful to those seeking
more detailed coverage.
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Matheson documents most of the re-
curring concerns in sanctions (prob-
lems with enforcement, collateral
consequences, and possible legal limits
on sanctions), peacekeeping operations
(tensions produced by the principles of
consent and impartiality applicable to
Chapter VI peacekeeping operations),
and the use of force. Also provided is a
most welcome description of the vari-
ous UN technical commissions and of
the criminal tribunals established by the
Security Council to address crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia
and in Rwanda. His descriptions are
concise, accurate, and well documented.
This book admirably serves its descrip-
tive role and supports the author’s the-
sis regarding the council’s post–Cold
War renaissance. In the end, however,
one comes away feeling that the UN has
been largely spared critical scrutiny in
this book, that the writer, though emi-
nently well qualified to take us through
a more focused and prescriptive treat-
ment of this vital international institu-
tion, stopped short. Now that Matheson
has piqued our interest, perhaps he will
provide us with those additional in-
sights in a sequel—one that draws out
the lessons to be learned from the “re-
nascent” Security Council’s response to
the acknowledged threats to interna-
tional peace and security posed by Iran’s
nuclear programs and the genocide in
Darfur.
CRAIG H. ALLEN
Naval War College
Reveron, Derek S., ed. America’s Viceroys: The
Military and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 214pp. $75
In 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana
Priest wrote a series of articles on the
rising importance of the regional com-
batant commanders, comparing them
to modern-day “proconsuls” whose
Roman forebears served as regional
governors and commanders in chief of
their military forces. Reveron’s Amer-
ica’s Viceroys examines this comparison,
providing a historical and contempo-
rary analysis of contemporary regional
combatant commanders and their ris-
ing influence in the foreign policy–
making arena. (While the implications
of this rising trend are left to the reader,
nowhere does the book imply that our
combatant commanders are present-
day Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon
and seize Rome.) The last chapter of
Reveron’s book expertly examines their
rising power and influence on tradi-
tional civil-military relations. In short,
he finds, administrations use the mili-
tary in non-warfighting ways, because
of its size, capabilities, and “can-do”
culture.
It is somewhat ironic that it was the
military services and the Pentagon that
fought hardest to prevent the ascen-
dancy of the regional combatant com-
manders. Four decades of legislative
changes to the Department of Defense
and military mistakes from World War
II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols De-
fense Reorganization Act of 1986. This
act finally gave unity of command to
the combatant commanders and re-
duced the service chiefs to the second-
ary role of training and equipping their
forces. In hindsight, however, it was the
Department of State, not the service
chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of
influence with this change.
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The regional combatant commanders
today are considered by many within the
U.S. government to be policy entrepre-
neurs. Each commands a large staff,
oversees a huge budget, and travels fre-
quently within his region to promote
U.S. interests. In fact, our national secu-
rity strategy now directs regional com-
batant commanders to engage with
regional allies and promote theater secu-
rity cooperation. A regional viewpoint
and focus, instead of the country-specific
view represented by U.S. ambassadors,
makes combatant commanders ideally
suited to promote and implement secu-
rity agreements with heads of state.
Their enormous resources and regional
access dwarf the capabilities of the State
Department, whose process of policy
formulation still resides in Washington,
D.C. In contrast, regional commanders
are out on the ramparts daily, just like
the proconsuls or British viceroys in the
days of empire.
In this aspect, readers will find much of
value in the book. As Reveron points
out, there is a paucity of scholarly re-
search on the subject of foreign policy
making by regional combatant com-
manders and their subsequent en-
croachment into traditional fields of
international relations. Anthony Zinni,
a retired Marine Corps general and for-
mer commander of U.S. Central Com-
mand, describes the book in these
terms: “Derek Reveron has put together
an excellent work describing the con-
troversial role of our nation’s combat-
ant commanders. It is an insightful,
accurate, and provocative presentation
of the issues and history done by
first-rate contributors who clearly know
the subject.” The book is well suited for
midcareer officers and students of
international relations who are about to
enter the field of national security policy
making. While the cost of the hardcover
edition will certainly deter all but the
most avid readers of foreign policy, the
paperback is now available for $26.95.
DONALD K. HANSEN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Gillespie, Paul G. Weapons of Choice: The Devel-
opment of Precision Guided Munitions. Tusca-
loosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 2006. 232pp. $35
At least since medieval expert Lynn
White’s controversial argument that the
stirrup was responsible for the demise
of feudalism, historians have high-
lighted the seminal role of technology
in social change. Paul Gillespie’s com-
pelling, compact history of precision
guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to
raise such an acrimonious debate, but
he has provided a valuable contribution
to the study of technology and society
and, more specifically, to the rapidly
growing body of literature concerning
the “revolution in military affairs.”
The great advantage of Gillespie’s book
is its focus on a single, obviously signif-
icant military technology and on that
technology’s effect on national security
policy. The book traces the history of
PGMs from World War I; the grainy
picture of a destroyed bridge on the
dust cover turns out to be, somewhat
surprisingly, not the “Vietnam poster
child” for PGMs (the notorious Tranh
Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by
an early guided bomb in Burma during
World War II. Some readers may find a
few of Gillespie’s claims a bit too “Air
Force laudatory,” but one should expect
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at least a bit of airpower advocacy from
a professor of history who teaches at the
Air Force Academy. Gillespie’s account
is on the whole balanced and well docu-
mented, and his frank discussion of
some of the less-than-favorable impacts
of PGMs on national security policy
makes it clear he is not a complete
airpower zealot.
Nearly as valuable as the technology-
policy linkage is the detailed and inti-
mate look at the technology innovation
process itself. Perhaps the best chapter
is the author’s account of the mid-1960s
development of the Paveway laser-
guided bomb. Gillespie makes it clear
that this was not the work of an “indi-
vidual inventive genius” but rather the
product of a host of factors ranging
from changes in national policy (i.e.,
“flexible response”), newly available
supporting technologies (the laser and
integrated circuit), an innovative engi-
neering team from a minor defense
contractor (Texas Instruments), and a
persistent and bureaucratically adept
Air Force colonel.
The biggest disappointment with this
work is that despite its October 2006 re-
lease date, the most recent conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq are treated almost
as afterthoughts. There are PGM suc-
cesses that could be amplified from
these conflicts (e.g., the evolution of
“urban close air support” and even the
demise of the terrorist al-Zarqawi), and
a fuller treatment would reinforce
Gillespie’s central contribution.
Weapons of Choice makes a good case
that PGMs have indeed altered the
American approach to war as “policy-
makers have seized upon precision
guided munitions as the key to more
humane war.” Gillespie makes clear this
is not a wholly positive development,
because “an anemic, casualty-averse
policy is unlikely to deter or defeat the
determined, resourceful foe,” and per-
haps more importantly, because “win-
ning and maintaining the peace” has
proven much more difficult than de-
stroying targets. While he could have
made his argument even stronger, Paul
Gillespie makes clear (with apologies to
Abraham Maslow) that the mere pres-
ence of an elegant hammer could cause
policy makers to overlook all but the
nails. Iraq and Afghanistan may further
reinforce Paul Gillespie’s assertion that
“technology best serves those who
thoughtfully implement it.”
DAVID BUCKWALTER
Naval War College
Burrows, William E. The Survival Imperative:
Using Space to Protect the Earth. New York: Forge
Books, 2006. 306pp. $24.95
Nowadays we take for granted that
space assets are necessary for military
operations, but the nonmilitary use of
space has also passed into the realm of
the necessary. While the use of space as-
sets, and thus access to space, is of vital
importance to the nation, there is no
watershed work that unites the politi-
cal, economic, industrial, and military
aspects into a single vision. Space pol-
icy, in other words, is still waiting for
its Mahan.
If he is not quite Mahan, veteran space
writer William E. Burrows lays a very
good foundation for what could evolve
into a national (or even international)
policy—planetary protection. The au-
thor unites two major themes under this
concept: protecting the earth from aster-
oid or comet strikes and monitoring the
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global environment to ward off an eco-
logical disaster.
Burrows provides an excellent summary
of asteroid strikes, from the dinosaur
killer to the 1908 Tunguska impact. But
is he overstating the threat? Imagine
Katrina on a global scale, or a nuclear
power mistaking an asteroid for a nu-
clear attack and retaliating. A large
enough strike could devastate the planet,
and, without warning, we could do
nothing to prevent it.
Burrows, who also wrote Deep Black
(1988), argues that overhead reconnais-
sance systems represent the perfect tool
for monitoring the global environment.
He asserts that these types of assets can
provide early warning of ecological dev-
astation (such as deforestation and
overfishing), enabling more effective
protection of the environment.
Burrows makes a number of recom-
mendations. He argues for expanded
and continued support for ongoing ef-
forts to monitor “near earth objects”
and supports a U.S. interagency effort
for monitoring the global environment.
In the long term, he believes, establish-
ing a human presence in space will be
necessary. Unlike other visionaries
(such as Gerard K. O’Neill and G.
Harry Stine), Burrows declares that
permanent human presence in space
will follow an economic need, rather
than the other way round. His wedge
into space is building a data warehouse
on the moon to preserve humanity’s
cultural and technological heritage. On
the moon its contents would be accessi-
ble to anyone on earth who could rig a
relatively simple communications site.
The author also provides a superb polit-
ical and social history of the space pro-
gram, up to the present, and provides
critical insights on the political drivers
for the space program.
Is Burrows’s premise farfetched? The 5
December 2006 edition of the Washing-
ton Times quoted the December issue of
Popular Mechanics that on Friday, 13
April 2029, a twenty-five-million-ton
asteroid will pass the earth less than
twenty-one thousand miles away. At
least, scientists claimed there was a 99.7
percent chance the asteroid will miss.
JOHN R. ARPIN
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Va.
Klein, John J. Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles
and Policy. Space Power and Politics Series. New
York: Routledge, 2006. 196pp. $110
We are a nation inextricably linked to
space. Every instrument of our national
power—diplomatic, information, mili-
tary, economic—relies to some degree
on access to and unimpeded use of
space. Space Warfare: Strategy, Princi-
ples and Policy uses this fact to illustrate
its author’s point that despite an in-
creasing reliance on space capabilities,
the United States has yet to develop a
comprehensive space-power theory.
Klein has written extensively on space-
power theory, and this book builds
upon many of his previous works, ad-
dressing the need for a national space
strategy that adequately links space op-
erations with national interests.
Throughout Space Warfare Klein as-
tutely draws numerous parallels with
space as a medium of national power
similar to those of air, land, and the sea
as viewed and utilized by independent
states. As space capabilities increase in
importance in relation to national
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power and security around the world,
Klein reasons, space will become an
arena where states will protect their
space assets in the same manner that
they protect their sovereign airspace,
land, and territorial seas. To this end,
he draws upon the historical context of
Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy
theory as a basis on which to build a
comprehensive space strategy. Previous
attempts at space strategies have hinged
upon using air or naval strategies, or a
combination of the two. Klein argues
that simply using air or naval strategies
is too restrictive and does not ade-
quately capture the uniqueness of space
operations. Air and naval strategies in
his view are too militarily focused, spe-
cifically on offensive weapons, or lack
the proper linkage to the instruments of
national power. For these reasons he
turns to Corbett’s maritime theory,
which describes the relationship be-
tween land and sea as vital and also
serves well as a model for development
of space strategy.
This unique approach may be criticized
by some. However, these same critics
would do well to understand Klein’s use
of Corbett not as the be-all and end-all
approach to space strategy but rather as
a framework upon which to build. In
fact, Klein himself admits that his ap-
proach to a space strategy largely agrees
with current joint doctrine, the Space
Commission Report, and other publica-
tions. However, his treatment highlights
some areas deserving more debate, such
as a better understanding of the defense
of high-value positions in space and ac-
cess to what he calls “celestial lines of
communication,” a phrase adapted
from classic Corbett.
Klein’s Corbett-based space strategy is
presented in a fairly easy-to-read way,
although some of his basic premises
are quite repetitive. Additionally, a
few of his recommendations may be
viewed as incredibly challenging, if not
impossible, from technological and fis-
cal perspectives.
This is a must-read for military and
nonmilitary strategic thinkers with in-
terests or stakes in space operations.
While it is sure to raise some eyebrows,
particularly in the air and space com-
munities, this book does what it is sup-
posed to do: raise the level of debate on
the formulation of a sound space strat-
egy. This is a critically important subject,
one that if not properly implemented
and understood could have disastrous
consequences on our national interests.
DANA E. STRUCKMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Naval War College
Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda
and the Road to 9/11. New York: Knopf, 2006.
480pp. $27.95
Lawrence Wright has provided the mili-
tary professional an excellent primer
into the world of those who see the
United States as a threat. The Arab
world remains little understood by
most Americans. It takes Wright nearly
five hundred pages to lay out the com-
plex tale of modern Islamic fundamen-
talism. It is no surprise that Osama Bin
Laden is a key player, and Wright gives
him center stage. Bin Laden is the son
of a wealthy Yemeni who through grit
and hard work earned the favor of the
ruling family in Saudi Arabia for bold-
ness in civil engineering projects that
helped Saudi Arabia advance into the
twentieth century.
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The 1980s saw the first true conflict be-
tween Islamic fundamentalists and a
major power, the ten-year war waged
by the mujahideen in Afghanistan after
the Soviet invasion. The Soviet Union
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989,
having suffered an unexpected drub-
bing. Emboldened by their victory
against one superpower, many muja-
hideen, under the spiritual leadership of
Osama Bin Laden (who spent some time
in Afghanistan during the war), turned
to fighting the new threat to Islam posed
by the United States. The organization
formed from disparate jihadist groups in
Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan to meet this
task was one whose name would become
synonymous with the most violent form
of anti-American Islamic fundamental-
ism—al-Qa‘ida (the Base). Ironically, it
was the United States that, through the
CIA, had largely financed and equipped
the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet
forces in Afghanistan.
The Looming Tower is truly a book for
our time. The New York Times agrees; it
selected it as one of the ten best books
of 2006. Drawing upon expertise gained
from living and teaching in the Middle
East, Wright has written a succinct and
engaging work on the history, religion,
and temperament of a people who re-
main at best enigmatic to most Ameri-
cans. More importantly, Wright’s
narrative characterizes the path to Sep-
tember 11th as a lengthy and convoluted
one, a journey that started long ago. The
attacks on that day were the next step in
an irrevocable conflict between elements
of radical Islam and the country they saw
as a threat to their existence.
The lessons of The Looming Tower are
many. The United States can succeed in
its fight against the radicals of Islam
only if it is completely united, with all
internal barriers swept aside. Much has
been done in the years since that clear,
blue Tuesday morning in September to
reconcile that environment. The other
take-away is that Bin Laden and his ilk
are more complex than their rhetoric
would have us believe. His followers,
however, see him as a devout Muslim,
pure in thought and strident in deed,
out to defend his faith from foreign in-
fluences bent on its destruction. So as
long as the United States remains en-
gaged in that vital region, his likes will
remain ever present and ever the threat.
DAVID L. TESKA
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
Key, Joshua, and Lawrence Hill. The Deserter’s
Tale: The Story of an Ordinary Soldier Who
Walked Away from the War in Iraq. New York: At-
lantic Monthly, 2007. 237pp. $23
Joshua Key is a young married man
with four children who joined the U.S.
Army to escape the grinding poverty of
his life in Guthrie, Oklahoma. In 2003,
he was deployed to Iraq with the 43rd
Combat Engineer Company. At the end
of seven months, Key had become so
disillusioned with the Army and the Iraq
war that he deserted while on leave in
the United States. He ultimately made
his way to Canada to ask for asylum.
Lawrence Hill, a Canadian writer and
journalist, put Key’s story into coherent
form.
Although the book is well written, it is
actually hard to read, because of the
U.S. Army’s allegations of Key’s disloy-
alty, dishonesty, disrespect, selfishness,
dishonor, lack of integrity, and coward-
ice, particularly during his first deploy-
ment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry
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Regiment to Iraq. Also, like others who
have served for many years in the mili-
tary, I find it tough to read about the
wrong-headed thinking and excuses of
a deserter.
Yet this is a book that we must read, if
for no other reason than not to allow
Private Key’s allegations to go unan-
swered. Consider, for example, that this
book sells in Costco’s and is listed as
one of its best sellers.
Is Joshua Key a weak man who was
pressured by his wife to desert, exagger-
ating or lying outright about his experi-
ence in Iraq to justify his desertion and
gain sympathy from the Canadian au-
thorities? Or is Private Key a naive,
trusting, moral man who could no lon-
ger stomach participation in a constant
series of immoral, unethical, and some-
times illegal acts in Iraq? These are the
questions that many may ask them-
selves when reading this book. Further,
as a result of this work these trouble-
some allegations now reside in the pub-
lic domain. The Army should determine
the truth. The outcome will determine
if the allegations are to be refuted or if
serious soul-searching and significant
changes in Army culture, training, and
leadership must be pursued.
The Deserter’s Tale does a credible job
explaining Joshua Key’s action, and it
provides some serious food for thought
about how the United States has been
selecting, training, and leading its sol-
diers. However, unfortunately, the book
fails to provide a good reason for Pri-
vate Key’s act of desertion.
THOMAS MOORE
Monterey, California
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY
To commemorate the U.S. Air Force’s sixtieth anniversary, the Air University has
announced the inauguration of Strategic Studies Quarterly, a peer-reviewed forum
for ideas on strategy, international security, defense policy, and the contributions of
air, space, and cyberspace power. Prospective authors are invited to submit five-to-
fifteen-thousand-word articles for consideration, in MS Word–compatible format,
to strategicstudiesquarterly@maxwell.af.mil or via mail (please include disk) to
Managing Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-6427.
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARITIME HISTORY
John B. Hattendorf, the College’s first Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime His-
tory and chairman of the Maritime History Department, is editor in chief of The
Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, which appeared in April 2007. It is the
first scholarly reference encyclopedia for the global field of maritime history to
be published in English. The four-volume, 2,800-page set weighs eighteen
pounds; it includes 942 articles by more than 850 authors from fifty countries.
Professor Hattendorf contributed fifteen articles, on topics ranging from “Fic-
tion: Naval Novel” to “A. T. Mahan,” “Charles Stockton,” “Gibraltar,” and “As-
tronomers and Cosmographers.”
As the Oxford University Press describes it, this is an encyclopedia of mari-
time history that in scope and depth rivals the expansiveness of the sea itself.
Placing maritime affairs in their larger historical context, the Encyclopedia
shows how seafaring has reflected and influenced major economic, cultural,
military, and political developments in world history. The Encyclopedia offers a
uniquely integrated approach, emphasizing the connections between maritime
history and many other fields. In this single reference work lies a wealth of infor-
mation that would otherwise require an extensive library. Its A–Z organization,
clear writing, plentiful illustrations, cross-references, bibliographies, synoptic
outline, and topical index make The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History an
inviting, easy-to-use reference for researchers and enthusiasts alike.
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